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Abstract 
The thesis explores the psychological antecedents of Islamophobic prejudice in the 
UK, through the lens of the Identity-Representations Model (IRM). The IRM attempts 
to combine the insights of Social Identity Theory, Intergroup Threat Theory, Identity 
Process Theory, Essentialism, and above all else, Terror Management Theory, in 
attempt to provide a stronger understanding of Islamophobic prejudice. 
 Seven studies were conducted in the thesis. The first two studies found that 
realistic and symbolic threats are related to a range of identity motives threats (esteem, 
efficacy, distinctiveness, belonging, continuity, and meaning). In addition, national 
identification, and ingroup/outgroup essentialism were identified as antecedents of 
threat perception. 
 Studies 3 and 4 explored whether these identity motives function to manage 
existential anxiety. Two experiments supported this assertion as reminders of death 
increased the need to write about oneself in a way that affirms these motives, whilst 
threats to these motives increase death-thought accessibility (DTA). 
 Study 5 then demonstrated that national essentialism and identification were 
related to levels of DTA after exposure to worldview threat. In addition, the findings 
suggested that DTA moderated the relationship of national essentialism and 
identification to levels of ingroup bias after worldview threat.  
 The final two studies considered how to reduce prejudice towards Muslims, 
and improve intergroup relations. The findings demonstrated that promoting tolerance 
as an ingroup norm could reduce opposition to Muslim rights, but this depended on 
the type of death reminder used. When reminded of terrorism, promoting tolerance 
instead increased opposition to Muslim rights. 
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 The present thesis marks a novel contribution into how various socio-
psychological perspectives could be deployed to explain Islamophobic prejudice in 
the UK. The discussion considers some future avenues for research, including the 
possibility of individual differences in motive importance, as well as some potential 
issues with an approach such as the IRM.  
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The question of why humans struggle to peacefully co-exist with those that are 
different from them is one that has captured the attention of scholars for centuries. 
History is abundant with examples of human oppression, discrimination and hostility 
towards so-called inferiors, as well as genocidal atrocities (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & 
Greenberg, 2003). Yet despite considerable effort and common interest amongst 
scholars to understand this question, prejudice is still an ongoing societal problem. 
Even today, millions of individuals worldwide face subjugation, discrimination and 
hostility based on their inter alia ethnic, religious, racial, sexual or class background. 
Whilst efforts have been made to reduce prejudice, perhaps most notably through 
increasing intergroup contact (see Pettigrew, 1998), discrimination unfortunately still 
exists with progress being slow, and in some cases on the rise (European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017; U.S. Department of Justice, 2015). 
Perhaps one of the most prevalent prejudices in modern times, particularly in 
the West, is that of prejudice towards Muslims or so-called Islamophobia. Islam is the 
world’s second largest religion with approximately 1.6 billion Muslims (Pew, 2010). 
Recent estimates have suggested that there are almost 47 million Muslims living in 
the West, and in Britain, Muslims constitute a visible minority with approximately 
2.78 million of the UK population identifying as Muslim (Office of National Statistics, 
2011; Pew, 2010). It is also the fastest growing minority group in Britain, with 
expectations that by 2050 the Muslim population in the UK will more than double to 
11.3% (Pew, 2010). 
The term Islamophobia remains highly controversial in academic circles, in 
part due to a lack of agreement over its precise meaning. For example, some scholars 
have defined it almost exclusively as a fear of Islam and Muslims (e.g., Abbas, 2004; 
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Lee, Gibbons, Thompson, & Timani, 2009); whilst others have suggested that it refers 
to hostility towards Islam, but not necessarily Muslims (Zúquete, 2008). Whilst a lack 
of a consistent definition causes problems for the studying of Islamophobic prejudice 
in the social sciences, the current thesis defines Islamophobia as an umbrella term for 
“indiscriminate negative attitudes and emotions towards Islam or Muslims” (Bleich, 
2011, p.1585). 
Islamophobia in the West 
Current attitudinal trends of Islamophobia across the West paint a bleak picture for 
Islamic-West relations. Muslims are typically stereotyped as being unfriendly, 
fanatical, violent and threatening (Abrams & Houston, 2006; Field, 2007; Pew, 2011), 
and viewed as unwilling to integrate with Western society (Pew 2016). These negative 
perceptions of Muslims are reflected in recent attitudinal surveys across Western 
countries. For example, in a recent US survey, the average American held negative 
attitudes towards Muslims, and only 25% of respondents held warm feelings towards 
Muslims (Pew, 2017). Similar patterns are evidenced across Europe, with Muslims 
generally being viewed negatively, and Britain being no exception (Pew, 2016, 
Strabac, Aalberg, & Valenta, 2014). According to recent estimates, over 1 in 4 British 
individuals have a negative view of Muslims, and attitudes towards Muslims have 
been on the decline since the 2015 Parisian Bataclan attack that took the lives of 130 
civilians (Pew, 2016). 
Indeed, concern over the rise in Islamic-related terrorism has been an 
undeniable factor in the increased anti-Islamic sentiment across the West. For 
example, research conducted after 9/11 indicates that there was an increase in anti-
Muslim attitudes in both Europe and the US (Sheridan, 2006; Sheridan & Gillet, 
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2005), with Muslims also reporting experiencing increased discrimination (Islamic 
Human Rights Commission, 2004). Similar spikes in Islamophobic sentiment have 
also been identified with other terrorist atrocities, such as after the Charlie Hebdo 
attacks (Lieptye & McAloney-Kocaman, 2015). Given the relationship between 
terrorism and attitudes towards Muslims, it is perhaps concerning that over one third 
of UK mainstream press articles concerning Muslims contain themes of terrorism 
(Moore, Mason & Lewis, 2008). Moreover, numerous sociological analyses of UK 
media reporting have emphasised that Muslims are noticeable in the media for themes 
of terrorism, threat and deviance (e.g., Richardson, 2004; Moore et al., 2008; Saeed, 
2007; Poole, 2002, 2011; see also Ahmed & Matthes, 2017 for a recent meta-analysis 
of Western media representations of Muslims). This emphasis of Islamic-related 
terrorism in media reporting may increase the perception of Muslims as violent, 
threatening and in conflict with dominant British values. 
Indeed, British public opinion appears to echo these media sentiments 
regarding Muslims. In the UK, opinion is generally divided about whether growing 
diversity is a good for British society, particularly because of ongoing concerns over 
terrorism and extremism (Pew, 2011; 2016). Whilst fortunately, the majority of British 
citizens do not think most Muslims support extremist groups such as ISIS, at the same 
time, only a minority of the British public believe “very few” British-Muslims support 
ISIS (Pew, 2016). This fear of Islamic-related terrorism has led to concerns over 
immigration, especially amongst those who hold unfavourable opinions of Muslims, 
as there is a belief that increases in refugees will increase the possibility of future 
terrorist events (Pew 2016). 
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Of course, whilst it is largely undeniable that recent terrorist events have 
affected attitudes towards Muslims across the West, Islamophobia is a new term for 
an old notion, with the West and Islamic cultural divides stemming back decades 
(Ansari, 2004; Said, 1978). In Britain, much of this anti-Islamic sentiment may have 
originated from the large-scale immigration at the end of the Second World War; but 
at the time this was generally subsumed within a broader anti-Asian attitude, with the 
‘Muslim identity’ of secondary importance (Field, 2007; Poynting & Mason, 2007). 
 In contrast, scholars have argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 
1980s coincided with the emergence of Muslims as the new global figure of threat or 
‘evil other’ (Poynting & Mason, 2007). This was compounded by the Satanic Verses 
affair in 1989 that caused international controversy, as well as high-profile media 
attention on Islam and Muslims (Runnymede Trust, 1997; Field, 2007). Furthermore, 
the 1991 Gulf War placed Britain in an allied coalition in direct conflict with a Muslim 
country (Lewis, 1994). These events are believed to have divided Islam and the West 
in terms of their perceived compatibility, a so-called “clash of civilisations” (Abbas, 
2007; Huntington, 1993). 
Indeed, the perceived erosion of national identity appears to be a central issue 
in the role of Islamophobia. In the UK, an overwhelming majority of the British public 
believe language, customs, and traditions to be an important feature of national 
identity (Pew, 2016). Moreover, over 1 in 2 British individuals believe birthplace is 
important to one’s national identity, and over 1 in 3 believe the Christian roots of 
national identity are important (Pew, 2016). These conceptions of national identity, 
juxtaposed with perceptions of Muslims as having very different customs and 
traditions, place Muslims in a position where they are in direct conflict to one’s 
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national identity (e.g., Alba, 2005; Cinnirella, 2012; Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Poppe, 
2011). 
 The rise of Islamic terrorism and extremism has further compounded this 
debate over the compatibility of Muslim and British identities, and sparked attention 
over the concern of Muslims willingness to integrate into British society (Abbas, 
2007). This in turn has increased anti-Muslim hostility and prejudice to unprecedented 
levels. For example, Bleich (2009) compared UK and European opinion polls of 
attitudes towards Muslims over a 20-year period and found that such attitudes have 
become more negative since 1988, with surges in anti-Muslim hostility after high-
profile events. Given the UK has suffered a recent spate of terrorist events in the last 
12 months; there are legitimate concerns that anti-Muslim hostility might again be on 
the rise. This might be evidenced by the recent attack on Muslims in Finsbury Park, 
London that the Muslim Council of Britain described as the “most violent 
manifestation” of Islamophobia to date (Muslim Council of Britain, 2017). 
Moreover, the last few years has seen a wave of so-called right-wing 
movements across the US and Europe. These have included the UK’s vote to leave the 
EU, as well as the US’ decision to elect Donald Trump as President. Both these 
movements strongly campaigned off anti-immigration rhetoric, which in part has been 
driven by increased anti-Muslim sentiment and fears of Islamic-related terrorism. 
Whilst it would be simplistic to say that this was the only factor driving these 
campaigns, it is undeniable that immigration and terrorism were central issues 
throughout these elections, and that these campaigns may have been somewhat 
successful because of this. Indeed, in one of his first acts as President, Donald Trump 
implemented his highly controversial “Muslim travel ban”, and following the UK’s 
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decision to leave the EU, there was a dramatic increase in religiously or racially 
aggravated hate crime (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017). It is 
our belief that these occurrences represent the clear need to find strategies to combat 
the escalating prejudice towards Muslims and the continuing decline of West-Islam 
relations.  
The Psychology of Prejudice 
Psychologists have devoted considerable attention to the phenomenon of prejudice. 
Theoretical perspectives on prejudice have shifted considerably throughout the 
decades, not only through an increasing body of research on the subject, but also in 
relation to the current social contexts at the time. For example, Duckitt (1992) in his 
review of the historical developments of understanding prejudice noted that in 
response to the mass genocide of Jewish folk at the hands of the Nazis, the notion of 
a universal or natural cause of prejudice was deemed undesirable. This sparked a 
search for personality and individual difference explanations to prejudice (see for 
example, Authoritarian personality; Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & 
Sanford, 1950). 
Social Psychologists have criticised the approach to explain prejudice from 
individual differences in personality. Whilst many criticisms of this approach exist, 
perhaps the most notable is one that suggests that a personality account is problematic 
in explaining the shared formation of prejudicial attitudes amongst groups, and the 
historical fluctuations in prejudicial attitudes (Brown, 2011). Importantly, this 
approach also overlooks the plethora of socio-psychological research that notes our 
attitudes are often influenced by others, the groups that we belong to, and the 
relationships that exist between one’s own group and other groups (Brown, 2000). 
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Indeed, over the last few decades, Social Psychology has become littered with 
several theoretical perspectives about group psychology and intergroup relations that 
attempt in some way to understand the nature of prejudice, its antecedents, and the 
way it can be reduced. Whilst we will be unable to explore all of them here in the 
present thesis, these theories are often micro in nature and attempt to lay claim to 
specific psychological phenomena. Whilst undoubtedly insightful, in our view, these 
theories are insufficient in capturing the full complexity of prejudice and its 
antecedents, as well as the larger social frame that prejudice exists within (for similar 
ideas see Breakwell, 1986; Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2015). Moreover, 
the interface and reconciliation of these theories remains under-researched and 
somewhat controversial (Cinnirella, 2014). However, it is the contention of this thesis 
that an approach that combines the efforts of multiple socio-psychological 
perspectives can offer a stronger understanding to the antecedents of prejudice, than 
any one single approach could offer.  
Therefore, it is the aim of this thesis to explore how multiple socio-
psychological perspectives concerning prejudice and intergroup relations can be 
combined in such a way to elucidate more clearly on the antecedents of Islamophobic 
prejudice. It is our hope that such an approach can provide not only a stronger 
understanding of the rise of anti-Islamic sentiment across the West, but also ways in 
which this can be countered. The thesis will explore the Identity-Representations 
Model (IRM; Cinnirella, 2014); an eclectic framework that attempts to address the 
interface between multiple socio-psychological theories to understand Islamophobic 
prejudice in the UK. 
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Thesis overview 
The present thesis therefore attempts to explore how several prominent socio-
psychological theories can be deployed within a singular framework to understand 
Islamophobic prejudice. The aim of using such a framework is the belief that this will 
yield an approach that is greater than the sum of its parts. It should be noted that despite 
the current focus on Islamophobia in the UK, the approach outlined should generalise 
across a variety of intergroup and cross-cultural contexts, thus being able to explain a 
range of prejudices beyond the current scope of the thesis. 
 Chapter II outlines the theoretical frameworks that are deployed in the thesis 
to examine Islamophobic prejudice. Specifically, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986); Intergroup Threat Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000); Identity Process 
Theory (Breakwell, 1986; Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006) and 
Terror Management Theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) will be 
covered, outlining their basic tenets, research and relevance to prejudicial attitudes. In 
addition, the chapter introduces the IRM (Cinnirella, 2014), that aims to combine these 
approaches to explain fluctuations in anti-Islamic sentiment. The chapter will outline 
some of the key arguments of the IRM, as well as consider some conceptual 
refinements and additions (e.g., Essentialism; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000) that 
could be incorporated into the framework. 
Chapter III marks the beginning of the quantitative research that has been 
conducted in the PhD. This chapter specifically focuses on the key tenet of the IRM, 
the relationship between intergroup threats and identity motives. The chapter outlines 
two cross-sectional studies exploring this; as well as the role of essentialist beliefs and 
social identification as potential antecedents to the perceptions threat. 
19 
 
The next chapter then considers the role of Terror Management processes in 
identity, threat, and coping. Specifically, the chapter considers the extent to which 
several fundamental human motives, that are important in identity construction and 
maintenance, may serve the need of managing concerns over the inevitability of death. 
Two experimental studies are reported and their findings are discussed in relation to 
both identity motivation, and to the current focus of the thesis: Islamophobic prejudice. 
Chapter V then continues to explore the role of Terror Management Theory in 
Islamophobic prejudice. Given that the media constitute a major source of information 
for the public, and reporting of Muslims is highly noticeable for themes of symbolic 
threat, this chapter presents an experimental exploration of how exposure to 
symbolically threatening news articles about Muslims may increase Death-Thought 
Accessibility. It also attempts to explore how social identity and essentialist beliefs 
may moderate levels of death-thought accessibility when exposed to symbolic threats 
to worldview. 
Finally, Chapter VI and Chapter VII presents the last studies conducted in the 
thesis. These particularly attempt to utilise the previous findings, and the multi-
theoretical approach, to evaluate and consider ways in which Islamophobic prejudice 
in the UK can be reduced. Two empirical studies are reported. The first chapter 
considers the extent to which countering stereotypes of Muslims may reduce 
Islamophobic prejudice. The second chapter considers the extent to which the ingroup 
can be framed in a way that promotes prosocial norms that can reduce prejudice and 
opposition towards Muslims.  
Chapter VIII offers a general discussion and concluding remarks based on an 
evaluation of the research conducted within this thesis. The chapter particularly 
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considers the theoretical implications of the research, potential advantages to the 
approach utilised, but also some of the disadvantages concerning the theoretical 
eclecticism deployed, as well as limitations of the research designs used. Some 
directions for future research are outlined. 
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Chapter II: 
Theoretical perspectives on identity, 
threat and prejudice 
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The present chapter provides an overview of the socio-psychological lenses that are 
deployed in the Identity-Representations Model (IRM; Cinnirella, 2014). The chapter 
will first give brief overviews of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), 
Intergroup Threat Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), Terror Management Theory 
(Greenberg et al., 1986) and Identity Process Theory (Breakwell, 1986; Vignoles et 
al., 2006), outlining the main tenets of each theory, and how these may apply to 
prejudice, specifically Islamophobia in the UK. Research from each tradition will also 
be explored.  
Next, the chapter focuses on how the IRM proposes that these approaches can 
be combined into a single model. In addition, the thesis considers some of the issues 
surrounding the IRM approach, and attempts to elaborate and clarify them by offering 
a re-conceptualised model that provides a stronger integration of the theories than is 
currently offered. Moreover, the thesis also explores how aspects of Essentialism (e.g., 
Haslam et al., 2000) can be introduced into the current theorising to elucidate more 
antecedents of the perception of threat than are currently offered by the IRM. 
Before outlining each of the theories, and the IRM itself, it should be noted 
that the current approach to understanding prejudice carries the assumption that media 
reporting and representations of Muslims are important in understanding prejudice. A 
lot of literature has been devoted to the subject of media effects, the processes by 
which media news content affects individual attitudes, as well as whether media 
representations ‘form’ attitudes, or simply ‘harden’ pre-existing attitudes due to 
selective exposure effects (e.g., McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 
2007; Zillmann & Bryant, 1985). Although it goes beyond the scope of this thesis to 
explore the extent to which the media affects individual perception and attitudes, it 
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nonetheless bears the assumption that media reporting has been important in the 
increased Islamophobic sentiment witnessed across the West (e.g., Sheridan, 2006; 
Sheridan & Gillet, 2005). This is because the frequency with which Muslims are 
reported in the media, especially concerning terrorism (e.g., Moore et al., 2008), may 
constitute an agenda-setting effect making the issue salient in the minds of the British 
public (e.g., Cinnirella, 2012; McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Moreover, the way in which 
the media has covered Muslims is important in understanding the way in which threat 
perception is concretised in the mind of the British public (Cinnirella, 2014; Jaspal & 
Cinnirella, 2010). As such, throughout this literature review reference will be made to 
sociological analyses of media reporting in the UK. 
In addition, it should be noted that it would be impossible to outline all the 
components of these theories, their strengths and weaknesses, and their amassed 
empirical support in this review.  Suffice to say that all these approaches to 
understanding intergroup phenomena have amassed considerable empirical support, 
and their strengths and limitations have been reviewed quite eloquently elsewhere (see 
inter alia Brown, 2000; Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010; Hayes, Schimel, Arndt, & 
Faucher, 2010; Hornsey, 2008; Riek, Mania & Gaertner, 2006; Pysszczynski et al., 
2015). Instead, the purpose of this chapter is to give an overview to each approach, 
some of their research pertinent to the subject of intergroup relations and Islamophobic 
prejudice, before explaining how the IRM combines these approaches into a 
framework that can explore the antecedents of Islamophobia from multiple levels of 
analysis.  
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Social Identity Theory 
Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) is primarily a theory that was 
intended to elucidate the problems associated with intergroup relations. The core 
notion of SIT is that it distinguishes between personal and social identities, the latter 
which is defined as the “part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his/her 
knowledge of his/her membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value 
or emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978, p.63). 
Accordingly, because of their relevance to the self-concept, SIT posits that individuals 
are motivated to view their social identities positively to enhance self-esteem, and that 
one way this can be achieved is by making favourable intergroup comparisons. 
 Early research in SIT utilised a minimal group paradigm whereby individuals 
were allocated to groups based on arbitrary or minimal criteria. These studies 
demonstrated that when individuals were asked to make choices that affect both the 
ingroup and outgroup (e.g., a resources allocation task), that members would favour 
their own group at the expense of the outgroup, even if there were choices that 
represented better options for absolute ingroup gain (e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & 
Flament, 1971). In other words, choices were not made based on maximising profit, 
but on maximising differentiation (Tajfel, 1970). Moreover, findings show that even 
trivial categorisations can result in ingroup biases (for a review see Brewer, 1979). 
 These minimal group studies illustrate the seemingly endemic nature of 
categorisation and the importance of positively differentiating one’s own group from 
another, presumably to enhance self-esteem. Indeed, research suggests that when 
given the opportunity to positively discriminate in an intergroup setting, self-esteem 
is increased; whilst being denied this opportunity decreases self-esteem (Lemyre & 
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Smith, 1985; Oakes & Turner, 1980). As such, it would seem apparent that intergroup 
differentiation (at least in part) is a product of attempting to achieve a positive view of 
oneself and group. Although there remains some debate over the precise relationship 
between self-esteem and ingroup bias, or whether there are other motives beyond self-
esteem that motivate bias, the general association between self-esteem and intergroup 
discrimination seems borne out (see Brown, 2000 for a review of this point). 
 As such, an SIT approach to prejudice places heavy focus on an ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
mentality, with ingroup-outgroup differentiation being achieved in a way that views 
the ingroup in a positive manner. In relation to Islamophobia, ‘the Muslim world’ is 
often differentiated from ‘the Western world’ (Said, 1978; Ansari, 2004), possibly 
echoing this need for intergroup differentiation. Moreover, sociological analyses of 
UK media reporting seem to suggest that Muslims are portrayed in ways that contrast 
with British identity (e.g., Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004). Possibly because of the 
‘hyper-visibility’ of Muslims in the media that presents them as the ‘other’, they 
become a strong source of differentiation for the ingroup identity in terms of outlining 
“who we are” but also “who we are not”, placing them in a position of direct conflict 
with the ingroup (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010).  
 One of the most important contributions of SIT is its assumption that the 
relevance of a group to the self-concept will moderate the level of intergroup 
discrimination. Thus, strong identifiers are presumed to be more motivated to make 
favourable intergroup comparisons because of the need to maintain and/or enhance 
self-esteem. At the same time, this also makes strong identifiers more susceptible to 
perceived threats to identity because of its subjective importance to the self-concept 
(e.g., Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999).  Numerous studies have 
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supported the role of strength of social identification in perceiving threat (see Riek et 
al., 2006 for a meta-analysis), and in relation to Islamophobia, strength of national 
identification has been found to be related to both threat perception and prejudice 
towards Muslims (e.g., Ciftci, 2012; Cinnirella, 2014; Velasco-González, Verkuyten, 
Weesie, & Poppe, 2008). 
Not only does strength of social identification appear to make individuals more 
susceptible to perceiving threats to identity, it may also moderate responses or 
strategies that group members may utilise in response to a perceived threat to social 
identity. SIT proposes that at times of threatened identity, members may choose to 
dissociate themselves from the group or re-affirm their membership and engage in 
increased intergroup discrimination. Both responses are presumed to be protective 
strategies to maintain and/or enhance levels of self-esteem (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 
1986). However, the choice of strategy appears to differ based on strength of 
identification, presumably because distancing strategies become more psychologically 
and/or physically difficult as one increasingly identifies with the group (as it holds 
important significance to one’s self-esteem and/or self-concept). Indeed, research 
appears to support the idea that when threat is perceived, those who weakly identify 
tend to dissociate themselves from the group, whereas in contrast high identifiers are 
more likely to re-affirm their membership under threat perception and choose to 
engage with increased intergroup discrimination (e.g., Branscombe & Wann, 1994; 
Wann & Branscombe, 1990). Moreover, high identifiers are also more likely to react 
with increased anger than low identifiers when experiencing threat (Yzerbyt, Dumont, 
Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003).  
27 
 
Similarly, strength of identification also moderates the extent to which 
individuals feel the need to live up to the norms and values promoted within one’s 
group (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1999). Research demonstrates that strength of 
national identification for both American and Indonesian participants affected levels 
of individualism and collectivism because of the different salient group norms (Jetten, 
Postmes, & Mcauliffe, 2002). In some cases, this commitment and conformity to 
group norms amongst high identifiers can shape responses towards outgroups 
(Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002), and the response can depend on what group norm 
is salient (e.g., Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Poppe, 2012; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014a). 
For example, Smeekes et al. (2012) found that when participants were reminded of the 
Christian or tolerant roots of Dutch national identity, this subsequently affected 
responses towards Muslim rights, but only amongst those high in national 
identification. 
 Whilst reactions towards others and coping strategies in response to perceived 
identity threat may be affected by strength of identification, these responses may also 
be affected by the group’s characteristics. Groups can vary on several dimensions 
including size, function, distribution and longevity (see Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & 
Ethier, 1995; Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Cotting, 1999), that can impact the ways in 
which group members cope with perceived threat and the need to comply with group 
norms. What might be of relevance to the current focus of the thesis, is the fact that 
some identities, such as the nation, are ascribed (e.g., given) rather than idiosyncratic 
(e.g., chosen) in nature, instilled from an early age, and are particularly enduring with 
deep historical roots (Cinnirella, 2012; Connor, 1994; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; 
28 
 
Smith, 1991)1. As such, the nature of national identity may make the possibility of 
distancing oneself from the group psychologically or physically difficult, reinforcing 
the need for intergroup discrimination when facing perceived threats to identity. 
Similarly, as a relatively enduring group identity, living up to the norms promoted 
within them might be especially important in satisfying existential concerns (e.g., 
Castano & Dechesne, 2005). Finally, the ascribed, enduring nature of the nation may 
also increase beliefs that the group is natural, impermeable, historically stable, and 
invariant to socio-cultural shaping (we return to this point later).  
In short then, from an SIT perspective, it is presumed that high British 
identifiers exposed to negative media portrayals of Muslims are more likely to 
perceive Muslims as threatening to identity, and are additionally more likely to engage 
in intergroup discrimination (including prejudice) because of experiencing threats to 
identity.  This contribution of SIT makes it a valuable framework for understanding 
intergroup relations, particularly in relation to the need to make favourable intergroup 
comparisons, and the notion that strength of identification is a moderator of threat 
perception and/or response. However, whilst the research appears to support the 
relationship between identity and prejudice, it also demonstrates that the relationship 
tends to be modest (e.g., Brown, 2000; Riek et al, 2006). This might be due to the need 
to consider more than simply strength of identification, and examine the contents, 
characteristics, and beliefs about the group. Indeed, some researchers have suggested 
it is a failure of Social Psychology to ignore “the ideological character of identity 
                                                          
1 The notion of idiosyncratic and ascribed identities could also apply to the Muslim identity as well 
given that one’s religious background can often be prescribed to the individual rather than chosen. 
However, as discussed later in the chapter, it is the beliefs about these groups that are particularly 
important in understanding threat perception and threat response. Nonetheless, the nature of these 
groups as somewhat ascribed may make them more prone to essentialist thinking. 
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definitions” that may underpin this relationship between in-group identification and 
out-group discrimination (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 99).  
Moreover, whilst SIT has been valuable in outlining the importance of social 
identity and the experience of threatened identity, it arguably lacks nuance in 
comparison to other approaches, in elucidating both on the motivational antecedents 
to identification, as well as outlining identity threat (Cinnirella, 2014). For example, 
many researchers have argued that identity formation and maintenance goes beyond 
just concerns over self-esteem as is traditionally implied by SIT (e.g., Breakwell, 
1986; Vignoles, Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2002; Vignoles et al., 2006). Whilst the 
Social Identity tradition has considered other motives beyond self-enhancement such 
as optimal distinctiveness and uncertainty reduction (e.g., Brewer, 1991; Hogg, 2000); 
there is noticeable fragmentation within these approaches to understanding identity 
processes and how they might be integrated. Therefore, there is a need to consider 
other approaches offering additional unique insights, and in doing so look to construct 
a stronger overview of the antecedents of prejudice.  
Intergroup Threat Theory 
For decades, researchers have consistently referred to the concept of threat as 
fundamental in producing negative intergroup relations (e.g., Allport, 1954; Sherif, 
1966). However, the research being conducted on threat, and the various 
conceptualisations of ‘threat’ deployed by theoreticians remained separate and in 
conflict (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Dissatisfied with these distinct approaches, 
Intergroup Threat Theory (ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) attempted to combine these 
efforts to produce a broader understanding of the role of threat perception in producing 
prejudice. 
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 Whilst the basic model of ITT includes four types of threat: realistic threats, 
symbolic threats, intergroup anxiety and stereotyping; we focus only on the former 
two in the current thesis. This is guided in part by research that has suggested that 
Islamophobia may be best characterised by perceived realistic and symbolic threats 
(e.g., Croucher, 2013; Hitlan, Carrillo, Aikman, Zárate, 2007; van der Noll, Poppe, & 
Verkuyten, 2010; Velasco-González et al., 2008) or a so-called hybrid threat of the 
two (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010). Moreover, there are also concerns whether the latter 
two represent actual types of threat, and not antecedents or consequences of 
experiencing threat. For example, Stephan et al. (2002) compared models exploring 
outgroup attitudes and found that the model that deployed stereotyping as an 
antecedent of perceiving symbolic and realistic threats was superior (see also Riek et 
al., 2006).    
Realistic threat has its roots in Realistic Group Conflict Theory (RGCT; Sherif, 
1966). This proposed that when two groups are in competition for a scarce resource, 
such as land, power or wealth, it causes the potential for prejudice to arise between the 
groups as the intergroup relationship becomes a ‘zero-sum game’ in which victory of 
one group inevitably means the defeat of the other (a state labelled in RGCT as 
‘negative interdependence’). Whilst this theory limits the concept of realistic threats 
to intergroup competition, ITT broadens the nature of realistic threats to include any 
threat to the welfare of the group, such as its continued existence, or to its members 
(Stephan & Stephan, 2000). 
 The concept of realistic threat has typically been deployed in three ways. The 
first concerns an economic threat whereby there is a perceived threat over a scarce 
resource such as jobs, housing, or money, sticking closely to the roots of RGCT. For 
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example, anti-immigration hostility may be best characterised by concerns over the 
competition for jobs and benefits (e.g., McClaren & Johnson, 2007). The second 
concerns political threats, whereby there is some threat to power or control (e.g., Bobo, 
1988). Finally, realistic threats also encompass physical threats where there is concern 
over the safety, health, or well-being of the group and its members. This would 
encompass warfare, but also particularly pertinent to the case of Islamophobia, the 
ongoing concerns surrounding terrorism. 
In comparison to realistic threats that concern a threat to something tangible, 
whether economic, political or physical, symbolic threats concern the “perceived 
differences between groups in their morals, values, standards, beliefs and attitudes” 
(Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p.26). This threat has its roots in theories of symbolic 
racism (e.g., Sears, 1988), which suggests that prejudice is the result of conflicting 
values, rather than conflicting goals (which would be more in line with realistic 
threats). For example, in the case of Islamophobia, concerns over the compatibility 
between Muslim and British values is often played out across the front pages of the 
UK media, by focusing on such issues as the veil and conversion (e.g., Moore et al., 
2008; Poole, 2002). By doing so, this positions Muslims and Islam as restrictive and 
regressive, and threatening to the tolerant values of liberal Britain (Poole, 2011). 
 Where ITT also differs from the previous theories it was predicated on, is its 
emphasis on the perceived experience of a realistic or symbolic threat, rather than the 
experience of threat having to be real (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). In addition, it makes 
distinctions between experiencing these threats at a personal or collective level. That 
is, for example, a person could feel their job is in jeopardy (personal realistic threat) 
or that the group is in competition with another group over a scarce resource 
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(collective realistic threat). Research has tended to corroborate the distinction between 
these two threat types, and the independence they have in predicting a range of 
conflicts and prejudices (e.g., Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzald, & Tur-Kaspa, 
1998; Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999), although some research indicates that 
attitudes might be most negative when experiencing both realistic and symbolic threats 
(Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 2005). 
 This coalesces with evidence from both the US and Europe that anti-Muslim 
attitudes are predicted by both perceived symbolic and realistic threats (e.g., Ciftci, 
2012; Croucher, 2013; Doosje, Zimmerman, Küpper, Zick, & Meertens, 2009; Hitlan 
et al., 2007; van der Noll et al., 2010; Velasco-González et al., 2008). In addition, 
realistic threats have either been deployed as economic threats (e.g., Croucher, 2013; 
Hitlan et al., 2007; Velasco-González et al., 2008), presumably because Muslims tend 
to be immigrants in these countries, and anti-immigration attitudes are highly 
predicted by levels of perceived economic threat (McLaren & Johnson, 2007). They 
have also been deployed as a safety-based threat due to terrorism (e.g., Doosje et al., 
2009; van der Noll et al., 2010). Consequently, it appears that Islamophobic prejudice 
may be driven by perceptions of symbolic threat, realistic physical threat, and realistic 
economic threat. 
 Some researchers have suggested that due to the realistic and symbolic nature 
of Islamophobic prejudice, Muslims may pose a perceived hybridised threat of the two 
(Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010). They argue that because media representations of 
Muslims focus heavily on the differences in values between Islam and the West, but 
concurrently this is entwined with discourse and fear surrounding Islamic terrorism 
(for sociological analyses of UK media reporting, see Poole, 2002; Moore et al., 2008; 
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Richardson, 2004), that Muslims may pose a perceived hybridised threat to British 
identity. As such, Islamophobia may be a unique prejudice that blurs the distinction 
between the two threat types (see also Cinnirella, 2012) 
 Despite the usefulness of ITT in outlining types of threat and how these may 
relate to different prejudices, a potential failure of ITT is its inability to elucidate how 
perceiving threat may affect identity processes (Cinnirella, 2014). In contrast, Identity 
Process Theory (Breakwell, 1986) may offer more nuanced insight into the 
motivational underpinnings to the identity, threat and prejudice link. 
Identity Process Theory 
Identity Process Theory (IPT; Breakwell, 1986) is a holistic socio-psychological 
approach designed to understand identity formation, threat, and coping. Its 
development was largely generated out of dissatisfaction with approaches such as SIT 
that underappreciated the full-range of motivational forces underpinning identity 
(Breakwell, 1993), but also to unify the separate research traditions examining 
individual- and group-level identity (Vignoles, Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2000; 
Vignoles et al., 2006). 
 IPT states that one’s sense of self is made up of many aspects or identity 
elements, whether personal, relational or group level in nature of self-representation 
(although see Vignoles, 2017 for some issues with these distinctions). It suggests that 
the extent to which individuals emphasise elements (e.g., Britishness) of themselves 
within their own identity structure depends on the degree to which a certain element 
satisfies identity motives that permit the identity to be adaptive and useful. Therefore, 
these motives guide the development of identity structures in a way that achieves a 
desirable end-state for one’s sense of self. In the original conceptualisation of IPT, 
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Breakwell (1986) identified four guiding motives to identity. These were how much a 
specific identity provides the individual with a sense of self-worth (self-esteem); a 
sense of continuity across time and situation (continuity); a sense of competency and 
control (efficacy); and a sense of uniqueness (distinctiveness). Later revisions by 
Vignoles and colleagues (2002, 2006) added the motives of belonging, which 
describes the sense of closeness to others, and of meaning which refers to the sense of 
purpose an identity provides to one’s life. 
It should be noted that IPT does not necessarily state that this is an exhaustive 
list of identity motives and instead actively encourages the introduction of new 
motives within its framework (Breakwell, 1986; Vignoles et al., 2006). However, for 
the current thesis we limit our theorising to just these six motives. Moreover, some 
questions might be raised as to the ‘universality’ of these motives, a line of inquiry 
that has been acknowledged by IPT researchers (e.g., Vignoles et al., 2000), given that 
it was originally formulated to apply to Westernised cultures (Breakwell, 1986). 
However, given the focus of this thesis is to explore Islamophobia in the UK, 
consideration of cross-cultural variations in the existence, importance or expression of 
these motives goes beyond the current scope of the thesis. Finally, whilst it is likely 
these motives share some reciprocity in an interconnected network; in comparison to 
other theories that emphasise self-esteem as a superordinate motive (e.g., Abrams & 
Hogg, 1988), IPT argues that these motives should be considered as independent and 
distinct from self-esteem in their contribution to identity (Vignoles et al., 2002). In 
line with this, we believe that acknowledging the role of each motive in threat 
construction and response is important in understanding Islamophobic reactions. 
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 In short then, a central claim to IPT is that the more an identity satisfies (and 
does not frustrate) these motives, the more central to identity it will be construed 
(Vignoles et al., 2006). Moreover, given that IPT stresses that certain identities gain 
privilege in one’s identity structure over time due to their satisfaction of these motives, 
it carries a similar assumption to SIT that these identities require continual 
maintenance but also carry more sensitivity to perceived threats. In addition, like with 
ITT, IPT acknowledges that threat is a subjective experience (Breakwell, 1986). 
However, IPT provides the valuable contribution of outlining that threat perception is 
experiencing that one’s identity is undermined as a source of these identity motives. 
For example, a Social Psychologist might feel threatened by a Neuroscientist because 
they perceive the other research tradition is threatening the continuation of their 
profession (continuity threat), but also perceive the methodological approach as more 
“scientific” which in turn might affect the sense of competency that one might 
associate with being a Social Psychologist (efficacy threat).  
When perceived threats to these motives are experienced, IPT suggests that 
relevant coping strategies are activated to alleviate the threat, with the goal of re-
establishing and/or modifying the identity as a source of these motives (Breakwell, 
1986). These coping strategies can be deployed at an intrapsychic, interpersonal or 
intergroup level. This includes inter alia choosing to deny a situation as threatening 
(Breakwell, 1986), removing or distancing oneself from the group (e.g., Breakwell, 
1986; Tajfel, 1978) or re-defining (remooring) identities to alleviate a specific context 
as threatening (Ethier & Deaux, 1994; see Vignoles, 2017 for further examples of 
responses to threat). For example, if one feels that they do not meet the criteria of 
group membership (e.g., do not have the psychological characteristics of a group 
member); this could represent a perceived threat to belonging. To alleviate this threat, 
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one might re-define the identity in a different way that emphasises one’s 
belongingness to the group such as emphasising heritage.  
Whilst not the only potential coping strategy, an IPT lens would propose that 
prejudice is one form of coping response to perceived threats (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 
2010; Vignoles, 2017). Moreover, it is the assumption of this thesis that when specific 
types of perceived threat compromise several identity motives, this reduces the 
number of available coping mechanisms that can effectively deal with the threat, and 
in turn increases the possibility of prejudice as a response to threatened identity 
(Cinnirella, 2014). This might be particularly germane to the case of British Identity, 
because as an ascribed identity where removal from the group may be difficult, the 
number of available coping strategies at one’s disposal may be limited.  
 IPT also emphasises the interface between the individual and the social, 
particularly relating to how the latter may affect upon the former in terms of shaping 
identity processes (Breakwell, 1986). Individuals may use social representations, 
which are shared constructions of reality that allow individuals to interpret the social 
reality meaningfully and shape personal identity structures (Breakwell, 1986, 1993; 
see Social Representations Theory, Moscovici, 1981). Social representations operate 
via two basic processes. The first process is objectification where new abstract 
information can be concretised into something tangible. For example, the idea of Islam 
can be rendered concrete by thinking about the veil (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010). The 
second process is anchoring where unfamiliar information is integrated into something 
that is already known. For example, current Islam-West conflict may be anchored into 
previous known historical conflict, or into common-sense dyads such as (im-) morality 
and (ab-) normality (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010; see also Liu & Hilton, 2005). Thus, 
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for example, Britain may be represented at one end as moral and tolerant, and Muslims 
may be viewed at the other end as immoral and intolerant.  In addition, social 
representations are therefore also important to understanding how a threat is 
constructed, perceived, and coped with. Jaspal and Cinnirella (2010) have argued that 
understanding media social representations is therefore an important component in 
understanding how realistic and symbolic threats are perceived by the individual, and 
their subsequent shape in terms of identity motive threat and response. 
 Empirically assessing IPT’s claims has been somewhat of a challenge for 
researchers’ due to its multifaceted approach to identity, with multiple motives 
influencing identity structures. Perhaps the best approach was developed by Vignoles 
et al. (2002, 2006) who developed a method that attempts to elicit the contents of one’s 
identity repertoire. This asks participants to freely recall aspects of themselves in order 
to elicit identity contents, and then requires participants to rate these aspects across 
each motive as well as their perceived importance to the self (centrality). Using this 
method, Vignoles et al. (2002, 2006) demonstrated that each motive made an 
independent contribution to identity, explaining a total 53.8% of the variance in 
identity ratings. In addition, this method has been used to demonstrate that changes in 
identification over time are related to changes in satisfaction of these motives 
(Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2012), and that these motives influence future desired and 
feared selves (Vignoles, Manzi, Regalia, Jemmolo, & Scabini, 2008). 
IPT however has largely been ignored by the wider academic community, and 
especially outside Europe, possibly due to a perception that its complexity is difficult 
to test quantitatively, despite its theoretical foundations being informed by a rich 
history of empirical research (see Vignoles, 2014). This contrasts with the other 
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theories that are considered in the thesis that have a long history of empirically testable 
hypotheses and support. IPT may therefore benefit from being integrated with these 
approaches to lend itself to being more empirically testable. Similarly, some of the 
other approaches considered in the thesis may benefit from IPT’s holistic and 
multifaceted approach to identity, threat and coping that more clearly elucidates a 
range of motivational forces relevant to identity construction and maintenance.  
Terror Management Theory 
From the outset, Terror Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg et al., 1986) was 
developed to answer basic questions concerning human behaviour. Dissatisfied with 
socio-cognitive approaches that attempted to elucidate psychological processes, and 
tended to be preoccupied in explaining laboratory phenomena rather than real-world 
behaviour, TMT sought to address the “why” questions behind human behaviour 
(Pyszczynski et al., 2015).  
 TMT is primarily derived from the integrative works of cultural anthropologist 
Ernest Becker (1971, 1973), and starts with two simple observations. Firstly, that 
human beings are like animals in that we are biological entities whose bodies are 
designed and orientated towards self-preservation. Secondly, that human beings differ 
from animals by having presumably unique cognitive abilities such as self-awareness 
and abstract thought. Whilst undoubtedly these capabilities have been advantageous 
to humans, they also present a conflict to a biological species with a desire for 
continued existence, because they permit the knowledge that death is uncontrollable 
and inevitable. Thus, TMT proposes that the human awareness of the inevitability of 
death, juxtaposed with the biological desire to survive, provide the active ingredients 
to the potential for a paralyzing anxiety known as existential terror. 
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 TMT argues that human beings have used the same cognitive capabilities of 
symbolic and abstract thought that caused this problem to arise in the first place, to 
manage it. It proposes that humans invest in- and identify with- cultural worldviews 
that manage the awareness of death via a dual-component anxiety buffer. Firstly, 
cultural worldviews provide a stable, orderly, and meaningful sense of reality. 
Secondly, cultural worldviews provide associated standards of conduct that if lived up 
to, can afford individuals with a sense of self-esteem. In that sense, TMT, unlike other 
theories reviewed here, proposes that motives such as self-esteem are not in and of 
themselves psychological end-states, but serve (at least in part) the superordinate need 
of managing existential anxiety (Pyszczynski et al., 1997). Finally, by living up to the 
standards promoted in one’s worldview, TMT proposes that a person might be able to 
transcend death either literally (e.g., religious beliefs promise an afterlife) or 
symbolically (e.g., children, achievements, affiliation to causes and groups).  
 Eligibility for immortality requires that individuals maintain faith in their 
worldview, but also live up to the standards of value that are promoted within them. 
However, because there are so many competing or contradictory worldviews; and very 
few assurances of the validity of our own as well as our own personal value, their 
ability to manage this anxiety is a fragile one. Thus, for individuals to go about their 
daily lives with relative equanimity despite the awareness of their inevitable mortality, 
worldviews and one’s own worth require continual maintenance in the form of 
consensual validation (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). In contrast, 
exposure to others who impinge upon the correctness of one’s beliefs reduces the 
effectiveness of one’s worldview in buffering from this anxiety. In short then, people 
are generally motivated to prefer, endorse, and exaggerate the value of those who share 
or bolster one’s worldview, and avoid, dismiss and denigrate those who subscribe to 
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alternative worldviews that impinge upon the validity of one’s own worldview 
(Greenberg et al., 1986). 
 Over three decades, TMT has accumulated a strong and extensive record of 
empirical evidence supporting its core assumptions over the impact of death awareness 
on human behaviour. The evidence amassed in support for TMT does not just cover 
topics of prejudice, identity and intergroup relations that is the focus of the current 
thesis, but extends across a wide array of domains that we would not be able to do 
justice here (for extensive reviews see Burke et al., 2010; Hayes et al., 2010). This 
evidence supporting TMT has been distilled across three separate, logical hypotheses 
that are derived from TM theorising. Two of these, the Mortality Salience hypothesis 
and Death-Thought Accessibility hypothesis, we believe to be very important in 
elucidating on Islamophobic prejudice, and are deployed in the current thesis (for a 
review of the Anxiety-Buffering Hypothesis see Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, 
Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). We will briefly outline each one, and explore the evidence 
supporting its role and its importance to Islamophobic prejudice.  
Mortality Salience Hypothesis 
The Mortality Salience (MS) hypothesis is by far the most extensively used and tested 
hypothesis to assess TMT claims (Burke et al., 2010). It proposes that if self-esteem 
and worldviews serve to protect against the awareness of death, then reminders of 
death should increase the need to maintain these psychological structures. Typically, 
MS studies include asking participants to write about two open-ended questions 
concerning their own death (v control topic), and then after a brief delay to allow 
thoughts of death to fade from conscious awareness, complete dependent measures 
that aim to measure the bolstering of one’s worldview. However, various 
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manipulations of death have been used including exposure to terrorism news (e.g., 
Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009); subtle natural reminders of 
death (e.g., Osborn, Johnson, & Fisher, 2006; Pyszczynski et al., 1996); and subliminal 
death reminders (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997) that all 
demonstrate similar worldview-bolstering, distal effects. 
 TMT research has highlighted that the effects of MS appear to be unique to 
death-related thoughts, and are not the result of exposure to a negative or aversive 
topic (e.g., Greenberg, Simon, Harmon-Jones, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1995; 
although see Proulx & Heine, 2008 as an example of non-MS induced worldview 
defence). Nor do they appear to be the result of increased negative affect or 
physiological arousal (e.g., Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon & Chatel, 1992; 
Greenberg et al., 1995; although see Lambert, Eadeh, Scherer, Peak, Schott, & 
Slochower, 2014 for qualifications on MS and negative affect claims). Over the course 
of more than 250 experiments, the MS hypothesis has been robustly tested, producing 
reliable effects that appear to support TMT claims (for a meta-analysis on MS studies 
see Burke et al., 2010). 
Worldview defence 
Various research using the MS hypothesis has explored its effects on intergroup 
relations and behaviour. Notably, the most germane to the current focus of 
Islamophobia in the UK are the studies examining worldview defence. Given that it is 
argued that MS increases the need to maintain one’s worldview, then it should follow 
that MS should cause a polarising effect on attitudes and behaviours towards others 
dependent on whether that individual is perceived to support or violate one’s 
worldview. Perhaps the most notable MS worldview defence study was by Rosenblatt, 
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Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, and Lyon (1989) who explored the effects of MS 
in municipal court judges. They hypothesised that as upholding the law was a central 
part to a judge’s worldview, after being reminded of death, judges should become 
more punitive to a law offender. Supporting this assertion, their findings showed that 
judges who had been reminded of their own death were more punitive towards a 
prostitute, setting bail bonds that were 9 times higher ($450) than the control group 
($50). 
The most common method of examining MS effects on worldview defence 
typically includes having participants evaluate the author of an essay that either 
threatens or bolsters one’s worldview (e.g., Arndt et al., 1997a; Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon & Breus, 1994; Harmon-Jones, Simon, Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, Solomon, & McGregor, 1997; Heine, Harihara, & Niiya, 2002). These 
demonstrate that after MS, participants are likely to defend their worldview by 
derogating the author of the threatening essay. Moreover, McGregor and colleagues 
(1998a) have extended this finding by demonstrating that after being exposed to an 
essay that threatened participants’ worldview, they were more likely to allocate higher 
amounts of hot sauce, a proxy for aggression, to the essay writer.  
Thus, like with the other theories reviewed so far, TMT research therefore 
shares in common the supposition that MS effects on worldview defence are 
contingent on exposure to a threat or perceiving ‘others’ as threatening or different. 
When another group is perceived to conflict with one’s own group, then MS should 
motivate aggressive or derogatory tendencies towards others in defence of one’s own 
worldview (although this should not necessarily be considered the only response; see 
Solomon et al., 1991 for an overview to responses to threat). Research conducted by 
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Hirschberger, Pyszczynski, & Ein-Dor (2009) particularly highlights the importance 
of how the ‘other’ is perceived in reactions after MS. They found that after MS, when 
the other group was framed as hostile, this increased support for violent resolutions to 
conflict, however when the other group was framed as co-operative, MS decreased the 
support for violence (for similar ideas, see Lieberman, Arndt, Personius, & Cook, 
2001).  
Additionally, TMT would also raise concerns regarding media reporting of 
Muslims. This is because they often pose them as to conflict with mainstream British 
values, and in some cases, propose a wish to annihilate them (e.g., Moore et al., 2008; 
Poole, 2002).  However, unlike other theories reviewed so far, TMT brings an added 
layer of nuance by suggesting that British identity (and its associated values) represent 
important anxiety buffers in the awareness of death, thus suggesting the need to defend 
these values to maintain them as anxiety buffers. Moreover, TMT also offers 
additional insight into why attitudes towards Muslims may have intensified after 9/11 
(e.g., Sheridan, 2006; Yum & Schenck-Hamlin, 2005; see also Lieptye & McAloney-
Kocaman, 2015 for reactions after Charlie Hebdo attacks). It also highlights a problem 
caused by the constant media agenda of terrorism-related news, as these mortality 
reminders may serve to increase prejudice and derogation towards Muslims (see Das 
et al., 2009 for example of how exposure to terrorism news increases prejudice towards 
Muslims).  
In addition to the role of perceived threat moderating responses to MS, 
considerable attention has been given to the role of self-esteem as a moderator of MS 
effects. This is perhaps unsurprising given the importance that TMT places on the need 
for self-esteem to defend from death-related concerns. Despite support for self-esteem 
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moderating individual responses after MS, the precise relationship is not fully clear. 
Harmon-Jones and colleagues (1997) found that high self-esteem mitigates defensive 
reactions after MS, something that is corroborated by other researchers (e.g., Arndt & 
Greenberg, 1999; Halloran & Brown, 2007). In contrast, other findings suggest that 
the polarising effect of MS on attitudes is only apparent in those with high self-esteem 
(e.g., Baldin & Wesley, 1996; Juhl & Routledge, 2014). 
 What is the reason for this discrepancy in findings? Juhl and Routledge (2014) 
have suggested that the way in which self-esteem moderates MS effects may in part 
depend on the type of self-esteem (e.g., state versus trait). They suggest that self-
esteem does protect individuals from the awareness of death, but those high in self-
esteem are more inclined to engage in defensiveness to protect this self-esteem. Thus, 
findings that demonstrate self-esteem mitigates defensive reactions after MS have 
typically manipulated self-esteem after MS (e.g., Arndt & Greenberg, 1999; Harmon-
Jones et al., 1997; Halloran & Brown, 2007). This elevated self-esteem should 
therefore insulate from the effects of MS and mitigate defensive reactions. In contrast, 
when dispositional self-esteem is high, individuals will feel especially motivated to 
defend and maintain their worldview as TMT proposes that those high in self-esteem 
are the ones that are living up to the standards of worth promoted in their worldview, 
thus have the most need to maintain their worldview. 
It should be noted that whilst the role of self-esteem is considered in the present 
thesis, it explores a slightly different type of self-esteem; namely self-esteem that is 
associated with (or derived from) a social identity (cf. collective self-esteem; Luhtanen 
& Crocker, 1992). What role should this type of self-esteem play in prejudice 
formation? We would expect that self-esteem associated with a social identity might 
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operate similarly to the trait self-esteem mentioned above. That is, those who derive a 
strong sense of self-worth from their respective social identity will be highly motivated 
to defend it when necessary. Prior MS research has suggested that death awareness 
increases the desire to engage or identify with behaviours that are relevant to one’s 
self-esteem (Ben-Ari, Florian, & Mikulincer, 1999; Ferraro, Shiv, & Bettman, 2005; 
Goldenberg, McCoy, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2000; Hansen, Winzeler, 
& Topolinski, 2010). Thus, it is likely that those who view their nation as a source of 
self-esteem should increase identification in attempt to bolster their self-esteem after 
MS (Castano & Dechesne, 2005). Of course, at the same time, whether this intensifies 
or mitigates worldview defence would likely depend on whether one perceives one’s 
nation to be under attack. If one perceives the legitimacy of their worldview to be 
questioned, it potentially compromises their self-esteem, thus intensifying reactions to 
worldview violators. Supporting this notion, Arndt and Greenberg (1999) demonstrate 
that whilst elevated self-esteem mitigates defensive reactions after MS, if this source 
of self-esteem is then called into question then the effects are reversed with reactions 
being intensified. 
 Other TMT research has explored more subtle effects that MS may have on 
worldview defence. For example, Greenberg, Schimel, Martens, Solomon, and 
Pyszczynski (2001) posited that if an outcome of MS is to become more favourable to 
those who espouse or uphold one’s worldview, then this might lead to less negative 
reactions to ingroup members who espouse prejudicial themes. They reasoned that as 
prejudice towards outgroups can often be entwined with espousing ingroup pride, then 
MS may reduce reactions towards those who espouse prejudice because they are the 
same time bolstering one’s worldview. Across a series of studies, they demonstrated 
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that after MS, White participants were less likely to view another White individual 
espousing racial pride as racist or view them as guilty of a racial crime. 
 What seems important here is that MS may not necessarily cause individuals 
to react in hostile ways towards others, but may also decrease the tendency to derogate 
ingroup members who hold prejudicial attitudes because they are at the same time 
providing support for one’s worldview. This passive tendency towards ingroup 
members holding prejudicial attitudes may lead to perceptions of a false-consensus for 
one’s attitudes (e.g., Pyszczynski et al., 1996) or at the very least not lead to 
perceptions of a dissensus. As consensus for one’s beliefs and attitudes is important in 
validating the appropriateness of them (Solomon et al., 1991; see also Jonas, 
Greenberg, & Frey, 2003; Lavine, Lodge, & Freitas, 2005 on MS-induced preferences 
for congruent information), this may provide those who hold negative attitudes 
towards Muslims with a sense of a normative basis for their behaviour. This is 
important because perceiving a normative basis for behaviour has been highlighted as 
important in expressing prejudicial attitudes (e.g., Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997).  
Stereotyping 
Other research using the MS paradigm has also demonstrated that aside from being 
more likely to derogate others after being reminded of death, there is also an increased 
tendency to cling onto prevailing group stereotypes. This is not just because 
stereotypes can serve self-enhancement purposes by making favourable comparisons 
that increase self-esteem (see Renkema, Stapel, Maringer, & van Yperen, 2008), but 
because stereotypes serve to assist in the perception of the social reality in a 
meaningful way, and thus represent an important component of worldviews (Schimel 
et al., 1999). Across a series of studies, Schimel and colleagues (1999) demonstrated 
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that participants exposed to MS were more likely to stereotype others; explain away 
stereotype inconsistent behaviour; as well as show increased preferences for 
stereotype-consistent individuals and decreased preferences for stereotype-
inconsistent individuals. Similarly, Fritsche, Koranyi, Beyer, Jonas, and Fleischmann 
(2009) explored this idea of MS and stereotyping in relation to Muslims. Given that 
Muslims are often stereotyped as violent and associated with terrorism, they 
hypothesised that MS should decrease preferences for a Muslim who opposed 
terrorism of the stereotypical inconsistency. Their findings supported this paradoxical 
notion of a decreased preference for a Muslim who opposed terrorism. However, they 
did not replicate the same increase in preference for a stereotypical member as found 
by Schimel and colleagues (1999), presumably as the authors note, due to the universal 
rejection of terrorist behaviour. Given this need to cling onto stereotypes, to such an 
extent as to reject or decrease liking towards Muslims who oppose terrorism, this poses 
a worrying concern for how researchers might consider combating Islamophobic 
prejudice. 
Annihilation and support for war 
Finally, whilst derogation, such as prejudice and discrimination, may be one way to 
respond to worldview threatening others, derogation rarely leads to others reducing 
the conviction with which they hold their own beliefs. Thus, derogation may only act 
as a brief panacea to existential anxiety. Instead, ironically the most effective form of 
defence may be just to eradicate the other belief system altogether (Solomon et al., 
1991). This is not just because it effectively removes the threat entirely, but also 
because it can imply that the worldview that “survives and thrives can be viewed as 
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the right one” (Greenberg & Kosloff, 2008, p. 1885). Therefore, TMT would predict 
that MS should engender increased support for extreme measures and warfare. 
Supporting these ideas, Pyszczynski, Abdollahi, Solomon, Greenberg, Cohen, 
and Weise (2006) demonstrate how MS may increase support for extreme measures 
to conflict resolution concerning the West and the Middle East. For Iranian 
participants, MS led to increased support and willingness to join pro-martyrdom 
causes against the West, whilst this finding was reversed when mortality was not 
salient. For American participants, MS led to increased support for extreme (e.g., use 
of biological and chemical weapons), pre-emptive, military force in the Middle East 
despite knowledge that thousands of innocent civilians would die in the process. 
Similarly, reminders of 9/11 have been shown to increase support for George Bush 
and his counter-terrorism policies (Landau et al., 2004). Indeed, this finding has been 
replicated showing that MS increases support for Donald Trump (Cohen & Solomon, 
2016), perhaps unsurprisingly, given his worldview espousing themes to “make 
America great again” and promises to be aggressive against worldview violators (e.g., 
Muslims).  
This willingness to support extreme measures to conflict resolution is troubling 
given that hostile responses will likely increase the accessibility of death-related 
thoughts to those on the other side of the conflict, engendering the same need to defend 
one’s worldview. For example, a common response to terrorist atrocities committed 
on Western soil has been to engage in conflict in the Middle East, which would in turn 
engender the possibility for retaliation and more terrorist acts being committed. 
Therefore, TMT would predict that responses to MS could potentially lead to an 
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escalating cycle of violence that may have deleterious effects on prejudice towards 
Muslims (Jonas & Fritsche, 2013; Niesta, Fritsche, & Jonas, 2008). 
In sum, TMT has accumulated a strong range of evidence supporting the MS 
hypothesis and its role in producing hostile, derogatory and prejudicial responses to 
those who are perceived to threaten one’s worldview, as well as a tendency to be more 
sympathetic to ingroup members who espouse ingroup pride, even if this is at the 
expense of an outgroup. Those who are likely to display these reactions to MS are 
those who derive a strong sense of self-esteem from their ingroup (such as those who 
highly identify to the ingroup). Additionally, MS also appears to motivate a need to 
stereotype, whether this is to achieve a stable and orderly worldview, or for self-
enhancement purposes. Finally, MS also increases support for extreme measures to 
conflict resolution that may escalate conflict between Islam and the West that in turn 
may lead to a cycle of conflict that serves to intensify negative attitudes towards 
Muslims. Taken together, TMT research using the MS paradigm shows a rather bleak 
picture for relationships between Islam and the West going forward, and some of the 
potential difficulties that may be faced in considering how to reduce prejudice. 
Death-Thought Accessibility concept and hypothesis 
Some research has started to examine the mechanisms by which MS effects operate. 
Early TMT research using the MS paradigm found that distal defences were greater 
when exposed to a subtle rather than an overt death reminder (Greenberg et al., 1994). 
This led TMT researchers to consider whether conscious thoughts of death may lead 
to initial efforts to banish these thoughts from conscious awareness, for example by 
actively suppressing them or minimising the current threat of death (proximal 
defences, see Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). Therefore, it is presumed 
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that MS distal effects occur when death-related thoughts are removed from conscious 
awareness, but remain highly accessible. As such, much of the research reviewed 
above includes a delay between the manipulation and dependent variable; although 
studies that include a subtle or subliminal presentation of death do not require such a 
delay because thoughts of death do not reach conscious awareness (e.g., Arndt et al., 
1997a; Osborn et al., 2006; Pyszczynski et al., 1996). 
 This line of enquiry led to the development of arguably the most important 
component of TM theorising, the Death-Thought Accessibility (DTA) concept. If MS 
effects occur after a delay because thoughts of death have receded from consciousness 
but remain hyper-accessible in the unconscious; then presumably accessibility to 
death-related thoughts (whilst consciously unaware to the individual) should be 
increased. Although not the only way, typically DTA is measured using a word-stem 
task whereby some of the words can be completed in either a neutral or death-related 
manner (e.g., KI _ _ ED can be either kissed or killed). Supporting this reasoning, 
Greenberg et al. (1994) confirmed the role of DTA by demonstrating that when death 
has been made salient, accessibility of death-related thoughts is low, but increases after 
a delay. Moreover, Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, and Simon (1997) found 
support for suppression effects after MS by manipulating cognitive load. When 
participants were prevented from engaging in active suppression, the accessibility of 
death-related thoughts was immediate rather than after a traditional delay. 
DTA Hypothesis 
The development of a DTA measure led to the eventual development of a new 
hypothesis derived from TM theorising known as the DTA hypothesis. This essentially 
proposes the inverse of the MS hypothesis. It suggests that if worldviews and self-
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esteem serve to protect against the awareness of death, then threatening these 
structures should temporarily increase the accessibility of death-related constructs 
(Schimel, Hayes, Williams & Jahrig, 2007). Presumably, the threatening of these 
psychological structures weakens them as anxiety buffers temporarily increasing the 
accessibility of death-related thoughts even if the individual has no conscious 
awareness of this accessibility (Hayes et al., 2010). In comparison to most MS studies, 
because threats to these structures do not make death salient, proximal defences are 
not required making DTA immediate after exposure to threat and fade over time 
(Schimel et al., 2007, Study 1). 
 The DTA hypothesis has been tested in relation to several aspects of TM 
theorising (for a review of DTA studies, see Hayes et al., 2010). Most relevant to the 
present thesis, these studies demonstrate that threats to worldviews such as one’s 
nation, religious or evolutionary beliefs (e.g., Hayes, Schimel, & Williams, 2008; 
Hayes, Schimel, Williams, Howard, Webber, & Faucher, 2015; Schimel et al., 2007) 
increase DTA. Similarly, threatening self-esteem (Hayes, Schimel, Faucher, & 
Williams, 2008) and meaning (Webber, Zhang, Schimel, & Blatter, 2015) produce 
similar increases in DTA. Importantly, like with the MS hypothesis, research tends to 
suggest that this increase in DTA is exclusive to death-related thoughts, and not the 
result of increased accessibility of negative thoughts (e.g., Schimel et al., 2007). 
Whilst TMT research is beginning to accumulate a strong range of evidence to 
suggest that DTA is elevated after worldview threat, as well as after threats to self-
esteem and meaning, little research has considered whether there may be individual 
differences in DTA when exposed to threat. Prior TMT research has typically selected 
participants based on whether they are a member of the threatened group in question 
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(e.g., Cohen, Soenke, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2013) or participants that score highly 
on pre-measures of group identification (e.g., Hayes et al., 2008a; Hayes et al., 2015; 
Schimel et al., 2007). Despite this, other perspectives explored within this thesis would 
propose that there are individual differences associated with threat perception (e.g., 
Branscombe et al., 1999; Riek et al., 2006), something that remains underappreciated 
by TMT research in relation to worldview threat. As such, levels to which individuals 
subscribe or identify with a worldview, should be associated with levels of DTA when 
that worldview is threatened. 
To our knowledge, only one study has explored whether there are individual 
differences underpinning levels of DTA when exposed to worldview threat. Roylance, 
Abeyta, Routledge, and Juhl (2014) explored whether individual differences in beliefs 
of a just world were related to DTA levels when that belief system is challenged. After 
being first asked to report about their own beliefs in a just world, participants were 
asked to write about a memory that led to either a just or an unjust consequence and 
then complete a measure of DTA. Their findings suggested that when reminded of an 
unjust outcome, those higher in just world beliefs were associated with higher levels 
of DTA. In replicating this finding, they also demonstrated the same relationship in 
those who supported a losing presidential candidate at an election, presumably a 
violation to one’s just world belief.  
DTA in worldview defence 
The introduction of the DTA concept has also been important in elucidating on TMT 
processes, specifically relating to MS effects and worldview defence. In the studies 
reviewed so far, it is apparent that both worldview defence and DTA appear to occur 
after a delay, when thoughts of death have been removed from conscious awareness, 
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but remain highly accessible. As TMT proposes that worldview defence occurs as a 
secondary line of defence against the awareness of death, and both DTA and 
worldview defence share a similar time-course trajectory, it implies that worldview 
defence may occur as result of an increase in non-conscious DTA (Hayes et al., 2010).  
Supporting this idea, studies have demonstrated that when given the 
opportunity to defend one’s worldview after MS, DTA is low, but when this 
opportunity is denied, levels of DTA are increased (Arndt et al., 1997b; see also Cohen 
et al. 2013). Similarly, when exposed to worldview threat, being offered additional 
information that affirms one’s worldview produces similar effects as being offered the 
opportunity to defend one’s worldview. For example, Hayes et al. (2008a) found that 
when Christian participants were exposed to the possibility of the Islamisation of 
Nazareth (e.g., worldview threat) they found the expected increase in DTA, but if they 
were additionally informed that a hundred Muslims were killed in a plane crash, then 
DTA was low. Presumably, knowledge that members of the worldview violating 
group died implied the appropriateness of one’s worldview (or incorrectness of the 
opposing worldview), and ironically reduced DTA. 
Moreover, as already reviewed above, fortifying self-esteem can insulate an 
individual from existential anxiety and thus mitigate defensive reactions that are 
commonly associated with MS. This effect of fortifying self-esteem after MS also 
appears to lower levels of DTA (e.g., Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). Similarly, findings 
also demonstrate that when an aspect of one’s worldview is first affirmed, the effect 
of MS on DTA is eliminated (Jonas & Fischer, 2006; Schmeichel & Martens, 2005).  
It is important to note that these DTA effects in relation to MS and worldview 
defence appear not to be the result of re-engagement of proximal defences such as 
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renewed suppression. Using a similar exploration to Arndt and colleagues (1997b), 
Greenberg, Arndt, Schimel, Pyszczynski and Solomon (2001) reasoned that if this 
reduction of DTA is the result of renewed proximal defences, then under high levels 
of cognitive load, DTA should be elevated because taxing cognitive load should 
prevent the possibility of suppressive tendencies. Their findings demonstrated that 
under both high and low levels of cognitive load; DTA was at baseline after defending 
one’s worldview.  
Alongside research that has explored the effect of worldview defence on DTA 
levels, some research has explored whether DTA is statistically correlated with 
worldview defence (or other distal measures) to assess the relationship between the 
two constructs. However, little research has attempted to explore this connection, and 
to some extent, the current literature seems to throw up some conflicting results 
regarding their relationship.  
In some cases, DTA has mediated the relationship between the manipulation 
(whether MS or worldview threat) and defence (e.g., Fransen, Fennis, Pruyn, & Das, 
2008; Vail, Arndt, Motyl, & Pyszczynski, 2012), whilst other studies demonstrate a 
more interactional mediation or moderation whereby DTA mediates the relationship 
to defence, but only in the MS/threat group. For example, Das and colleagues (2009) 
demonstrate that exposure to terrorism news increased DTA, and this was related to 
prejudice towards Muslims but only in the group that were exposed to the terrorism 
news article. Similarly, Hayes et al (2015) demonstrate that the effect of DTA on 
modifying beliefs or derogation was specific to those who were exposed to worldview 
threat. Whilst it is unclear why these differences in the literature exist, it seems at least 
that DTA should be related to prejudicial attitudes. 
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Does it matter in which way DTA is elevated? 
Given the large array of evidence supporting the role of DTA, and its importance in 
explaining both MS and worldview threat, it has been suggested that the situations 
(e.g., MS, death-associated stimuli or worldview threat) under which DTA is aroused 
may be “largely irrelevant” (Hayes et al., 2010, p.710). On face value, this would seem 
like a sensible suggestion given the current evidence reviewed appears to suggest that 
DTA operates similarly regardless of the way in which it is aroused. However, we 
believe this suggestion to underappreciate the broader array of literature that is 
outlined in this thesis. Namely that: (i) specific types of perceived threats may arouse 
specific types of coping responses designed to alleviate those threats (e.g., Breakwell, 
1986); (ii) prejudice towards a certain group appears to be the result of perceiving a 
threat from that group (e.g., Stephan & Stephan, 2000).  
 Additionally, research in the TMT tradition would appear to possibly conflict 
with this proposition. TMT research demonstrates that the effects of MS are dependent 
on “what aspect of the self or one’s worldview is currently most salient, accessible or 
psychologically pressing” (e.g., Dechesne et al., 2003, p.733). For example, priming 
individuals with the value of tolerance appears to mitigate defensive reactions after 
MS (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1992). Similarly, Rothschild, Abdollahi and Pyszczynski 
(2009) found that Christians exposed to compassionate Biblical texts were less likely 
to support extreme military interventions after MS; and Muslims exposed to 
compassionate verses from the Qu’ran after MS demonstrated lower anti-Western 
attitudes.  
 Moreover, Dechesne and colleagues (2003) suggest that reactions after MS 
depend not just on the salient or accessible information at one time, but also its 
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relationship to the subsequently measured behaviour. When there is no relationship 
between the information and behaviour, the information is likely to reduce MS 
engendered defensiveness (substitution effect); whilst when a relationship exists 
between the two, the information is likely to enhance MS engendered defensiveness 
(contingency effect). For example, as we reviewed earlier, Arndt and Greenberg 
(1999) found that elevating self-esteem mitigates defensiveness after MS because self-
esteem can insulate from death-related concerns (substitution effect), but only if the 
domain in which self-esteem is bolstered is not subsequently called into question 
(contingency effect). 
Taken together, the way in which MS influences attitudes is therefore (at least) 
somewhat dependent on situationally accessible norms, and the extent to which that 
norm is related to the behaviour under examination. Given that mortality reminders 
rarely (if ever) occur in a vacuum, instead presenting themselves in a variety of 
contexts and situations that vary considerably in the extent to which they make certain 
norms, or worldview beliefs, accessible, then it should follow that different mortality 
reminders should produce differential effects. 
For example, walking through Central Park, one might stop by the John 
Lennon memorial and be reminded of his life’s work and dedication to the values of 
peace and tolerance. In this situation, it might be expected that one may behave in a 
way that adheres to the tolerant and peaceful norms of their worldview. In comparison, 
only a few miles further south in Lower Manhattan, one might stop by the 9/11 
memorial and be reminded of the perceived safety threat associated with terrorism, 
and the perceived differences between Muslims and one’s own group. In this situation, 
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one might behave in a way that seeks to protect and defend one’s worldview from 
perceived threats.  
Moreover, it has been a common occurrence for world leaders to remind the 
public of the value of tolerance in the aftermath of a terrorist event, whether suggesting 
the need for the public to be tolerant towards others or suggesting Muslim extremists 
are attempting to destroy the value of tolerance2. Whilst in some cases we might expect 
that reminders of this value might mitigate negative reactions towards perceived 
existentially threatening others (see Greenberg et al., 1992); the same reminder might 
intensify reactions when one is explicitly or implicitly reminded of the perceived 
intolerance of the other group such as is the case with acts of terrorism (a contingency 
effect).  
In summary, then, the current TMT literature on DTA appears to support its 
importance as a psychological construct. The reviewed research above implies that 
worldviews operate to prevent thoughts of death from reaching conscious awareness, 
and that worldview defence may act to dissipate the accessibility of non-conscious 
DTA. These findings therefore point towards the role of DTA in producing prejudice. 
However, more research is required to further understand whether there are individual 
differences in DTA after experiencing threat; if the extent to which the conditions 
under which DTA is elevated impacts upon choice of response (e.g., derogation, 
affirmation of the self); and the precise relationship DTA has with prejudicial attitudes. 
                                                          
2 See: Ex-Prime Minister, David Cameron: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/paris-
attack-david-cameron-warns-a-terrorist-attack-on-uk-is-highly-likely-a6734931.html; Prime Minister, 
Theresa May: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/04/london-attack-theresa-may-says-
enough-is-enough-after-seven-killed to name a few examples. 
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It is our belief that clarifying these relationships can help further understand the 
conditions under which prejudicial attitudes may be reduced.   
Putting it all together: The Identity-Representations Model of Prejudice 
Recently, Cinnirella (2014) has proposed an integrative framework, dubbed the 
Identity-Representations Model (IRM), that incorporates aspects of theorising from 
IPT, ITT, SIT and TMT to elucidate the antecedents, as well as the motivational 
underpinnings, of threat and prejudice at multiple levels of analysis: from the intra-
psychic, interpersonal, intergroup up to societal levels. The proposal for doing so is 
the belief that a framework that bridges the connection between these perspectives can 
generate a stronger, generic theoretical model to understanding prejudice, and 
overcome the deficiencies in any single one of these approaches (Cinnirella, 2014). 
The main contribution of the IRM is to understand how threats outlined by 
ITT, SIT, TMT may threaten identity motives as suggested by IPT. That is, the IRM 
attempts to explain how fear of death, worldview threat, and realistic and symbolic 
threats to social identity undermine identity motives outlined in IPT. Therefore, the 
IRM would propose that perceived symbolic and realistic threats, for example, are 
more distal predictors of prejudice; whilst the perceived threatening of these motives 
constitute proximal predictors of prejudice. In other words, these identity motives 
should mediate the link between prejudice and the threats outlined in ITT, SIT, and 
TMT. 
Moreover, it is believed that the number of identity motives compromised by 
these perceived threats outlined in TMT, ITT and SIT, reduces the number of available 
coping mechanisms to the individual to alleviate the threat. As a result, an individual 
may display prejudicial attitudes as a coping response to the threatened identity 
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(Cinnirella, 2014). Whilst the precise relationships between these threat types and 
identity motives are believed to be specific to the intergroup context, in part due to 
prevailing social media representations, the approach itself is argued to be 
generalizable to a range of prejudices and intergroup contexts outside of the British-
Islamic relations it was primarily derived to explain (Cinnirella, 2014).  
The IRM therefore places IPT at the heart of its approach. Mainly this is due 
to its presumed distinct advantage over the other approaches, as it arguably elucidates 
more closely on the motivational underpinnings of the threat-prejudice link. In 
addition, IPT is argued to be well equipped to take on this task of explaining several 
types of perceived threats highlighted by other approaches, due not only to its multi-
layered approach to motivational identity construction and maintenance; but also, its 
ability to explain a range of perceived threats and responses to threat from multiple 
levels - individual, relational or intergroup. 
 Whilst the IRM should be admired for its attempt at epistemological pluralism, 
and that Psychology should advocate an approach that seeks to reconcile disparate 
theories to understanding prejudice is a useful one, the current thesis would like to 
address some concerns with the original outlining of the IRM. In doing so, it is 
contention of this thesis to propose a conceptually refined and expanded version of the 
model that would offer greater clarity, coherence, and simplicity, but also increased 
understanding into prejudice. In broad terms, the thesis will address two problems 
believed to be present with the current IRM: (1) the conceptual clarity and distinction 
of the threat types that the IRM deploys; (2) a lack of consideration concerning 
antecedents of perceiving threat. 
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The clarity of threat 
Given that the main aim of the IRM is to offer increased understanding of threat 
perception, some of the distinctions given between the threat types appear 
unconvincing and confusing. The IRM appears to suggest that fear of death, 
worldview threat, as well as realistic and symbolic threats are separate types of 
perceived threat that all contribute towards Islamophobic prejudice via the 
undermining of identity motives (Cinnirella, 2014). 
 Firstly, it is unclear to me why worldview threat and symbolic threat are 
considered separate types of threat. From a TMT perspective, worldviews are 
symbolic meaning systems that offer a way for an individual to understand the world, 
as well as provide the individual with a clear set of values, norms, traditions, and 
morals. Thus, from the language of TMT, a worldview threat is to perceive that this 
symbolic meaning system is called into question by another person or group. This 
seems almost entirely analogous with what ITT outlines to be a symbolic threat. In 
fact, in outlining what constitutes a symbolic threat, ITT explicitly refers to the idea 
of symbolic threats being a perceived “threat to worldview of the ingroup” (Stephan 
& Stephan, 2000, p.26), and is consistently used by these researchers when describing 
this threat (e.g., Stephan, Diaz-Loving, & Duran, 2000; Stephan & Renfro, 2002; 
Stephan et al., 2002). It is hard to see therefore what distinction is being made between 
these threat types, or what benefit is served from keeping these as distinct types of 
threat.  
 Second, Cinnirella (2014) refers to the idea that the fear of death, given that 
Muslims are particularly noticeable in the media for terrorism and violence, can add 
additional nuance in understanding Islamophobic reactions over and above what 
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ITT/SIT can offer in terms of terrorism as a perceived realistic threat. This use of TM 
theorising, particularly in relation to terrorism, makes a lot of sense given the long and 
reliable history of MS in producing worldview defence and prejudice.  However, 
TMT’s notion of death-related concerns is deployed exclusively in terms of 
understanding the impact of terrorism and terrorism-related news on prejudice. This 
deployment arguably misses the point about TMT, and essentially waters down the 
theory to the MS hypothesis. What makes TMT such a valuable contribution is its 
ability to understand how the role of these motives, and worldviews, serve more basic 
and vital functions of managing the awareness about the inevitability of death.  
If the use of TMT is to provide the added understanding of how death-related 
concerns impact upon prejudicial attitudes, then it makes sense to embrace and utilise 
TMT’s full arsenal of hypotheses to understand this problem. To that end, the present 
thesis would like to offer a reconceptualization of perceived threat that more 
adequately incorporates a hybrid of TMT, IPT, and ITT that utilises their best assets, 
but also offers a clearer understanding of the interface between the threat types in 
question. 
The proposal is a relatively simple one: ITT, IPT and TMT all concern and 
discuss the same type of threat(s), but explore them from different levels of analysis, 
with each perspective offering a valued contribution in providing a full definition of 
perceived threat. In relation to ITT, its proposal of a typology of threats offers the 
useful insight into how different prejudices may be the outcome of different perceived 
threats, and how these threats may be perceived at a personal or group level. However, 
from a TMT perspective, both perceived realistic and symbolic threats could be 
characterised as existential threats that disrupt worldviews as an effective anxiety-
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buffer. Both symbolic and realistic threats are existentially threatening because at the 
heart they call into question or challenge our self-worth, albeit in slightly different 
ways.  
For symbolic threats, exposure to groups that are perceived to be different from 
one’s own, calls into question the ‘correctness’ of the ingroup’s values, beliefs, 
traditions and morals. This not only challenges one’s worldview, but also the extent 
to which these can be used for self-esteem purposes. Similarly, realistic threats (at 
least in the case of economic realistic threats) also challenge one’s degree of self-
worth. For example, money, houses, jobs and other tangible resources can often be 
useful barometers to assessing one’s self-worth to society (Arndt, Solomon, Kasser, 
& Sheldon, 2004). Therefore, believing that one faces competition for these resources 
impinges on the extent to which one can feel they are a valuable contributor. In either 
case, perceiving a realistic or symbolic threat to identity should be associated with an 
increase in DTA that in turn leads to the need to affirm, and if necessary defend, one’s 
worldview.  
IPT offers the novel contribution of understanding that these issues go beyond 
just the need for self-esteem, but also concern the motives of continuity, 
distinctiveness, meaning, belonging, and efficacy (we explore the interface between 
IPT and ITT in Studies 1 and 2; and IPT and TMT in Studies 3 and 4 of the thesis). In 
line with the original IRM, this thesis would agree that IPT offers a useful theoretical 
tool to understanding how perceived realistic and symbolic threats impact upon 
prejudice via their undermining of identity motives. However, by applying the 
contribution of TMT in its notion that the sense of these motives may buffer from 
more death-related concerns, we can begin to elucidate the nature of why perceiving 
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symbolic and realistic threats are so potent in producing prejudice. Indeed, it should 
be noted that identity motives are outlined in IPT as “pressures towards certain identity 
states and away from others” (Vignoles et al., 2006, p.309), so it would make sense 
from an IPT perspective that one of these undesired states would be the existential 
anxiety that TMT outlines.  
In short then, in line with the original IRM, it is proposed that perceived 
realistic and symbolic threats compromise multiple identity motives, and the extent to 
which these threats coalesce with perceived threats to identity motives depends on the 
intergroup context as well as social media representations of the threat posed. 
However, in contrast, this reconceptualization of threat would suggest that this 
compromising of identity motives in turn opens the individual up to the potential for 
experiencing anxiety that these motives are intended to buffer against. As such, 
perceiving threat should activate increases in nonconscious DTA that lead to a need to 
affirm, and defend one’s worldview in the form of prejudice and discrimination. In 
our view, this provides an elegant and coherent definition of threat perception that 
incorporates multiple levels of analysis, but also fully encapsulates the power of all 
three approaches (see figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: A hybrid ITT, IPT and TMT definition of threat perception 
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Antecedents of threat perception 
In addition, the IRM does very little to clarify what it considers to be antecedents of 
threat perception3, only specifically outlining the idea that strength of social 
identification moderates the perception of threat in accordance with SIT (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986). Whilst research has typically supported this assertion, the overall effect 
tends to demonstrate a weak relationship (for meta-analysis, see Riek et al., 2006). 
This is likely because strength of identification only measures one component of 
identity, and overlooks the importance that types of attachment (e.g., nationalism and 
patriotism; Li & Brewer, 2004), beliefs (e.g., Pehrson, Brown & Zagefka, 2009; 
Zagefka, Nigbur, Gonzalez, & Tip, 2012) and contents (e.g., Smeekes et al., 2012) 
associated with specific identities may have in understanding threat perception.  
 The current thesis therefore aims to expand on this by exploring the beliefs 
component of identity (Oyserman, 2009); as well as how beliefs about the outgroup 
may affect prejudice. Specifically, the present thesis focuses on natural kind and 
entitativity beliefs, two types of essentialist beliefs (Haslam et al., 2000; Haslam, 
Rothshild, & Ernst, 2002). This is because prior research has suggested they are related 
to prejudice (e.g., Andreychik & Gill, 2015; Haslam et al., 2002; Pehrson et al., 2009; 
Effron & Knowles, 2015), but when related to one’s own group, may constitute a 
valuable source of the motives in question, making them susceptible to perceiving 
intergroup threats. We first outline a definition of the terms essentialism, entitativity, 
                                                          
3 Hereafter, any mention of threat perception in the thesis where intergroup or motive is not explicitly 
mentioned in the text should be considered to refer to both. As the contention of this thesis is that 
intergroup and motive threats are synonymous with each other (at least in the context of Islamophobic 
prejudice in the UK), the general use of threat perception should be considered to refer to both, and in 
situations where this is not the case, the thesis will explicitly mention which motive(s) or intergroup 
threat(s) are implicated.  
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and natural kinds before considering: (1) a motivational basis to these beliefs; (2) 
literature that has explored these beliefs in relation to threat perception and prejudice. 
Essentialism 
In Allport’s (1954) seminal work on prejudice, he outlined that what differentiated 
prejudiced from non-prejudiced individuals was a tendency to perceive groups as 
unchanging, clear-cut, and unambiguous with an essence that permeates group 
members making the group homogenous. This essentialist way of thinking about 
social groups was suggested to mirror a general cognitive style reflecting one’s own 
understanding about the nature of reality, rather than beliefs that were category-
specific.  
 More contemporary research has proposed that essentialist beliefs play an 
important role in lay perception and understanding of social categories (Yzerbyt, Judd, 
& Corneille, 2004), but has not always corroborated definitions consistent with 
Allport’s original notion of essentialism, demonstrating that these beliefs tend to vary 
across social categories (Haslam et al., 2000; 2002). Nevertheless, findings are broadly 
consistent with Allport’s notion that such beliefs are important in prejudice formation 
(Haslam et al., 2002; Pehrson et al., 2009; although see Haslam & Levy, 2006 for 
some important qualifications), and that highly essentialised groups tend to be the 
most maligned in the social arena (Haslam et al., 2000).  
In exploring the structure of essentialism, Haslam and colleagues (2000; see 
also Haslam et al., 2002) assessed nine separate beliefs, that have been associated with 
essentialist thinking, across 40 different social categories. Specifically, these 
concerned whether the group was viewed as: natural or artificial (naturalness); having 
clear-cut boundaries (discreteness); historically invariant (stability); having an 
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underlying reality (inherence); necessary features for membership (necessity); 
membership that is difficult to change (immutability); members that are similar to each 
other (uniformity); allowing inferences over member behaviour (informativeness) and 
membership to the group excludes membership to other groups (exclusivity).  
Conducting a factor analysis on these beliefs, their findings suggested that 
essentialism could be comprised of two separate constructs. The first factor included 
the beliefs of naturalness, discreteness, stability, necessity, and immutability which 
they termed natural kind beliefs. This type of belief can imply a sense that a group is 
naturally occurring and inalterable, with membership being genetically determined or 
“in the blood” (e.g., Hamilton, 2007; Haslam et al., 2000; Pehrson et al., 2009; 
although see Rangel & Keller, 2011 for ideas of socially influenced natural kind 
beliefs). The second factor included the beliefs of inherence, uniformity, 
informativeness and exclusivity which was defined as entitativity. These beliefs 
provide a sense that a group constitutes a real and meaningful entity that is a rich 
source of inductive potential (e.g., Campbell, 1958; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; 
Hamilton, 2007; Haslam et al., 2000). As such, entitativity beliefs may concern 
perceptions that are relevant to the psychological or behavioural properties of the 
group (Andreychik & Gill, 2015).  
It should be noted that some researchers have contested the idea that 
entitativity is a component of essentialism, and have cogently advocated that it should 
be considered a separate construct (see Hamilton, 2007). We have no qualms with this 
view, and whilst we agree it is important to seek further clarity on the relationship and 
distinctions between these conceptual constructs, it goes beyond the scope of the 
current thesis to explore this. Instead, our analysis only extends to the assumption that 
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natural kind and entitative beliefs are conceptually different constructs, something that 
seems borne out by data and is generally uncontested by scholars (e.g., Andreychik & 
Gill, 2015; Hamilton, 2007; Haslam et al., 2000, 2002).  
A motivational perspective on essentialism  
Although researchers have put forward cognitive explanations for essentialism (e.g., 
Hirschfield, 1996), essentialist beliefs, at least when concerning one’s own group, may 
particularly satisfy the motives outlined in IPT. For example, both natural kind and 
entitativity beliefs constitute ways for the perceiver to understand oneself in a 
meaningful way. Natural kinds provide explanations for one’s connection to social 
groups (e.g., natural, potentially biological basis), whilst entitativity suggests that the 
group itself is a meaningful “real” entity. In that sense, both these beliefs can offer a 
sense of being a part of a group that is meaningful. Additionally, entitativity beliefs 
have been argued to provide clear prototypes of a group that help to reduce uncertainty 
(cf. meaning, Hogg, 2009). 
Essentialist thinking can further satisfy the continuity motive, because it views 
groups as static and historically invariant. Perceptions of national group membership, 
for example, can often be built upon a common and shared history that makes members 
feel they are ancestrally related (Connor, 1994; Smith, 2001). This could involve the 
group developing shared ‘possible social identities’ (Cinnirella, 1998) that tie 
temporal elements of group identity together with myths of common ancestry, in turn 
facilitating strong identification (e.g., Sani et al., 2007; Sani, Bowe, & Herrera, 2008; 
Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014b). Moreover, entitativity beliefs also imply that groups 
are real entities thus will not “cease” to exist. Castano (2004) has suggested that 
entitativity beliefs afford groups “celestial” value that may be useful in managing 
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existential concerns. Indeed, Herrera and Sani (2013) found that MS increases 
perceptions of collective continuity that in turn predict perceptions of entitativity, 
which in turn positively predicted identification. 
Additionally, these beliefs when related to one’s own group may also afford a 
sense of belonging and distinctiveness. Natural kind beliefs that suggest some 
potential criteria for group membership (e.g., “in the blood”) can affirm one’s sense 
of belongingness to the group (cf. Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014b), whilst at the same 
time suggesting there is something distinctive about the group. Similarly, entitativity 
which is associated with perceptions of group cohesion and unity (Brewer, Hong, & 
Li, 2004; Sacchi, Castano, & Brauer, 2009), may allow the individual the sense they 
“belong” to something meaningful. At the same time, entitativity beliefs can offer 
clear group prototypes that provide a distinctive identity (Hogg, 2009). In other words, 
entitative and natural kind beliefs can provide a sense of “who we are” that may affirm 
a sense of belongingness, but also “who we are not” that makes clear the difference 
between one’s own group and other groups that can imply a sense of distinctiveness 
to one’s social group.  
Moreover, these distinctiveness and belonging concerns may feed into 
satisfying esteem concerns as they may help individuals to understand more clearly 
“who they are” (Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000). Essentialist beliefs can 
often imply a strong sense of group temporality that may be important in satisfying 
immortality striving, as well as glorifying the group with a long, proud history, thus 
satisfying self-esteem needs (e.g., Sani et al., 2007, 2008). Finally, entitativity beliefs 
may also satisfy efficacy concerns, because they suggest that groups have agency, with 
a common purpose, intentions, and goals (Brewer et al., 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2000). 
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In short then, both natural kind and entitative beliefs may provide important bases for 
the motives under examination in the current thesis, and thus may facilitate 
identification to social groups as suggested by research (e.g., Castano, Yzerbyt, & 
Bourguignon, 2003; Herrera & Sani, 2013; Sani et al., 2007) 
Essentialism, threat, and prejudice 
Research has considered the role of essentialist beliefs in prejudice formation. Most 
of this research has focused on essentialist beliefs about the target group (e.g., 
Andreychik & Gill, 2015; Haslam et al., 2002), although some research has also 
considered how essentialist beliefs about the ingroup can affect attitudes towards 
others (e.g., Pehrson et al., 2009; Zagefka et al., 2012). However, to our knowledge, 
no research exists that has examined both beliefs concerning the ingroup and target 
group in prejudicial attitudes. Additionally, research has tended to focus on either 
natural kind (e.g., Pehrson et al., 2009; Zagefka et al., 2012) or entitativity beliefs (e.g., 
Effron & Knowles, 2015) and their relationship to prejudice, but little research has 
considered the potential interface between these beliefs in prejudice formation. We 
will briefly review the research concerning ingroup and target group essentialist 
beliefs in turn, and how these may apply to the current focus of Islamophobia in the 
UK. 
Ingroup essentialism 
As we have mentioned earlier, because essentialist beliefs about social categories may 
constitute an important source of identity motives, they may facilitate identification to 
social groups (e.g., Castano et al., 2003a; Herrera & Sani, 2013; Sani et al., 2007). At 
the same time, essentialist thinking about one’s own group may increase susceptibility 
to perceiving threats to identity because both natural kind and entitative beliefs 
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facilitate relatively unambiguous descriptions over “who we are” and “who we are 
not” that may increase concerns over group contamination, trespassing and change 
(e.g., Hogg, 2009; Zagefka, Pehrson, Mole, & Chan, 2010; Zagefka et al., 2012). 
 For example, perceptions of national group membership can often be built 
upon a common and shared history that makes members feel that they are ancestrally 
related (Connor, 1994; Smith, 2001). This is a type of natural kind belief that implies 
that membership to the group may be determined by quasi-biological features that are 
demarcated “in the blood” (cf. ethnic nationalism; Pehrson et al., 2009; Zagefka et al., 
2012). As such, these beliefs suggest that the ingroup is impermeable, historically 
stable, with clear-cut and rigidly defined boundaries. Consequently, these beliefs may 
imply that certain individuals (such as British-Muslims) cannot be a member, and their 
presence may be considered as trespassing, contaminating “real Britishness” and/or 
threatening to group continuity (Pehrson et al., 2009; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014a; 
Zagefka et al., 2012). 
 Research conducted on UK nationals has found that beliefs that national group 
membership is “in the blood” are negatively related to the possibility of immigrants 
being able to adopt British culture, but also increased perception of immigrants posing 
a threat to British identity (Zagefka et al., 2012). Similarly, Pehrson and colleagues 
(2009) found that national identification was positively related towards prejudice 
against asylum seekers, but only amongst those that endorsed ‘ethnic’ conceptions of 
British identity. In the Netherlands, Smeekes and Verkuyten (2014b) explored a 
slightly different type of natural kind belief, namely perceived cultural continuity. 
They found that those who had high perceptions of cultural continuity demonstrated 
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increased opposition to Muslim rights (for similar findings see also Smeekes et al., 
2011; Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Martinovic, 2014). 
Like natural kind beliefs, entitative ingroup beliefs, may also increase 
perceptions of threat because of the clear descriptions they provide over what makes 
a group member. As we have mentioned, entitativity beliefs may concern perceptions 
that are relevant to the psychological or behavioural properties of the group 
(Andreychik & Gill, 2015). Consequently, groups that are perceived to be highly 
entitative may provide stronger group prototypes (e.g., Hogg, 2009), which may lead 
to increased sensitivity to those who deviate from this prototype, such as is the case 
with media reporting of British-Muslims (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010; Poole, 2002). 
Consequently, one result of perceiving the ingroup as highly entitative may be 
to exhibit stronger desires to exclude certain members from the ingroup who deviate 
from the group prototype (cf. black-sheep effect; Marques & Paez, 1994). Supporting 
this idea, Lewis and Sherman (2010) find that black sheep effects are strongest when 
the group is perceived to be highly entitative. Moreover, Castano (2004b) found that 
after MS, participants were more likely to over-exclude members from the ingroup as 
a strategy to maintain high perceptions of ingroup entitativity. Therefore, it is likely 
that perceiving Britain to be high in entitativity provides a distinct and unambiguous 
group prototype that may lead to increasing perceptions of Muslims as threatening to 
this prototype due to prevailing social media representations. In other words, British 
entitative beliefs should be related to perceiving Muslims as a realistic and symbolic 
threat. 
 In contrast, Effron and Knowles (2015) propose an alternative reason why 
perceptions of ingroup entitativity might be associated with prejudice. They suggest 
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that because entitativity enhances the perception that group members are in pursuit of 
collective interests, that it increases the legitimacy of displaying prejudice as an 
acceptable outcome of protecting the collective group’s interest from those that 
challenge its’ symbolic and/or realistic well-being. As such, Effron and Knowles 
(2015) argue that entitativity rationalises the exhibition of prejudice, causing a 
‘licensing effect’ that legitimises the overt expression of implicitly held biases. Over 
the course of eight studies, their findings supported their hypotheses, suggesting that 
prejudice was viewed as more rational when the ingroup was perceived as highly 
entitative, and that perceiving the ingroup as highly entitative increased the expression 
of prejudice amongst those who strongly identify with the group. 
Outgroup essentialism  
Concerning beliefs about the outgroup; essentialist beliefs have commonly been 
associated with a range of negative intergroup outcomes (e.g., Andreychik & Gill, 
2015; Haslam et al., 2002; Bastian & Haslam, 2006). Most prominently, this may be 
because essentialist beliefs, particularly concerning entitativity beliefs, can imply that 
a group is homogenous and with an underlying reality. Therefore, essentialist 
orientations about the other are often considered to be related to stereotyping (Spencer-
Rodgers, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2007; but see Bastian & Haslam, 2006 for 
immutability beliefs predicting stereotyping), but also preferences for stereotypic 
consistent behaviour (Bastian & Haslam, 2007). 
 As such, one view of essentialism is that it can be a breeding ground for 
stereotyping, which as we have previously mentioned can often be a precursor to threat 
perception, particularly if these stereotypes are negative (e.g., Riek et al., 2006; 
Stephan et al., 2002). Similarly, perceptions of entitativity can increase a sense of 
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group intentionality and cohesion, thus in turn making the target group seem more 
overtly threatening (Abelson, Dasgupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998; Castano, Sacchi, & 
Gries, 2003). For example, Castano and colleagues (2003b) explored how perceptions 
of entitativity may affect attitudes towards the European Union (EU) amongst 
American participants. They found that after manipulating entitativity, increases in 
entitativity perceptions led to more perceived harmfulness of the EU, particularly 
amongst those who initially perceived the EU as an enemy (the opposite effect was 
found amongst those who perceived the EU as an ally). As such, the researchers 
suggested that entitativity might produce a polarising effect on group attitudes. 
 Given that media representations of Muslims in the UK are overwhelmingly 
negative and often noticeable for themes of threat, terrorism and deviance (e.g., Moore 
et al., 2008; Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004), it might be expected that these sorts of 
representations might become a strong basis for stereotypes concerning Muslims 
amongst those who perceive the group as highly entitative. This stereotype 
endorsement may in turn lead to an increase in the perception of Muslims posing a 
symbolic and/or realistic threat. 
 Another view of why essentialist beliefs may affect prejudice is because they 
can affect the extent to which other members of a group are viewed as collectively 
responsible for the individual actions of certain group members. Lickel, Schmader and 
Hamilton (2003) argue that because entitativity beliefs imply a sense that a group is a 
coherent, unified entity, it increases the sense that a group is collectively responsible, 
as the perceived association between the perpetrator and other group members is 
increased. Moreover, they argue that that entitativity impacts upon collective 
responsibility by either increasing perceptions that group members are either directly 
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encouraging or benefitting from the actions of other group members (inference of 
commission) or by not preventing the actions of other group members (inference of 
omission).  
 From this perspective, entitative beliefs are likely to increase the extent to 
which the wider Muslim community is held accountable for the actions of others, such 
as is the case with terrorist atrocities. This is because entitative beliefs may increase 
the sense that Muslims are supportive of terrorism and extremist groups like ISIS (see 
Pew, 2016 for British views on Muslims support of terrorism), or should be at the 
forefront of preventing terrorism. Indeed, Doosje, Zebel, Scheermeijer and Mathyi 
(2007) demonstrate that the degree to which terrorists are perceived as prototypical 
Muslims, a type of entitative belief, affects the degree to which the wider Islamic 
community is perceived to share responsibility for terrorist atrocities. Moreover, 
because entitativity increases collective responsibility, it also affects the extent to 
which individuals may seek vicarious retribution against other group members for 
these attacks (Stenstrom, Lickel, Denson, & Miller, 2008). As such, these inferences 
can make other Muslims appear to be guilty-by-association, and therefore make them 
suitable candidates for hostility and prejudice. 
 Some other research has also suggested that essentialist natural kind beliefs 
may be related to negative intergroup relations, although the evidence is less clear. 
Haslam and colleagues (2002) explored both entitativity and natural kind beliefs in 
relation to prejudice towards various social groups. They found that whilst entitativity 
beliefs were related to prejudice, natural kind beliefs were unrelated to these measures. 
In contrast, some research that has explored beliefs in biological determinants of group 
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behaviour, a type of natural kind belief, has suggested they are associated towards 
prejudice (Andreychik & Gill, 2015; Jayaratne et al., 2006).  
 What might be relevant here is the difference between the measures used to 
explore natural kind beliefs. Both studies that support the role of natural kind beliefs 
explored a specific type of belief, namely concerning biological explanations of 
behaviour, whilst Haslam’s research looked at a range of natural kind beliefs as an 
aggregate. Therefore, it might be that there exist specific relationships between beliefs 
that make up these factors and prejudice. Indeed, Haslam and colleagues (2002) seem 
to support this assertion as whilst they found that the natural kinds factor was unrelated 
to prejudice, they did find components of natural kind beliefs as being related to 
prejudice, suggesting that the nature of the relationship between essentialist beliefs 
and prejudice may be specific to the essence-belief in question. 
 Particularly, Haslam et al. (2002) found that the beliefs of discreteness, 
immutability, and naturalness were related to attitudes towards homosexuals, although 
the latter two were particularly associated with decreasing levels of prejudice. Whilst 
the direction of the relationship likely represents the category-specific nature of 
essentialist beliefs relating to prejudice (e.g., ‘race’ versus ‘sexuality’ see Haslam et 
al., 2002; see also Haslam & Levy, 2006), it might be then that the extent to which 
these beliefs are related to prejudice, is to the extent that they imply ideas that certain 
group behaviour is biologically and/or genetically determined. Indeed, this would be 
consistent with the research that links bio-essentialist beliefs and prejudice 
(Andreychik & Gill, 2015; Jayaratne et al., 2006). Moreover, Bastian and Haslam 
(2006) found that stereotyping was associated with immutability beliefs, because 
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immutability (like genetic determinism) implies people cannot change certain 
characteristics (see also implicit person theories, Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998) 
As such, what these natural kind beliefs may have in common with bio-
essentialist beliefs is the idea that certain behaviours are “lurking beneath the surface” 
of all group members (Andreychik & Gill, 2015; Denson, Lickel, Curtis, Stenstrom, 
& Ames, 2006), that in the case of Muslims may make the group seem more overtly 
symbolically or realistically threatening. For example, perceiving the category 
Muslims to be immutable might imply that whilst not all Muslims are terrorists, all 
Muslims have the potential to be terrorists. Indeed, news reporting of Islamic-related 
terrorism often decontextualizes the behaviour such that it emphasises Muslim identity 
as the sole reason for the said behaviour (Poole, 2011). 
Moreover, it is possible that when a group is essentialised on both dimensions 
that this exacerbates the perceived threatening nature of the group. This is because 
entitativity beliefs are the perception of group unity and homogeneity, whilst essences 
(cf. natural kind beliefs) are the explanations of this unity and homogeneity (Lee, 
McCauley, & Jussim, 2013). Therefore, entitativity beliefs are particularly informative 
about the psychological and/or behavioural properties of the group (Andreychik & 
Gill, 2015), that may lead to increased stereotype endorsement, that when negative 
(such as the case with Muslims) may increase threat perception. From this perspective, 
when perceiving Muslims to be highly entitative, individuals may be more willing to 
endorse social media representations of Muslims as holding regressive, deviant values 
from the ingroup, as well as a violent disposition (e.g., Moore et al., 2008; Poole, 
2002). However, when these representations can be attributed to something 
immutable, or potentially biological, it may increase the perceived threatening nature 
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of the group because it not only adds increased legitimacy to these stereotypes, but 
also further suggests that these behaviours are immutable. Whilst little research has 
explored the potential interface between natural kind and entitativity beliefs, there is 
some suggestion that essentialising groups on both dimensions might be associated 
with deleterious intergroup outcomes. For example, Denson et al. (2006) found that 
essentiality (cf. natural kinds) increased the effect of entitativity on perceptions of 
collective responsibility, and Andreychik and Gill (2015) demonstrate that prejudice 
was highest amongst those who viewed the group as both highly entitative and high in 
bio-essentialism. Moreover, Haslam et al’s (2000) seminal work on essentialist belief 
types and social categories, reported that groups that are traditionally considered the 
most maligned in the social arena, tended to be the ones that were essentialised across 
both dimensions. 
It is worthwhile returning to the point that research has identified that 
essentialised beliefs can be associated with decreasing levels of prejudice (e.g., 
Haslam et al., 2002; Haslam & Levy, 2006). Whilst we have already mentioned that 
this underscores the category-specific nature of essentialist beliefs relating to prejudice 
(e.g., ‘race’ versus ‘sexuality’), more broadly it hints toward the idea that essentialism 
should not necessarily be viewed as inherently oppressive, nor de-essentialism viewed 
as inherently progressive, with this instead depending on the context in which they are 
used (Verkuyten, 2003). For example, the Castano et al. (2003b) study demonstrated 
that perceptions of entitativity may polarise attitudes towards the group in question, 
but that the valence of this attitude depends on the way in which the group is framed. 
Therefore, whilst one possibility for reducing prejudice may be to attempt to break 
down essentialist beliefs about the nature of social categories, thus in turn reducing 
stereotyping; we suspect that potentially a more profitable way might be to consider 
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how the specific group can be framed in positive terms. Indeed, given we have outlined 
that these types of beliefs might hold specific anxiety-buffering properties against the 
awareness of death (e.g., Castano & Dechesne, 2005; Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & 
Sacchi, 2002; Herrera & Sani, 2013; Keller, 2005), then it is possible that prejudice 
reduction strategies that attempt to maintain these anxiety-buffers may be most 
effective.  
Overview of the key aims of the thesis 
In sum, the current thesis is focused on exploring the interface between social identity, 
essentialist beliefs, intergroup threat, identity motive threat, and existential anxiety as 
proposed by the expanded and reconceptualised IRM. Specifically, the current thesis 
focuses on the arguments of the IRM to explore the specific case of Islamophobia in 
the UK. 
 Given the theoretical multiplicity of the IRM, and its attempt to explain 
prejudice from multiple levels of analysis (Cinnirella, 2014), it will be impossible to 
cover all the tenets and arguments of the IRM in this thesis alone. However, we will 
set out to explore some of the key arguments that are posited by the IRM. We will 
address each one of these in turn. 
 Firstly, the IRM stresses the importance of identity motives in understanding 
the potency of perceived realistic and symbolic threats in Islamophobic responses. 
Cinnirella (2014) proposes that Muslims may be perceived to pose several motive 
threats to British Identity, that are distilled into realistic (e.g., physical and 
economical) and symbolic concerns. As such, the IRM argues that perceived realistic 
and symbolic threats could be broken down into constituent elements that pose threats 
to the motives under examination of the current thesis. We seek to address this claim 
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(Studies 1 and 2), and whether these perceived motive threats mediate the relationship 
between perceived realistic/symbolic threats and prejudice. 
 Second, the current thesis has outlined a re-defined conceptualisation of threat 
perception that places TMT’s notion of existential anxiety as of paramount 
importance. Using IPT, it is argued that the sense of self-esteem, continuity, efficacy, 
distinctiveness, belonging, and meaning act as important anxiety buffers in 
overcoming the terror that is associated with the awareness of the inevitability of 
death. Using two distinct hypotheses from TMT, we seek to assess the interface 
between these lenses. Firstly, if these motives (and more broadly identity) are 
important in buffering from death-related concerns then: (1) reminders of death should 
engender a need to affirm oneself as a source of these motives (Study 3); (2) 
threatening these motives should increase DTA and a need to re-affirm the motive that 
was threatened (Study 4). 
 Third, the current thesis seeks to place more emphasis on antecedents of threat 
perception, particularly concerning those that may be an important source of identity 
motives. Thus, we expect that social identity and ingroup essentialism (e.g., 
entitativity and natural kind beliefs) are predictors of perceiving symbolic and realistic 
threats to identity (Study 1 and 2), as well as increases in DTA when exposed to 
symbolic threats (Study 5). Additionally, given that the IRM places emphasis on social 
media representations in threat perception, and that essentialist beliefs are related to 
stereotyping which can be an antecedent of threat perception, we also explore the 
relationship between Muslim essentialism and threat perception (Study 2). 
 Finally, we seek to conclude the thesis by assessing the efficacy of current 
prejudice reduction strategies, taking into consideration the present findings of the 
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thesis, and the multiplicity approach of the IRM (Study 6 and 7). Specifically, we seek 
to explore two strategies: the first concerns how perceptions of the target group might 
be changed to reduce prejudice, whilst the second concerns how perceptions of the 
ingroup might be changed to reduce prejudice. In both cases, we investigate the extent 
to which these approaches can produce more positive attitudes and intentions towards 
Muslims; and we particularly consider these strategies in relation to TMT, which the 
thesis places centrally to understanding prejudice. 
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Abstract 
The first two studies of this thesis seek to explore the interface between intergroup 
threat and motive-based approaches to threat as outlined by the IRM. Utilising a 
framework of IPT and ITT these studies investigate how perceived realistic and 
symbolic threats may relate to a range of motives (esteem, efficacy, distinctiveness, 
belonging, continuity, and meaning) related to identity processes. In addition, the 
present two studies additionally explore how Social Identity (Study 1 & 2), as well as 
ingroup and outgroup essentialist beliefs (Study 2) are related to perceiving realistic 
and symbolic threats. Online surveys were conducted with 197 (Study 1) and 368 
(Study 2) Non-Muslim, British nationals. The findings demonstrate that perceived 
symbolic and realistic threats are related to a gamut of motive threats related to British 
identity, and that these perceived motive threats mediated the relationship between 
realistic and symbolic threats to prejudice. In addition, strength of social identification 
(Study 1 & 2), and essentialist beliefs (Study 2) were positively related to perceiving 
realistic and symbolic threats. These findings support the idea that an integrated 
approach that utilises IPT, bolstered with contributions of SIT, ITT and Essentialism 
may offer a useful approach to understanding prejudices. 
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Introduction 
Social Psychologists have considered threat perception as an essential concept in 
promoting negative intergroup relations and prejudicial attitudes (e.g., Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Greenberg et al., 1986). However, despite 
the ubiquitous agreement about the importance of threat perception in generating 
prejudice, threat has been deployed and conceptualised in various ways by researchers. 
For example, threat has been deployed as a perceived threat to the ingroup social 
identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), or as being perceived at a personal or collective level 
in the form of realistic and symbolic threats (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), or as an 
existential threat to worldviews (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1986). Other approaches have 
operationalised threat perception to specific motives such as one’s sense of optimal 
distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991); belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995); continuity 
(Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2013, 2014a); self-esteem (e.g., Leary & Baumeister, 2000); 
meaning (e.g., Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Hogg, 2000); or feelings of control and 
competency (e.g., Bandura, 1982; Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Vohs, 2009). The 
diverse and disparate approaches concerning threat perception in the literature leaves 
the concept lacking a unified definition and clear understanding of its impact upon 
identity.  
It is the focus of this research to consider the extent to which all these 
approaches to threat perception may complement each other and be deployed within a 
singular framework (the IRM). By doing so, it is believed that this can overcome the 
shortcomings of any single one of these approaches, culminating in a parsimonious, 
yet elegant, definition of threatened identity that can explain fluctuations in prejudice 
(Cinnirella, 2014). The IRM borrows a lot of theorising from IPT (Breakwell, 1986; 
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Vignoles et al., 2006), which we believe provides a flexible and parsimonious 
framework to help elucidate the motivational interface between identity, threat, and 
coping. Specifically, the IRM suggests that perceiving intergroup threats (as outlined 
by ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) can be considered to threaten a range of identity 
motives (as suggested by IPT; Cinnirella, 2014). As such, the IRM posits that 
perceived symbolic and realistic threats are distal predictors of prejudice, with 
perceived identity motive threats as proximal predictors. These studies provide the 
first empirical assessments of this claim. We briefly review both theories before 
exploring how these two approaches can be combined as suggested by the IRM. 
Identity Process Theory 
IPT (Breakwell, 1986; Vignoles et al., 2006) proposes that people identify with aspects 
of themselves to the degree that these aspects satisfy identity motives that permit 
identities to be adaptive and useful. Specifically, IPT posits that people are motivated 
to construct identities that allow them to feel positive about themselves (self-esteem); 
make them feel competent and have a sense of control (efficacy); offer them a sense 
of continuity across time and situation (continuity); have a sense of uniqueness 
(distinctiveness); as well as feelings of closeness to others (belonging); and finally, a 
sense of meaning to their life (meaning). The more that an identity element satisfies 
(and does not frustrate) these motives, the more central to identity (e.g, the self) it will 
be construed (Vignoles et al., 2006). In line with this theorising, cross-sectional and 
cross-lagged research exploring identity structures has supported that these motives 
make an independent contribution to identity construction at personal, relational and 
group levels of identity (Vignoles et al., 2002; Vignoles et al., 2006). Moreover, these 
motives are emphasised varyingly across individual identity structures (Vignoles et 
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al., 2002); and influence the assimilation of new identities into the self-concept 
(Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2012).  
Interpreting a SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) perspective through the lens of IPT, 
would suggest therefore that strength of ingroup identification would be the result of 
social identities better satisfying a wider range of identity motives than typically 
examined by SIT. Any valued social identity would therefore require continual 
maintenance and defence from perceived threat(s) due to its subjective importance to 
the individual self-concept, with threat potentially being responded to at multiple 
levels – individual, relational, or intergroup. This approach, like SIT, assumes that 
strong identifiers will be highly sensitive to perceived threats to the identity in 
question. Indeed, a common finding in the intergroup literature is that strength of in-
group identification is an antecedent of threat perception and response (e.g., 
Branscombe et al., 1999; Riek et al., 2006). Moreover, low and high identifiers 
respond to perceived threats to social identity differently because of the relevance of 
said group to the self-concept (e.g., Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Wann & 
Branscombe, 1990). In the language of IPT, coping strategies in response to threat 
perception reflect the need to maintain an identity (and by extension the self) as a 
strong source of these identity motives. 
Intergroup Threat Theory 
The IRM also deploys aspects of ITT (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) to explain a typology 
of threats to identity. ITT outlines two basic types of threat: symbolic threats that are 
threats stemming from perceived differences in the meaning systems of groups and 
realistic threats, which concern perceived threats to the welfare of the ingroup, such 
as economic or safety-based threats. However, despite offering understanding into 
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types of perceived threat, ITT does not provide insight into their impact on identity 
processes (Cinnirella, 2014). In contrast, IPT offers greater insight into how perceived 
threats (whether realistic or symbolic) may threaten identity by suggesting that they 
frustrate a range of identity motives, as well as outlining the ways in which people 
may seek to cope with threatened identity. Moreover, IPT elucidates individual 
differences in both threat perception and threat response depending on the extent to 
which each motive is emphasised in defining individual identity structures (e.g., 
Vignoles & Moncaster, 2007). 
 As such, a central claim to the IRM is that ITT and IPT can be combined in 
such a way that a better understanding of how and why perceived threats to identity 
lead to prejudice can be offered. The current thesis looks to investigate this claim by 
exploring the case of Islamophobia. This is because Islamophobia may be one of the 
most prevalent prejudices in Britain (e.g., Abrams & Houston, 2006; Pew, 2016, 
2017). Moreover, non-Muslims may perceive Muslims as posing as both a symbolic 
and realistic threat to identity (Hitlan et al., 2007; Velasco-González et al., 2008; van 
der Noll et al., 2010), a so-called hybridised threat (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010). This 
therefore offers an opportunity to test our theorising about combining ITT and IPT 
while exploring a particularly timely prejudice, which appears to be prevalent across 
varied national contexts. Particularly, we aim to explore how different ITT threat types 
might relate to threatened identity motives, and therefore how identity motives may 
mediate the link between perceived realistic/symbolic threats and prejudice.  
 It should be noted that whilst the IRM attempts to offer a general model of 
threat perception and prejudice by deploying ITT and IPT, the actual relationships 
between intergroup threats and identity motives are likely to be highly context-specific 
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because they reflect the societal, temporal, contextual and cross-cultural variations that 
influence how intergroup threats impact upon identity processes. Indeed, IPT was 
specifically intended to address the dynamics between the social and individual 
(Breakwell, 1986). For example, previous IPT research has acknowledged the 
importance of considering the specific discourse and rhetoric used by both the media 
and individual when considering the construction of threat perception (Jaspal & 
Cinnirella, 2010; Jaspal, Nerlich, & Koteyko, 2012). Thus, the precise relationships 
between ITT and IPT elements we outline here should be considered specific to the 
intergroup context of Islamic-British relations. The broader approach being proposed, 
however, should generalise to any intergroup context – that is, the notion of exploring 
how specific perceived intergroup threats might threaten specific identity motives.  
A motivational perspective on symbolic and realistic threats 
Symbolic threats may be best characterised by a clash or conflict of group meaning 
systems. Exposure to conflicting worldviews (cf. meaning systems) can limit the 
extent to which they can be construed as meaningful (e.g., Greenberg, Solomon, & 
Pyszczynski, 1997). This might particularly be the case in Britain where the media 
have often implicitly, or sometimes explicitly, suggested that Islamic values are in 
direct conflict with notional ‘traditional’ or historic British values (e.g., Poole, 2011). 
The mass media in the UK also tend to position Muslims and Islam as challenging 
majority values and norms, implying that Muslims wish to challenge, revise and/or 
usurp these values (Cinnirella, 2014; for similar ideas see Smeekes et al., 2011; 
Verkuyten, 2013). In the language of IPT, this represents a perceived continuity threat 
due to concerns over the loss of ingroup traditions, norms, and values that are 
perceived to have important historical connotations for the group (Jaspal & 
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Yampolsky, 2011). Perceived threats to continuity may be particularly prominent 
when concerning groups such as the nation, as national culture is believed to be 
generationally inherited (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2013), but 
also may offer group members a sense of symbolic continuity beyond personal death 
(Lifton, 1973). Consequently, perceived loss of one’s national identity may enhance a 
desire to maintain this motive, and subsequently derogate or discriminate against the 
perceived source of the threat to social identity (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2013; see also 
Smeekes et al., 2014). 
 Perceived loss of ingroup norms and values may further threaten the 
distinctiveness motive, as these values are important defining elements of a group, 
which equip identifiers with a means of constructing a sense of distinctiveness in 
intergroup settings (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010). In turn, this may also limit the extent 
to which they can be used for self-esteem purposes in accordance with SIT (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986). Moreover, the perceived challenge to British values also questions the 
validity of them, thus compromising the esteem motive further (Cinnirella, 2014). 
Indeed, research on esteem threats has typically defined perceived threats to group-
esteem as a threat to the ingroup’s inherent value (Branscombe et al., 1999), 
suggesting that perceived symbolic threats and threatened self-esteem are somewhat 
synonymous, at least in certain contexts.   
 An ingroup’s system of values also likely affords a sense of efficacy in that it 
can break down perceived barriers to goal attainment thus offering an empowering 
function to its members (cf. Kelman, 1997). Indeed, social systems and norms can be 
important sources for feelings of personal control (e.g., Shephard, Kay, Landau, & 
Keefer, 2011).  For example, some perceive British values to espouse a strong sense 
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of equal opportunities to all citizens (e.g., the right to vote) or freedom of speech 
offering a sense of efficacy to its members. However, the UK mass media often present 
Muslims and Islam as being in direct opposition to these values, by focusing on such 
issues as the veil, conversion, or Sharia law (Poole, 2011). Thus, social media 
representations of Muslims emphasising constraint vis-à-vis freedom (Jaspal & 
Cinnirella, 2010) can constitute a perceived threat to efficacy. 
Media discourse has also focused on this perceived threat being posed both 
externally and from within the group (e.g., Poole, 2011). British-Muslims may 
therefore reduce feelings of group cohesiveness and lead to perceptions of group 
schisms (e.g., Sani, 2005) that may destabilise a sense of belongingness. The 
belonging motive may also be perceived to be threatened for majority members who 
derive a sense of belongingness from their perceived group prototypicality (Wenzel, 
Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007). Minority groups within the overall ingroup (in this 
case British citizens) who constitute a perceived symbolic threat by deviating from the 
group prototype may destabilise the belonging motive, as this may suggest that 
prototypicality is not a requirement for member status or that the group prototype is 
changing (van Veelen, Otten, & Hansen, 2014). Indeed, majority members, 
particularly those who strongly identify with their group, tend to prefer assimilation 
strategies to acculturation as this allows them to retain a sense of their perceived 
prototypicality within the superordinate identity (Verkuyten & Brug, 2004), thus in 
turn, preserving and not impairing, the belonging motive. 
In relation to realistic physical threats, British media reporting has placed 
considerable attention and emphasis on the perceived threat of terrorism since 9/11 
that has shaped public discourse surrounding Muslims (e.g., Moore et al., 2008; Poole, 
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2011). This perceived physical threat posed from terrorism may further crystallise 
threats to all these motives as terrorism similarly constitutes a perceived threat to 
worldview (Cinnirella, 2014), thus not only posing similar challenges to the validity 
of British values as outlined above, but also by seeking to annihilate the ingroup and 
its associated values. However, terrorism also promotes further concerns about the 
safety of British citizens and the impact it can have upon their activities (representing 
both a perceived realistic threat, in the language of ITT, and a perceived threat to the 
efficacy motive elucidated in IPT; Cinnirella, 2014). For example, terrorism has led to 
the introduction of increased security at airports and large sporting events, but can also 
influence people’s decisions to use public transportation (see Rubin, Brewin, 
Greenberg, Simpson, & Wessely, 2005 for reactions after 7/7 London Underground 
bombings). The concern for personal or group safety can thus further exacerbate 
perceived threats to the continuity and efficacy motives (Cinnirella, 2014; Jaspal & 
Yampolsky, 2011). 
Similarly, realistic economic threats may pose similar threats to these motives 
as access to material resources, and their relationship to power status, may contribute 
towards a meaningful identity (Arndt et al., 2004; Bebbington, 1999). Perceived 
realistic threats to these resources can be considered as one group blocking the goals 
of another group, thus limiting potential ingroup success (Riek et al., 2006; see also 
Brown, Maras, Masser, Vivian & Hewstone, 2001). In that sense, realistic economic 
threats can be perceived as threatening to group meaning and group efficacy; but they 
may also further undermine well-being and self-worth, implicating the self-esteem 
motive (Arndt et al., 2004; Riek et al., 2006). Additionally, members of high-status 
groups (such as Britain) tend to demonstrate increased bias on relevant dimensions 
that favour the group (such as economic and political power), as well as when that 
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relevant dimension is perceived to be threatened (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). 
This may be because in high-status groups, competition for resources may also be 
perceived to threaten the distinctiveness and continuity motives due to the current 
status quo benefitting the ingroup (Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005). Finally, the 
belonging motive may again be affected by the perception of group schisms and 
reduced cohesiveness (Sani, 2005), due to both the perceived minority group size 
(Quillan, 1995) and how certain minority members may be considered to have not 
contributed towards the British economy, and thus should not be befitting of member 
status (e.g., Pearce & Stockdale, 2009). 
As such, we posit that perceived intergroup threats serve to threaten identity 
by frustrating a gamut of identity motives. Perceived threats to these motives will 
activate coping strategies that attempt to restore the social identity as a source of these 
motives. One way in which perceived threats posed by Muslims and Islam may be 
responded to, is via the endorsement of social representations that promote 
Islamophobic sentiment, leading to an increase in prejudice and hostility towards the 
targeted outgroup (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010). As such, prejudice may be viewed as a 
coping response to perceived identity threat that seeks to restore motives through 
intergroup discrimination and hostility (for similar perspectives see Fein & Spencer, 
1997; Greenaway, Louis, Hornsey, & Jones, 2014; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2013). 
Moreover, the number of motives under attack may particularly crystallise the 
psychological damage, proliferating prejudice as a response to the threat perception 
(Cinnirella, 2014). 
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Study one aims and hypotheses 
The first study of this thesis attempts to offer an integrated perspective on threat 
perception and Islamophobic prejudice, with the central aim to explore the extent to 
which realistic and symbolic threats may be considered to threaten identity motives 
related to British identity processes. In addition, it also seeks to explore how strength 
of national identification and media news consumption may be antecedents of threat 
perception. An online survey was conducted with non-Muslim British nationals that 
took measures of British identification, television news consumption, symbolic and 
realistic threat of Muslims, as well as the six British identity motive threats (esteem, 
efficacy, continuity, distinctiveness, belonging and meaning). It also asked 
participants to rate their attitudes towards Muslims using a feeling-thermometer. The 
relationships between these constructs were tested using path analysis. It was expected 
that British identification and television news consumption would be positively related 
to perceiving Muslims as a realistic and symbolic threat. It was also expected that 
realistic and symbolic threats would be positively related to all British identity motive 
threats. In addition, it was hypothesised that the British identity motive threats would 
be positively related to prejudice. Finally, it was expected that the relationship between 
British identification and British identity motive threat should be mediated by 
perceived realistic and symbolic threats. Moreover, the relationship between perceived 
realistic and symbolic threats to prejudice should be mediated by the British identity 
motive threats.  Figure 2 summarises the hypothesised relationship between these 
constructs. 
93 
 
 
Figure 2: a graphical representation of the relationship between strength of British 
national identification (SIT) and threats to British identity motives (IPT) mediated by 
symbolic and realistic intergroup threats (ITT); and their relationship to prejudice 
towards Muslims. The expected relationship between British identification and 
threats to motivational principles after controlling for the intergroup threats is 
expressed in parentheses. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N = 250) were recruited via social media and a range of British-based 
internet forums4 to take part in a study on the perception of various minority groups 
in Britain. The sample size was decided by the number participants that could be 
recruited by end date. All participants were required to be British (defined as 
possessing, or qualifying to possess, a UK passport). There were 139 males, 109 
females and 2 participants identified themselves as transsexual/intersex. The mean age 
of participants was 28.42 (SD = 11.22).  Two participants identified themselves as 
Muslim and were filtered away from the key dependent measures and their data 
removed from the final sample. Additionally, 46 participants were judged to have 
insufficient data points (missing data >25%) to be included in the final analysis, and 
five participants were removed as their data indicated that they had not participated 
                                                          
4 We carefully selected where we advertised the study on social media and internet forums to ensure 
high exposure to British nationals, but in places that were not specifically related to British-related 
issues (e.g., political party groups) as these might have higher levels of nationalistic and possible anti-
Islamic sentiment.  
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seriously5. The final sample therefore consisted of 197 British non-Muslim 
participants (M age = 29.38, SD = 11.90), with 109 males, 87 females and 1 
transsexual/intersex. Participants were predominantly White British (83.8%), and of 
an atheist (73.6%) or Christian (23.9%) background, with an education level of Degree 
(71.1%) or A-Levels (20.8%). Additionally, participants indicated they resided in 
various regions of the UK: London (24.4%); South of England (29.7%); The Midlands 
and North of England (31%); Wales (5.1%) and Scotland (9.1%). Of this final sample, 
the expectation maximisation (EM) algorithm was used for any remaining missing 
data. EM is a method of handling missing data (rather than excluding the entire 
response) that can statistically input an estimated value based on a covariance matrix 
of all the variables in a dataset. However, it carries the assumption that the data be 
missing at random (Allison, 2002; Osborne, 2013).  Little’s MCAR test indicated that 
the data were missing at random (χ2 (2971) = 2857.04, p =.188), thus there was no 
systematic pattern to the missing data, permitting the EM algorithm to be utilised to 
provide all participants with a full data set6. Ethical approval for this study was 
obtained from the Psychology Department Ethics Committee at Royal Holloway, 
University of London. 
 
 
                                                          
5 We computed a SD score for responses across all the variables in the dataset. This indicated that 
these participants had either clicked the same response all the way through, or showed very little 
deviation in their responses. 
6 Although techniques such as multiple imputation are often preferred for missing data handling, the 
analyses of the present study (e.g., bootstrapping) do not allow for multiple imputation procedures. In 
these situations, EM is the preferred method of missing data handling as it is a single imputation 
strategy (Bentler, 2006).  
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Measures and procedure 
The survey was pitched as an exploration of an individual’s perceptions of minority 
groups in Britain, to mask the true aim of the study and minimise socially desirable 
responding. The questionnaire included demographics and measures of television 
news consumption, British identification, intergroup threats, prejudice and threatened 
identity motives. For some of these measures, these items were repeated with decoy 
groups (Chinese and EU Migrants) but these responses were discarded for the final 
analysis. This was to ensure that participants would not suspect the real aim of the 
study as concerning Islamophobic prejudice, and therefore might minimise social 
desirable responding towards this group. Halfway through the survey, participants 
were informed that an on-screen ‘click-to-spin’ animated wheel would randomly 
allocate them one of these groups to answer further questions about. Unknown to 
participants, the wheel was rigged to always fall on Muslims as a group to answer 
questions about (the other labels included were the decoy groups). All measures 
utilised a seven-point Likert scale ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly 
agree unless otherwise stated. 
Television news consumption was measured using a single-item ‘On average 
how often do you watch the news on TV?’ on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 
(1) hardly ever to (5) every day. 
British Identification was measured using a four-item scale (adapted from 
Vignoles et al., 2006): ‘I feel that being British is "central" to my identity’; ‘I feel that 
being British is not important in defining who I am’ (reversed); ‘I feel pleased about 
being British’ and ‘I feel unhappy about being British’ (reversed). These items 
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provided an acceptable level of reliability (α = .75) with a higher score on this scale 
reflecting stronger identification with being British. 
The Intergroup threats of economic and symbolic threat were measured using 
items adapted from Velasco-González et al. (2008), worded here to specifically 
measure perceived threats to Britain from Muslims. Symbolic threat measure included 
three items: ‘British identity is threatened because there are too many Muslims’; 
‘British norms and values are being threatened because of the presence of Muslims’ 
and ‘Muslims are a threat to British culture’. These items provided an excellent level 
of reliability (α = .95). Our economic threat measure also had three items: ‘Because of 
the presence of Muslims, British people have more difficulties in finding a job’; 
‘Because of the presence of Muslims, British people have more difficulties in finding 
a house’ and ‘Because of the presence of Muslims, unemployment in Britain will 
increase’. These items provided a good level of reliability (α = .90). Physical threat 
was measured using three-items developed in-house that aimed to assess the perceived 
threat of terrorism perpetrated by Muslims. We chose to operationalise physical threat 
relating to Muslims by referencing the threat of terrorism because of the convincing 
body of evidence cited earlier which demonstrates that the British mass media have 
focused on Islamic terrorism consistently when terrorism is reported (e.g., Moore et 
al., 2008). These terrorist threat items were: ‘Because of terrorism, Muslims pose a 
real threat to British society’; ‘Because of terrorism, Muslims threaten the safety of 
British people’ and ‘Because of terrorism, Muslims are a threat to British 
infrastructure (e.g., airports, transportation services, energy, and water supplies)’. 
These items provided an excellent level of reliability (α = .98). Higher scores on these 
scales reflect stronger feelings of threat. 
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Prejudice towards Muslims was measured using a feeling-thermometer 
(Velasco-González et al., 2008). Responses were provided on an 11 point-Likert scale 
ranging from ‘Intensely cold or unfavourable feeling’ (1) to ‘Intensely warm or 
favourable feeling’ (11). This scale was reversed, so that a higher score reflects higher 
negative feelings towards Muslims.  
Threatened identity motives as suggested by IPT were measured using six 
single-item scales developed in-house that aimed to assess an individual’s perception 
that British identity was threatened by Muslims. These items were (with the specific 
IPT threat in brackets) : ‘I feel that Muslims in Britain are causing people to feel less 
positive about being British’ (esteem); ‘I feel that Muslims in Britain are causing 
Britain to change as a nation in a negative way’ (continuity); ‘I feel that Muslims in 
Britain are changing what it means to be British in a negative way’ (meaning); ‘I feel 
that Muslims in Britain hinder Britain and British people from achieving its/their 
goals’ (efficacy); ‘I feel that Muslims in Britain are diluting the unique aspects 
associated with being British’ (distinctiveness) and ‘I feel that Muslims in Britain are 
weakening the sense of connection that people have with Britain and other British 
people’ (belonging). Higher scores on these items reflected stronger feelings of 
identity motive threat. 
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Results 
Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations of all the measured variables 
are displayed in table 1 below. Path analysis was conducted using Amos (version 21) 
using bootstrapping of 1000 samples to test for mediation effects (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008). Bootstrapping analyses are a random resampling of a subsample of the data 
numerous times (typically at least 1000) to produce more reliable estimates of effects 
(e.g., Singh & Xie, 2010). Goodness-of-fit was assessed using chi-square tests, root 
mean square of approximation (RMSEA) and the comparative fit index (CFI), 
whereby a good fitting model would be indicated by a non-significant chi-square test, 
a value of RMSEA less than .06 and a CFI value greater than 0.95 (Hu & Bentler, 
1999). 
We first tested a full mediation model (model 1a) where British identity and 
TV news consumption had pathways to intergroup threats (e.g., symbolic and realistic 
threat), which in turn had pathways to the six motive threats which finally had 
pathways to our prejudice dependent measure. The residual variances of the predictor 
variables were also allowed to correlate with each other (Cole, Ciesla, & Stieger, 
2007).  
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This model proved to be a reasonably good fit for the data (χ² (17) = 32.22, p 
= .014; CFI = .992; RMSEA = .068). However, modification indices suggested that 
the model could be improved by placing a direct path from British identity to perceived 
efficacy threat. This model (1b) proved to be an even better fit (χ² (16) = 22.01, p = 
.143; CFI = .997; RMSEA = .044) and was a significant improvement over the first 
model (Δχ² (1) = 10.21; p < .001). Modifications also suggested that placing a direct 
effect of perceived symbolic threat on prejudice towards Muslims would also improve 
model fit. This model (1c) proved to be an excellent fit for the data on all fit indexes 
(χ² (15) = 11.40, p = .724; CFI = 1.000; RMSEA = .000) and was a significant 
improvement over model 1b (Δχ² (1) = 10.61; p < .001).  
Table 2 presents the regression coefficients for the direct effects. The findings 
appear to confirm our hypotheses concerning intergroup and motive threats. Perceived 
symbolic threat was positively related to all six perceived motive threats, whilst the 
perceived physical threat of terrorism positively predicted all identity motive threats 
except group esteem (p >.500), and perceived realistic economic threat positively 
predicted all identity motives except group continuity (although was trending towards 
significance p<.150). However, when it came to the perceived motive threats 
predicting prejudice, only the perceived threats to efficacy and belonging, as well as 
perceived symbolic threat predicted prejudice towards Muslims. However, it should 
be noted that the high correlations shared between the motive threats might suggest 
that they were all competing to explain the same variance in prejudice. 
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Table 2: Standardised regression coefficients of direct effects on intergroup threats  
Dependent variable Predictors β 
Economic threat (R2=.09) British Identity .29*** 
 TV news consumption .00 
   
Physical threat (R2=.13) British Identity .31*** 
 TV news consumption .14* 
   
Symbolic threat (R2=.13) British Identity .34*** 
 TV news consumption .07 
   
Esteem threat (R2=.38) Economic threat .22** 
 Physical threat .05 
 Symbolic threat .38*** 
   
Efficacy threat (R2=.67) Economic threat .31*** 
 Physical threat .14* 
 Symbolic threat .50*** 
 British Identity -.11* 
   
Continuity threat (R2=.65) Economic threat .08 
 Physical threat .21** 
 Symbolic threat .56*** 
   
Distinctiveness threat (R2=.73) Economic threat .09+ 
 Physical threat .19** 
 Symbolic threat .63*** 
   
Belonging threat (R2=.64) Economic threat .16** 
 Physical threat .29*** 
 Symbolic threat .40*** 
   
Meaning threat (R2=.64) Economic threat .24*** 
 Physical threat .12+ 
 Symbolic threat .51*** 
   
Prejudice towards Muslims 
(R2=.58) 
Esteem threat -.02 
 Efficacy threat .15+ 
 Continuity threat .07 
 Distinctiveness threat -.05 
 Belonging threat .23* 
 Meaning threat .12 
 Symbolic threat .32*** 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 
Finally, bootstrapping analyses using 1000 bootstrapped samples and a 95% 
confidence level were conducted to assess the indirect effects of: (1) British identity 
and television news consumption (predictors) on perceived motive threat and 
prejudice (outcomes) through the intergroup threats (mediators), and (2) perceived 
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intergroup threats (predictors) on prejudice (outcome) through the motive threats 
(mediators). Whilst indirect effects of the intergroup threats onto prejudice could be 
tested via each motive threat separately (e.g., 18 indirect effects in total), it goes 
beyond the scope of the analysis to explore this. Instead, our analysis concerns how 
well all six motive threats mediate the link between intergroup threats and prejudice, 
rather than which motive threat(s) are mediating the link. When the confidence level 
does not include zero, bootstrapping indicates that significant mediation has occurred. 
All effect sizes (ES) are given as standardised.  
For British identity, bootstrapping analyses revealed that perceived intergroup 
threats significantly mediated the relationship to perceived threatened esteem (ES = 
.22, 95% Cl .13-.32), efficacy (ES = .30, 95% Cl .17-.44), continuity (ES = .28, 95% 
Cl .16-.41), distinctiveness (ES = .30, 95% Cl .17-.43), belonging (ES = .28, 95% Cl 
.16-.40), meaning (ES = .28, 95% Cl .17-.40) and prejudice towards Muslims (ES = 
.24, 95% Cl .12-.36). In contrast, bootstrapping indicated that no mediation had 
occurred to any of these perceived motive threats when considering television news 
consumption, as all confidence levels included zero.  
Bootstrapping analyses also indicated that perceived motive threats had 
significantly mediated the relationship between symbolic threat (ES = .24, 95%Cl .09-
.41), economic threat (ES = .11, 95%Cl .05-23) and the physical threat of terrorism 
(ES = .11, 95%Cl .03-.24) to prejudice towards Muslims. 
Discussion 
The first study provides support for the claim that a hybrid approach of ITT and IPT, 
as outlined by the IRM, may be useful in understanding prejudice. Using the case of 
Islamophobia in the UK, the current findings support the hypothesis that perceived 
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intergroup threats, outlined by ITT, may be related to perceived identity motive threat, 
as suggested by IPT, that are important in identity formation and maintenance. The 
findings also suggest that the link between perceived intergroup threats and prejudice 
was mediated by perceived identity motive threats. Additionally, our findings 
demonstrated that British identity is an antecedent of all perceived intergroup threats, 
whilst media news consumption is an antecedent of perceiving a realistic terrorist 
threat. This latter finding converges with sociological media analyses that highlight 
the prevalence of terrorism reporting in the British media (e.g., Moore et al., 2008), 
and ideas that increased exposure to this reporting might lead to agenda-setting effects 
(e.g., McCombs & Shaw, 1972). 
However, the current findings present a few notable exceptions to the above 
notion that intergroup threats predict identity motive threats. Firstly, perceived 
economic threat did not predict perceived continuity threat (although was not far off 
statistical significance), and perceived terrorism threat did not predict perceived group 
esteem-based threats. However, that is not to say that the perceived threat of terrorism 
is unrelated to esteem threat, but that esteem-based threats here were better predicted 
by symbolic and realistic economic threats. Terrorism might only be linked to 
threatened group esteem when terrorism serves as a perceived worldview threat that 
emphasises the perceived symbolic differences between Islam and Britain. As such, 
the relationship(s) between intergroup- and motive-based approaches may be denoted 
by how individuals construct the threat, utilising a backdrop of media and social 
representations in concretising the threat.  
Our findings also supported the idea that strength of social identification is an 
antecedent of perceiving a threat (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999; Riek et al., 2006), 
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although also demonstrated the unexpected occurrence of a negative relationship 
between British identity and perceived efficacy threat after having statistically 
controlled for perceived intergroup threats. This finding should be approached with 
caution due to its exploratory nature. However, we would tentatively suggest that this 
finding, emerging in the absence of intergroup threat, might reflect that it is important 
to not just examine the membership component of social identities, but also the beliefs 
and contents associated with them (for similar ideas see Oyserman, 2009; Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001). For example, as we previously stated, British identity may serve the 
efficacy motive by empowering its members through certain values (cf. Kelman, 
1997), that may be threatened by the perceived cultural differences between Britain 
and Islam. However, it may also be that the presence of British-Muslims could affirm 
British values such as diversity and multiculturalism, hence producing a negative 
relationship after the perception of threat is statistically removed. Thus, the precise 
relationship of identity to perceived motive threat may be dependent upon beliefs 
associated with specific social identities.  
Study two 
The aims of the next study were two-fold: we sought to replicate the present findings 
of the compatibility of ITT and IPT using a new and larger sample. In addition, we 
also looked to investigate other potential antecedents of threat perception, particularly 
the beliefs component of identity (Oyserman, 2009), as well as beliefs about Muslims. 
Specifically, the present study focuses on natural kind and entitativity beliefs, two 
types of essentialist beliefs (Haslam et al., 2000, 2002). This is because prior research 
has suggested they are related to prejudice (e.g., Andreychik & Gill, 2015; Haslam et 
al., 2002; Pehrson et al., 2009; Effron & Knowles, 2015). Moreover, because as 
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discussed in the literature review chapter, they may be beneficial in satisfying the 
motives under current examination (e.g., Hogg, 2009; Castano, 2004a; Sani et al., 
2007; Yzerbyt et al., 2000). 
Essentialism 
Haslam and colleagues (2000, 2002) research has suggested that essentialist beliefs 
may be defined by two distinct components. Their research assessed nine separate 
essentialist beliefs across a variety of social categories and suggested that these fell on 
two distinct factors. The first they termed natural kinds, that includes the belief that 
categories are natural (and not artificial), historically stable, with fixed boundaries, 
and membership that is immutable and determined by necessary features. The second 
factor labelled entitativity included the beliefs that groups have an underlying essence 
and homogeneity, which makes knowledge of membership as a rich source of 
inferences, and excludes members from belonging to other groups.  
In that sense, natural kind beliefs often imply a sense that a group is naturally 
occurring, with membership being genetically determined or “in the blood” (e.g., 
Hamilton, 2007; Haslam et al., 2000; Pehrson et al., 2009; although see Rangel & 
Keller, 2011 for ideas of socially influenced natural kind beliefs). Entitativity beliefs 
are the view that groups constitute a real and meaningful entity that is a rich source of 
inductive potential (e.g., Campbell, 1958; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Hamilton, 2007; 
Haslam et al., 2000). As such, entitativity beliefs may concern perceptions that are 
relevant to the psychological or behavioural properties of the group (Andreychik & 
Gill, 2015).  
Whilst research has considered these beliefs in prejudice formation (e.g., 
Andreychik & Gill, 2015: Pehrson et al., 2009; Zagefka et al., 2012), no research has 
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considered whether ingroup and outgroup essentialist beliefs concurrently predict 
prejudice, and moreover, that the way in which these beliefs relate to prejudice may 
depend on whether they concern beliefs about us or beliefs about them. In addition, 
whilst some studies have explored the interface between entitativity and natural kind 
beliefs in prejudice (e.g., Andreychik & Gill, 2015), most literature has explored these 
beliefs separately, thus potentially ignoring the interplay that these beliefs may have 
in prejudice formation. The current study therefore seeks to address this gap in the 
literature. 
Ingroup essentialism 
Concerning ingroup essentialist beliefs, prior research has found that essentialist 
beliefs satisfy a range of identity motives and existential concerns, thus facilitating 
identification to groups (e.g., Castano et al., 2003a; Herrera & Sani, 2013; Sani et al., 
2007). However, they also may make individuals more susceptible to perceiving 
threats because they provide clearer distinctions of “who we are” and “who we are 
not” that may increase concerns over group contamination, trespassing and change 
(Zagefka et al., 2010, 2012).  
For example, natural kind beliefs imply that certain individuals (e.g., British-
Muslims) cannot be a member because they do not have it “in their blood”, and as 
such their presence is perceived to be threatening to group continuity and “real 
Britishness” (Pehrson et al., 2009; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014a; Zagefka et al., 
2012). As such, natural kind beliefs that imply the group is historically invariant, with 
clear-cut boundaries that are impermeable, may particularly be related to perceiving 
Muslims as threatening to the group because they imply that the group should not be 
107 
 
prone to socio-cultural shaping (e.g., Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014a; Zagefka et al., 
2012).  
Similarly, as entitativity provides clear group prototypes (e.g., Hogg, 2009), it 
may be associated with increased sensitivity to those who deviate from this prototype. 
This is often reported to be the case with British-Muslims who are deemed to be in 
direct conflict with British values (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010; Cinnirella, 2014; Poole, 
2002). As such, a common response may be to derogate those members (black-sheep 
effects; Marques & Paez, 1994), which prior research indicates is most prominent 
when the group is perceived as highly entitative (Lewis & Sherman, 2010). 
Additionally, individuals may choose to exclude these members as a strategy to 
maintaining ingroup entitativity (Castano, 2004b).  
 Alternatively, another reason why ingroup entitativity beliefs may be related 
to prejudice is that they not only increase the perception of threat, but may also 
legitimise the display of prejudice. This is because entitativity leads to a perception 
that group members are in pursuit of collective interests, and that prejudice is more 
acceptable when protecting the groups’ collective interest from those that challenges 
its’ symbolic or realistic well-being (Effron & Knowles, 2015). As such, it is argued 
that entitativity produces a ‘licensing effect’ that legitimises the expression of 
implicitly held biases. Supporting this notion, Effron and Knowles (2015) find that 
when the ingroup is highly entitative, individuals are more likely to view prejudice as 
socially acceptable, and it increases the effect of social identification on prejudicial 
attitudes.  
 In sum, whether concerning ingroup natural kind or entitativity beliefs, it is 
believed these beliefs should be related to Islamophobic prejudice via increasing the 
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perception of threat. However, research has also identified that this should particularly 
be the case for those who strongly identify with the ingroup (Effron & Knowles, 2015; 
Pehrson et al., 2009), thus suggesting that these beliefs may produce a moderating 
effect on the link between social identity and threat perception. 
Outgroup essentialism 
A lot of what makes essentialist beliefs so appealing to see in one’s own group, may 
conversely be the reason that essentialist beliefs about outgroups are commonly 
associated with negative intergroup outcomes such as stereotyping (Bastian & 
Haslam, 2006, 2007; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2007), threat perception (Abelson et al., 
1998; Castano et al., 2003b) and prejudice (Haslam et al., 2002). 
 Whilst ingroup entitativity may lead to perceptions of group homogeneity and 
a clear group prototype, these same beliefs when concerning the outgroup may make 
the category richly informative. As such, perceptions of entitativity have been found 
to be associated with stereotype endorsement (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2007; although 
see also Bastian & Haslam, 2006 for immutability beliefs predicting stereotyping) and 
preferences for stereotype-consistent behaviour (Bastian & Haslam, 2007). When 
these stereotypes are negative, as such is the case with Muslims in many Western 
nations (Richardson, 2004), these stereotypes can be considered antecedents of threat 
perception (Riek et al., 2006). 
Similarly, whilst ingroup entitativity can facilitate perceptions of collective 
cohesion, unity and action, this sense of cohesion and intentionality in relation to an 
outgroup can make them seem more threatening (Castano et al., 2003b). Moreover, 
this sense of intentionality and cohesion that is associated with entitativity beliefs may 
also increase perceptions of collective responsibility (Lickel et al., 2003) and vicarious 
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retribution against group members (Stenstrom et al., 2008). For example, Doosje and 
colleagues (2007) demonstrate that the degree to which terrorists are perceived as 
prototypical Muslims predicts perceptions that the wider Islamic community shares 
responsibility for attacks they carried out. This is because outgroup entitativity can 
imply other members are indirectly encouraging said behaviour or failing to prevent 
said behaviour (Lickel et al., 2003). Consequently, these inferences may make other 
Muslims guilty-by-association, and make them suitable candidates for hostility and 
prejudice even if they did not directly commit these attacks. 
In relation to natural kind beliefs, the evidence for their association to negative 
intergroup relations is less clear. Findings have demonstrated that beliefs in biological 
explanations of group behaviour, a type of natural kind belief, are associated with 
prejudice towards Blacks (Andreychik & Gill, 2015; Jayaratne et al. 2006). In contrast, 
Haslam et al. (2002) found that only entitativity beliefs, not natural kind beliefs, were 
associated with prejudice. However, they did find relationships between specific types 
of natural kind beliefs and prejudice towards homosexuals, although not always in the 
expected direction. Similarly, Haslam and Levy (2006) found that immutability beliefs 
(an aspect of natural kind beliefs) are associated with decreasing levels of prejudice 
towards homosexuals. 
There are a few possible reasons for the discrepant findings. Firstly, the 
findings here might represent the category specific nature of essentialist beliefs and 
their relationship to prejudice (e.g., ‘race’ versus ‘sexuality’; see Haslam et al., 2002). 
Secondly, is the way in which these studies have operationalised natural kind beliefs. 
For example, both studies that support the role of perceived biological explanations of 
behaviour as increasing prejudice, operationalise this as the differences of Blacks vis-
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à-vis Whites (Andreychik & Gill, 2015; Jayaratne et al., 2006).  This use makes it 
unclear to us which group is being essentialised; the ingroup, outgroup or both? In 
addition, the emphasis on this being an explanation for differences between these 
groups, in our view, incorporates considerable overlap with ideas of perceived 
symbolic threat, therefore further research is needed to understand the relationship 
these beliefs may have towards prejudice. 
Moreover, both these studies focus on a type of natural kind belief; namely the 
belief in biological determinants of group behaviour. It might therefore be that the 
extent to which natural kind beliefs are associated with prejudice, might be to the 
extent that these beliefs coalesce with ideas that group behaviour might be biologically 
and/or genetically determined. For example, immutability beliefs imply that 
membership to a group is fixed, and this might possibly be due to a belief in some sort 
of biological determinant to groups. We believe this explanation would therefore 
reconcile why Haslam’s research (Haslam et al., 2002; Haslam & Levy, 2006) finds 
that specific natural kind beliefs are related to prejudice, but not the entire natural 
kinds factor. 
Moreover, we propose that the relationship between target group natural kind 
beliefs and prejudice may also depend on the extent to which the group is also seen as 
highly entitative. This is because entitativity is the perception of group unity, whilst 
natural kind beliefs are an explanation of this unity (Lee et al., 2013). As we have 
previously outlined, outgroup entitativity beliefs can be richly informative about 
behaviour. When these behaviours can be further attributed to something immutable, 
potentially biological, it should increase the perceived threatening nature of the group 
because it implies that the group cannot “change”, or that the potential for these 
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behaviours are “lurking beneath the surface” of all group members (Andreychik & 
Gill, 2015; Denson et al., 2006). Indeed, news reporting of terrorism often 
decontextualizes behaviour, and emphasises the Muslim identity as the sole reason for 
behaviour (Poole, 2011). In short then, we expect that Muslim natural kind beliefs 
should enhance the relationship between entitativity and threat perception. Supporting 
this reasoning, Denson et al. (2006) found that essentiality (cf. natural kind beliefs) 
increased the effect of entitativity on collective responsibility, and Andreychik and 
Gill (2015) demonstrate that prejudice was highest when the group was viewed as both 
highly entitative and high in bio-essentialism. Moreover, Haslam et al’s (2000) 
findings demonstrate that groups that were essentialised on both dimensions tended to 
be ones that are most maligned in the social arena. 
Study two aims and hypotheses 
The present study has two aims. Firstly, we aim to replicate the findings of Study one 
concerning the relationship between perceived intergroup and motive threats. In 
addition, we aim to explore the role of types of essentialist beliefs in prejudice, and 
expand upon previous research in notable ways. Firstly, no research to our knowledge 
has explored whether ingroup and outgroup essentialism are independently related to 
prejudice, examining either beliefs about us (e.g., Effron & Knowles, 2015; Pehrson 
et al., 2009; Zagefka et al., 2012) or about them (e.g., Andreychik & Gill, 2015; 
Haslam et al., 2002; Jayaratne et al., 2006). Second, a large majority of this research 
reviewed above has often considered either the impact of entitativity or natural kinds 
on intergroup relations, with only one study to our knowledge explicitly exploring 
these components together in relation to prejudice (Andreychik & Gill, 2015). 
Moreover, Haslam et al’s (2002) research has suggested that there may exist complex 
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relationships between specific beliefs and prejudice, but little research has explored 
this. Therefore, the aims of this research are: (i) whether ingroup and outgroup beliefs 
are independently related to prejudice; (ii) the nature of the relationship between these 
beliefs and prejudice depend on whether they are about us or them; and (iii) add to the 
scarcity of literature concerning the interplay between entitativity and natural kind 
beliefs on prejudicial attitudes. 
 An online survey was conducted with non-Muslim British nationals that took 
measures of: national identification, essentialist beliefs about the categories Britain 
and Muslims, the perception of symbolic and realistic threats of Muslims, British 
identity motive threats, and finally a feeling-thermometer assessing levels of prejudice 
towards Muslims. Factor analysis was conducted to assess the possibility of a two-
factor structure of essentialism (e.g., natural kinds, and entitativity) for the categories 
Britain and Muslim, and path analysis was used to explore the relationships between 
the measured variables. 
Regarding British essentialist beliefs, it is expected that both natural kind and 
entitativity will be positively related to perceiving symbolic and realistic threats, but 
this will be most apparent for those high in British identification. In respect to Muslim 
essentialist beliefs, it is believed that only entitativity will be related to perceiving 
symbolic and realistic threats. However, it is expected that this will be strongest 
amongst those who not only view the group as high in entitativity, but also perceive 
the category Muslims as a natural kind.  
Moreover, given that the previous findings concerning natural kind beliefs 
have suggested that they are related because they imply differences between groups 
may be attributable to something biological (e.g., Andreychik & Gill, 2015; Pehrson 
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et al., 2009; Zagefka et al., 2012), we will also explore whether there are specific 
relationships between natural kind beliefs and perceived symbolic and realistic threat. 
Finally, we also expect to replicate the findings of Study one concerning the 
relationships between perceived realistic and symbolic threats and British identity 
motive threat. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N=592) were recruited to take part in an online survey. Participants were 
recruited via social media, British-based internet forums, as well as a local high school. 
Again, the sample size was determined by the number of participants that could be 
recruited by a certain end date. Of these, 159 participants were judged to have 
insufficient data points (missing data >25%) to be included in the final analysis, and 
50 participants did not meet the sample criteria (29= not British; 21= Muslim). The 
expectation maximisation (EM) algorithm was used for any remaining missing data to 
retain power. Little’s MCAR test indicated that the data were missing at random (χ2 
(1972) = 1976.31, p=.468), thus there was no systematic pattern to the missing data, 
and allowing the EM algorithm to be utilised to provide all participants with a full data 
set. Finally, Median Absolute Deviation was calculated and outliers assessed by 3 SD 
from the median (Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard & Licata, 2013). 15 participants were 
excluded on this basis. The final convenience sample therefore consisted of 368 non-
Muslim British participants (Mage = 24.35, SDage = 11.79), with 117 males, 246 females 
and 2 transsexual/intersex (three participants did not provide this information). Again, 
participants were predominantly White British (83.1%), and mostly identified as an 
atheist (68.1%) or a Christian (26.4%). 
114 
 
Measures and procedure 
The survey was pitched as an exploration of an individual’s beliefs about various 
social groups in Britain in attempt to mask the true aim of the study and minimise 
socially desirable responding. After first answering questions concerning British 
identity and beliefs, participants were again presented with the ‘click-to-spin’ wheel 
used in the first study that they were informed would randomly determine them 
another social group to answer further questions about. Like with Study one, this wheel 
always landed on Muslims so all participants answered questions concerning Muslims. 
British Identification was measured using a seven-item scale taken from 
Cinnirella (1997). We chose to change to a more validated measure of British 
identification to ensure that our findings were reproducible with other measures of 
identification. Sample items include: ‘To what extent do you feel British?’; and ‘How 
important to you is being British?’. These items provided a good level of reliability (α 
= .87) with a higher score on this scale reflecting stronger identification. Responses 
were provided on a seven-point Likert scale with extremely (7) and not at all (1) as the 
scale anchors. 
Essentialism scales were taken from Haslam et al. (2000, 2002) and were 
repeated twice in response to both participants’ beliefs about the social categories 
‘British’ and ‘Muslim’. These nine items aimed to tap into a range of elements 
associated with essentialist beliefs including discreteness, uniformity, 
informativeness, naturalness, immutability, stability, inherence, necessity, and 
exclusivity. These items were rated on seven-point Likert scales and had personalised 
scale anchors (Haslam et al., 2000). The scales for necessity, uniformity, 
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informativeness, inherence, and exclusivity were reverse scored. A Principal 
Component Analysis will be used to explore the structure of these beliefs. 
The measures for intergroup threats and threatened identity motives were the 
same as used in the first study7. The symbolic threat (α = .93), economic threat (α = 
.91) and physical threat of terrorism (α = .95) all provided an excellent level of 
reliability. In addition, prejudice towards Muslims was measured using the feeling-
thermometer that was deployed in Study one. 
Results 
A principal components analysis using varimax rotation was first conducted on the 
nine essentialist items to assess the structure of essentialist beliefs for the social 
categories Muslims and Britain. A two-factor structure was confirmed for Britain, 
whilst a three-factor structure was extracted for Muslims. For both categories, the 
beliefs of inherence, informativeness, exclusivity, uniformity, and necessity8 
resembled one factor that closely matches the entitativity dimension found by Haslam 
et al. (2000, 2002). The second factor for both categories included the beliefs of 
discreteness, immutability, and stability, whilst naturalness was included in this factor 
when concerning beliefs about Britain, but was a distinct factor when concerning 
essentialist beliefs about Muslims9. This second factor resembles the natural kinds 
dimension also found by Haslam et al. (2000, 2002). All items had factor loadings of 
                                                          
7 The item for meaning was changed to ‘I feel that Muslims in Britain are devaluing the meaning of 
being British’ due our belief that the previous wording has too much overlap with continuity threat. 
8 It should be noted that in Haslam et al’s (2000, 2002) research, necessity was found to be part of the 
natural kinds factor. However, Keller’s (2005) research also found necessity beliefs to belong to the 
entitativity factor, so our findings are not entirely inconsistent with prior research. 
9 Exploratory multiple regression analyses of the expected variables and the Muslim naturalness belief 
as a separate predictor yielded no significant results, thus we dropped this belief from the final 
analysis and it will be discussed no further. 
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>.50 (for precise loadings and variances of each factor, see Appendix table 1). 
Subsequently, composite scores of each latent factor were computed to use in the 
analysis. In line with Aiken & West (1991), all predictor variables were standardised 
before interaction terms were computed10. 
Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations of all the measured 
variables are displayed in table 3 below. As with Study one, path analysis was 
conducted with Amos (version 21), using bootstrapping of 1000 samples to test for 
mediation effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Any significant interactions were probed 
using simple slopes analyses with values computed at one standard deviation above 
and below the mean (Aiken & West, 1991). Goodness-of-fit was assessed using the 
same criteria as applied in Study one. 
We first tested a full mediation model (1a) where British identity and the 
essentialism factors predicted perceived intergroup threats, which then predicted 
perceived motive threat, which then in turn predicted prejudice towards Muslims. The 
residual variances of the predictors and mediating variables were permitted to 
correlate with each other. This model proved to be a reasonably good fit for the data 
(χ² (73) = 97.04, p =.032; CFI = .993; RMSEA = .030).  
                                                          
10 Despite having only specific hypotheses for interactions, we nonetheless probed the data for any 
possible interactions that we did not anticipate. Only one was identified between Muslim natural 
kinds and British entitativity (all other p’s>.10); all other non-predicted interactions were disregarded 
from any model testing. 
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Exploring modification indices however suggested that the model could be 
improved by inputting a direct path from the interaction of British identity and British 
entitativity to prejudice. This model (1b) proved to be a better fit for the data (χ² (72) 
= 87.66, p = .101; CFI = .995; RMSEA = .024) and was a significant improvement 
over the first model (Δχ² (1) = 9.38; p = .002). However, further modifications 
suggested the model could be improved by inputting a direct effect of the perceived 
physical threat of terrorism on prejudice. Inputting this pathway (model 1c) led to an 
excellent model fit (χ² (71) = 73.19, p = .499 CFI = .999; RMSEA = .009) and again 
proved to be a significant improvement over model 1b (Δχ² (1) = 14.47; p < .001). 
Table 4 presents the regression coefficients for the significant direct effects in model 
1c. 
The findings largely confirmed our predictions. British identity, as well as both 
British essentialist belief types positively predicted perceived intergroup threats 
(although the relationship between British natural kind beliefs and perceived symbolic 
threat was not statistically significant). These were qualified by an interaction between 
British identity and entitativity beliefs; however, there was no presence of an 
interaction concerning British natural kind beliefs and identification in predicting 
intergroup threats. For Muslim essentialist beliefs, entitativity positively predicted 
perceived intergroup threats, whilst there was an unexpected finding of Muslim natural 
kinds positively predicting perceived economic threat. These effects were qualified by 
the expected interaction between the Muslim natural kind and entitativity factors in 
predicting perceived symbolic threat and the physical threat of terrorism (the 
interaction did not reach significance for economic threat). Additionally, there was an 
unexpected interaction between British entitativity and Muslim natural kinds in 
predicting perceived symbolic threat and the physical threat of terrorism.  
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Table 4: Standardised coefficients of the significant direct effects of model 1c 
Dependent variable Predictors β 
Economic threat (R2=.22) British Identity (BI) .16** 
 British Natural Kind (BNK) .11* 
 British Entitativity (BE) .14** 
 Muslim Natural Kind (MNK) .16** 
 Muslim Entitativity (ME) .13* 
 BI x BE .16** 
   
Symbolic threat (R2=.29) BI .26*** 
 BE .14** 
 ME .22*** 
 BI x BE .10+ 
 MNK x ME .12* 
 MNK x BE -.17** 
   
Physical threat (R2=.26) BI .19*** 
 BNK .14** 
 BE .13** 
 ME .23*** 
 BI x BE .11* 
 MNK x ME .17** 
 MNK x BE -.12+ 
   
Esteem (R2=.32) Economic threat .13* 
 Symbolic threat .38*** 
 Physical threat .12+ 
   
Efficacy (R2=.63) Economic threat .29*** 
 Symbolic threat .39*** 
 Physical threat .23*** 
   
Continuity (R2=.58) Economic threat .10* 
 Symbolic threat .45*** 
 Physical threat .29*** 
   
Distinctiveness (R2=.56) Economic threat .13** 
 Symbolic threat .54*** 
 Physical threat .16** 
   
Belonging (R2=.53) Economic threat .15** 
 Symbolic threat .40*** 
 Physical threat  .27*** 
   
Meaning (R2=.63) Economic threat .24*** 
 Symbolic threat .44*** 
 Physical threat  .22*** 
   
Prejudice towards Muslims (R2=.42) Continuity  .14* 
 Belonging .18* 
 Physical threat .23*** 
 BI x BE .12** 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 
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Our findings were also mostly consistent with the findings of Study one, 
although all three intergroup threat types were now significantly related to all six 
motive threats as originally predicted. Finally, the perceived physical threat of 
terrorism, continuity threat and belonging threat, as well as the British identity and 
entitativity interaction, predicted prejudice towards Muslims. 
To assess these interactions, simple slopes analyses were conducted with the 
values computed at one standard deviation above and below the mean (Aiken & West, 
1991). These analyses revealed that identification had a stronger effect on perceiving 
intergroup threat under high (ST: β = .53, p<.001; ET: β = .42, p<.001; PT: β = .46, p 
=.001) than low (ST: β = .39, p<.001; ET: β = .22, p =.002; PT: β = .30, p =.001) 
entitativity beliefs. It also demonstrated a trending towards significant effect of 
identity on prejudice at high (β = .16, p =.140), but not low (β = -.04, p =.642) 
entitativity.  
Simple slopes also revealed that the effect of Muslim entitativity on intergroup 
threat perception was stronger at high (ST: β = .51, p<.001; PT: β = .59, p<.001) than 
low levels (ST: β = .34, p<.001; PT: β = .36, p<.001) of Muslim natural kind beliefs. 
Finally, the interaction between Muslim natural kind beliefs and British entitativity 
revealed that the effect of British entitativity was significant on intergroup threat 
perception at low levels (ST: β = .21, p =.006; PT: β = .20, p =.009), but surprisingly 
not at high levels of Muslim natural kind beliefs (ST: β = -.03, p =.800; PT: β = .04, p 
=.748). Thus, it appeared that when out-group beliefs were high, in-group beliefs 
played less of a role in threat perception, rather than both ingroup and outgroup beliefs 
interacting together to amplify the perception of intergroup threat. 
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Subcomponents of natural kind beliefs 
Because our prediction of the interaction between Muslim natural kind and entitativity 
beliefs particularly concerned the natural kind belief of immutability, and prior 
essentialism research has suggested that subcomponents of natural kind beliefs may 
have differences in their relationship to prejudice, we conducted follow-up analyses 
exploring these interactions with the natural kind belief types separately. We also 
explored this possibility in relation to the subcomponents of British natural kind 
beliefs as well. This was done for two reasons: (i) our findings had not detected an 
interaction between national identity and natural kind beliefs as highlighted by prior 
research; (ii) this prior research also concerned specific natural kind beliefs that imply 
the category is discrete and invariant to socio-cultural shaping. 
We first conducted analyses that removed the natural kind variables, as well as 
their interactions from the model, and in place input all natural kind beliefs separately. 
We also computed interactions for each Muslim natural kind belief and entitativity, 
and computed interactions for each British national kind belief and identity. Firstly, 
considering British natural kind beliefs, the findings suggested that discreteness (ST: 
β = .14, t=2.79, p=.006; PT: β =.21, t=4.25, p<.001; ET: β =.16, t=3.12, p=.002) and 
naturalness (ST: β =.16, t= 3.09, p=.002; PT: β =.13, t=2.40, p=.017; ET: β =.11, 
t=2.05, p=.041), were predictors of intergroup threat perception, but stability and 
immutability were unrelated to intergroup threat perception. However, despite the role 
of natural kind beliefs appearing to be specific to certain subcomponents, there was 
still no evidence of an interaction between these beliefs and identity (p’s>.10). 
For Muslim natural kind beliefs, the findings demonstrated that immutability 
beliefs predicted perceived symbolic (β =.15, t=2.83, p=.005) and economic threat (β 
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=.16, t=2.92, p=.004), but not the physical threat of terrorism (p>.10). However, there 
was also a critical interaction between Muslim immutability beliefs and Muslim 
entitativity in predicting the physical threat of terrorism (β =.12, t=2.47, p=.014). The 
findings also revealed a marginal interaction between Muslim stability beliefs and 
Muslim entitativity in predicting perceived symbolic threat (β =.10, t=1.83, p=.068). 
The pattern of these interactions mirrored the previous analyses. That is, the effect of 
entitativity was stronger on perceived intergroup threats under higher levels of 
immutability/stability. 
Mediation analyses 
Finally, bootstrapping analyses using 1000 bootstrapped samples and a 95% 
confidence level were conducted to assess the indirect effects of: (1) British identity, 
essentialism, and the interactions (predictors) on perceived motive threat and prejudice 
(outcomes) through intergroup threats (mediators); (2) perceived intergroup threats 
(predictors) on prejudice (outcome) through motive threats (mediators). When a 
confidence level does not include zero, bootstrapping indicates that significant 
mediation has occurred. 
The analyses revealed that perceived intergroup threats had generally mediated 
the relationship between identity and the essentialism factors to all six perceived 
motive threats, excluding a few exceptions. For British natural kind beliefs, intergroup 
threats had only significantly mediated the relationship to perceived efficacy and 
belonging threat; whilst for Muslim natural kind beliefs; perceived intergroup threats 
had only significantly mediated the relationship to perceived efficacy and meaning 
threat. In addition, the mediation analyses indicated that the six motive threats had 
significantly mediated the relationship between prejudice and identification and 
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essentialism factors. Importantly, they also demonstrated significant mediation of the 
link between perceived intergroup threat and prejudice. All other mediations were 
non-significant because the confidence level included zero (for precise effect sizes and 
confidence levels of all mediation analyses, see Appendix table 2).  
Discussion 
The findings of Study two offer increased support for the findings of the first study 
that perceived intergroup threats may compromise several identity motives, and that 
these motives mediate the link between perceived realistic and symbolic threats to 
prejudice. We do so by using a new and larger sample.  
 In addition, Study two also explored whether essentialist beliefs concerning 
Britain and Muslims are additional antecedents of intergroup threat perception beyond 
strength of British identification. The findings demonstrate that both British and 
Muslim essentialist belief types are related to threat perception and prejudice, but the 
precise relationships may be dependent on whether they concern us or them.  
For British essentialist beliefs, natural kind and entitativity were both related 
to perceiving a symbolic and realistic threat to identity, demonstrating that both types 
of beliefs are related to prejudice. These findings are mostly compatible with previous 
research on these beliefs concerning ingroup essentialism and prejudice (Effron & 
Knowles, 2015; Pehrson et al., 2009; Zagefka et al., 2012), but add to this by 
demonstrating the unique relationships of each belief type. Our findings also suggested 
that ingroup entitativity may strengthen the relationship of social identification on 
intergroup threat perception as highlighted by prior research (Effron & Knowles, 
2015), but did not support an interaction between natural kind beliefs and 
identification found by Pehrson et al. (2009). This difference might reflect that their 
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study focused on a specific type of natural kind belief akin to ethnic nationalism 
defined as “in the blood”, where the present study explored a range of natural kind 
beliefs.  
For Muslim essentialist beliefs, the findings demonstrated that entitativity was 
related to perceiving an intergroup threat from Muslims, and that this was particularly 
strongest when the group was not only seen as entitative, but also as a natural kind. 
We believe this finding is consistent with previous research demonstrating that groups 
that are highly essentialised on both dimensions tend to be the most socially 
stigmatised (Haslam et al., 2000), but also demonstrates in a novel way that individual 
differences in these beliefs predict the level of intergroup threat perception and 
prejudice towards that group. 
Additionally, our findings suggested that different subcomponents of natural 
kind beliefs were associated with prejudice depending on whether it was related to the 
ingroup or the outgroup. Beliefs that Britain is a discrete and natural category were 
related to perceiving an intergroup threat from Muslims. This might suggest that 
viewing the group as impermeable and natural leads to concerns of trespassing and 
feasibility of culture adoption (Pehrson et al., 2009; Zagefka et al., 2012). In contrast, 
beliefs that the category Muslims was immutable and stable were related to perceiving 
an intergroup threat, particularly when the group was also viewed as entitative. This 
implies that when behaviours of the group are attributed to something that is fixed and 
inalterable (e.g., genetic or biological) it makes groups seem more threatening. 
 Additionally, whilst we did not predict any relationship between ingroup and 
target group essentialist beliefs, it is interesting to note that the one interaction between 
ingroup and target beliefs that was found did not seem to suggest that prejudice is 
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related to essentialising both the germane groups in question. This contrasts with 
notions of prejudice resulting from a generalised cognitive style (e.g., Allport, 1954). 
Instead, the current study points to the idea that prejudice can be the result of when 
the ingroup or outgroup is defined in essentialist terms.  
General Discussion 
The main aim of this research was to establish a connection between intergroup threat 
types and motive-based threats as suggested by the IRM (Cinnirella, 2014). Across 
two online studies that explored the case of Islamophobic prejudice in the UK, the 
findings support the idea that perceiving realistic and symbolic threats may threaten 
several identity motives, and that these motives mediate the relationship between 
perceived intergroup threat and prejudice. In addition, we also identified that national 
identification (Study 1 and 2), and essentialist beliefs (Study 2) were predictors of 
threat perception. 
We believe these findings represent an important step in the right direction of 
clarifying the motivational underpinnings of the threat-prejudice link. By exploring 
intergroup threats from a motivational perspective, not only can we understand more 
clearly their potential impact upon identity processes as we have examined in the 
present research, but also the possibility of how individual differences in motive 
strengths may impact upon threat construction and response. For example, prior 
research has suggested that the relative motive strengths of distinctiveness and 
belonging are differentially associated with ingroup and outgroup evaluations for 
those high in national identification (Vignoles & Moncaster, 2007). We would suggest 
that the way in which symbolic or realistic threats may be perceived (and in turn 
responded to) might depend on how each motive is emphasised within one’s own 
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identity structure. Future research should explore this possibility, as it may suggest 
that interventions designed to reduce prejudice may be more effective if they are 
individually tailored to individual identity structures. 
Our research also supported the role of essentialist beliefs in predicting threat 
perception and prejudice. To our knowledge, this study is the first to demonstrate that 
both beliefs about us and beliefs about them may uniquely contribute towards 
prejudice formation. However, whilst both ingroup and outgroup entitativity were 
important predictors of threat perception, our findings suggested that different natural 
kind essentialist beliefs may contribute towards prejudice dependent on whether it 
concerned the ingroup or the outgroup. This might suggest that prejudice reduction 
strategies might be most effective targeting specific beliefs about the ingroup or the 
outgroup. Namely, that is the belief that Britain is a natural group that is not prone to 
socio-cultural shaping, with clear-cut boundaries over membership; or the beliefs that 
the Muslim identity is immutable and stable, particularly when it also coupled with a 
perception that the group is highly entitative. 
Like with all research, the current study has some limitations that should be 
acknowledged. Firstly, the correlational nature of the data leads to issues of implying 
causality of the observed effects. For example, it should be noted that there is some 
suggestion that the relationship between essentialism and prejudice may be 
bidirectional (Rangel & Keller, 2011; Newheiser, Tausch, Dovidio, & Hewstone, 
2009). Indeed, we would agree with the possibility of a cyclical relationship between 
beliefs and threat, whereby essentialism can lead to increased perception of threat, but 
also may be used to cope with this perceived threat (Rangel & Keller, 2011). Future 
research could explore experimental manipulations to unpick the causal connection 
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between the measured variables in the present study. Secondly, the present research 
focuses on the special case of Islamophobia in the UK, thus cannot speak to the 
generalisability of the IRM approach. However, as we have outlined previously, we 
have no reason to believe that other prejudices would not benefit from a similar 
approach as deployed here in the present study, but researchers should consider the 
variety of societal, temporal, contextual and cross-cultural variations that may 
influence how intergroup threats impact upon identity processes. Likewise, the 
specific relationships of ingroup and outgroup essentialism to prejudice outlined in the 
present study may be context- and content-specific to the current focus of 
Islamophobia in the UK.  Indeed, existing research suggests that essentialist beliefs 
can predict both increasing and decreasing levels of prejudice dependent on the group 
that is essentialised (e.g., Haslam et al., 2002). Moreover, essentialism should not be 
considered inherently oppressive, nor de-essentialism inherently progressive, but this 
instead depends on the context of how they are used (Verkuyten, 2003), and whether 
the other group is viewed as an enemy or an ally (Castano et al., 2003b). Further 
research exploring the specific contents associated with groups that are essentialised 
is warranted as it may help explain not only the conditions upon which prejudice may 
thrive, but can also be reduced. 
Finally, some researchers may be sceptical about the need to consider 
intergroup threat as threatening six distinct motives, particularly as not all six motives 
independently predicted prejudice in the current studies. However, it should be noted 
that prior research has identified that each motive makes an independent contribution 
to identity formation (e.g., Vignoles et al., 2002, 2006), and that our suggestion that 
perceiving intergroup threats can be broken down into constituent elements of 
different perceived motive threats, would imply that they should have considerable 
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shared variance. However, future research is required to further validate a six-factor 
approach to threat perception, perhaps by using multi-item scales to more accurately 
determine the unique role of each motive in threat perception and response. 
In sum, this research points to a motivational underpinning of prejudice, 
demonstrating that perceiving realistic and symbolic threats can be considered to be 
related to perceiving identity motive threats outlined in IPT that in turn provoke 
prejudicial responses. Additionally, the findings also illustrate that identity, and 
essentialist beliefs about us and them, are potential antecedents of threat perception 
and prejudice. We feel that these findings are an important step in the right direction 
towards exploring the threat-prejudice link. Through further testing and elaboration of 
the IRM as a lens for understanding the motivational antecedents of prejudice, our 
hope is that this perspective may offer new ways to better understand and design 
prejudice reduction interventions.  
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Chapter IV: 
The role of death awareness in 
motivational identity  
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Abstract 
The first two studies of the thesis have suggested that the motives of self-esteem, 
efficacy, continuity, meaning, belonging, and distinctiveness may be compromised 
when experiencing realistic or symbolic threats to identity. Utilising a TMT 
framework, this chapter focuses on whether these motives serve more basic and vital 
functions of managing existential concerns. Study 1 demonstrates that reminders of 
death (v control) promote the accessibility of central aspects of oneself that are strong 
source of these motives. In addition, participants who were reminded of death tended 
to list special social identities that were considered to have immortality properties. 
Study 2 demonstrates that threats to these motives increase death-thought 
accessibility, and that immortality striving may be particularly important when 
experiencing threats to continuity. These findings demonstrate that individuals may be 
driven to construct identities that satisfy these motives because of their importance in 
managing death awareness. The discussion briefly considers these findings in relation 
to the current focus of the thesis on Islamophobia in the UK. 
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Introduction 
TMT (Greenberg et al.,1986) is inspired by the works of Ernest Becker (1971, 1973), 
and suggests that the presumably universal striving for self-esteem and meaning 
derives from the need to buffer from deep-rooted anxieties concerning our transient 
existence that arise from the unique human awareness of the inevitability of death. 
Various research converges to support the sense of these motives as useful in 
alleviating existential concerns. Firstly, the anxiety-buffering hypothesis proposes that 
if these motives serve to function against the awareness of death, then fortifying these 
psychological structures should minimise reactions to reminders of death. Findings 
show that experimentally elevating self-esteem reduces anxious responses to death-
related stimuli (Greenberg et al., 1992), and reduces derogation of others when 
reminded of death (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997; although see Juhl & Routledge, 2014 
for distinctions between state v trait self-esteem in MS effects). Second, the MS 
hypothesis states that reminders of death should increase striving for self-esteem and 
meaning. Supporting this, studies demonstrate that MS increases behaviours that are 
relevant to one’s self-esteem (Ben-Ari et al., 1999; Ferraro et al., 2005; Goldenberg et 
al., 2000; Hansen et al., 2010). Additionally, several studies suggest that MS increases 
the need to affirm a sense of meaning (Landau, Kosloff, & Schmeichel, 2011) or 
meaning-related structures, particularly for those that are high in personal need for 
structure (Landau, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Martens, 2006; Vess, 
Routledge, Landau, & Arndt, 2009). Thirdly, the DTA hypothesis proposes that threats 
to these psychological structures should temporarily increase the accessibility of 
death-related thoughts. Supporting this assertion, Hayes et al. (2008b) found that 
threatening self-esteem via an intelligence test or negative personality feedback 
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increased DTA. Similarly, Webber et al. (2015) found that various meaning-related 
threats increased DTA. 
Despite research supporting the role of meaning and self-esteem in TMT, there 
is a scarcity of research which has explored what other motives may be important in 
managing concerns about death. It is our belief that TMT can speak to a broader array 
of human motives beyond self-esteem and meaning. The present research focuses on 
the extent to which the motives of continuity, efficacy, distinctiveness, and belonging 
(as outlined in IPT) derive, at least in part, in managing existential concerns. We 
briefly outline each motive, how they may be viewed through a TMT lens, and 
evidence supporting their role in managing death awareness. 
Continuity 
The desire to preserve the perception of “continuity across time and situation” has 
been emphasised as a core motive in identity construction and maintenance 
(Breakwell, 1986, p.24). This need for self-continuity has been identified not just as 
important at a personal-level but also at a group-level (e.g., Vignoles et al., 2006; 
Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010) with perceived threats to group continuity linked to 
increased opposition to the source of the threat (e.g., Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014a). 
However, whilst perceived threats to continuity can lead to resistance to change, 
continuity itself does not necessarily preclude change, as individuals may construct 
narratives that help maintain a sense of continuity between their past, present and 
future selves (Chandler, Lalonde, Sokol, & Hallet, 2003; McAdams, 2001). 
Experiencing a loss of subjective continuity has been associated with various negative 
outcomes including negative affect and suicide (Breakwell, 1986; Chandler & 
Lalonde, 1995). 
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 Whilst the desire to feel that one’s past, present and future are interconnected 
speak to the continuity of one’s ‘life story’, this desire to feel continuous is not limited 
to just one’s lifespan, but also includes a sense that some symbolic or literal aspect of 
the self will continue after death (Becker, 1973; Lifton, 1973). Lifton (1973) 
particularly argues that feeling that some aspect of oneself would continue is important 
in accepting one’s own personal mortality. This aspect of continuity speaks directly to 
TMT, which suggests that individuals strive to transcend death literally or 
symbolically (Greenberg et al., 1986). However, maintaining a general sense of 
continuity throughout life is likely important in managing existential concerns as it 
may distance oneself from the knowledge that death is inevitable. Moreover, 
integrating the self into a temporally structured narrative may manage death awareness 
by transforming isolated, disconnected events into an orderly and significant manner 
(see Becker, 1973; Lifton, 1973; Landau, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2008) 
 Research from a TMT perspective supports the idea that continuity may be 
important in managing existential concerns. Firstly, MS increases the preference to 
recall events in a coherent, interconnected and temporally structured manner (Landau, 
Greenberg, & Sullivan, 2009; Landau, Greenberg, Sullivan, Routledge & Arndt, 
2009). In addition, nostalgia which has been identified as facilitating a sense of 
continuity, and a coping response to a subjective loss of continuity (e.g., Sedikides, 
Wildschut, Routledge, & Arndt, 2015), buffers the effect of MS on the accessibility of 
death-related constructs and worldview defence (Juhl, Routledge, Arndt, Sedikides, & 
Wildschut, 2010; Routledge, Arndt, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2008). In addition, Sani 
and colleagues (2008) demonstrate that MS effects of increased group identification 
are mediated by increased perceptions of collective continuity.  
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Efficacy 
Efficacy is defined as the desire to feel “competent and in control” of one’s life 
(Breakwell, 1988, p.194), and has been considered fundamental in human motivation 
and identity (Codol, 1981; Deci & Ryan, 2000). In absentia of feelings of efficacy, 
individuals may experience futility and depression (Bandura, 1997; Breakwell, 1993). 
 Why does the awareness of death motivate individuals to strive for competency 
and control? Recognition of one’s own mortality, and by extension the uncontrollable 
and inevitable nature of it, is to recognise one’s own deepest vulnerabilities (Becker, 
1973; Greenberg et al., 1997). As such, individuals may seek to create perceptions of 
efficacy by overestimating their own control or competency (e.g., Alicke & Govorun, 
2005; Langer, 1975), and viewing the world as less chaotic and more orderly (Becker, 
1973; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1998). Moreover, Becker (1973, p.145) 
notes that individuals seek to distil the overwhelming chaos of the universe and bestow 
objects/persons with the “transcendent powers of the universe” that in turn affords the 
individual the power of control and fate. Supporting this idea, when confronted with 
this chaos through randomness primes, individuals increase the belief of the universe 
being governed by supernatural control (Kay, Moscovitch, & Laurin, 2010). Similarly, 
when personal control is threatened individuals compensate for this by increasing 
investment in social systems or religious beliefs (Kay et al., 2009; Shepherd et al., 
2011).  
 Supporting the role of efficacy in TMT processes, findings demonstrate that 
MS has no effect on desire for personal control and worldview defence when asked to 
write about a death that one had control over such as euthanasia (Fritsche, Jonas, & 
Fankhänel, 2008). Moreover, MS effects are reduced in those who have a high internal 
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locus of control (Talati, Fritsche, Du, Jonas, & Castano, 2013). Similarly, exposure to 
terrorism news report increases prejudice, but only amongst those who lack a sense of 
control (Greenaway et al., 2014). Taken together, it seems that a sense of self-efficacy 
may constitute an important existential anxiety buffer; not just because the awareness 
of death itself per se that is frightening, but also the fact that we lack control over it. 
Distinctiveness and Belonging 
The needs to belong and to see oneself as unique have been suggested to be powerful 
motivations shaping identity and behaviour (Brewer, 1991; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). 
Whilst seemingly contradictory motivational states, it has been suggested that 
individuals seek to maintain an optimal balance between these opposing needs (e.g., 
Optimal Distinctiveness Theory; Brewer, 1991). For example, individuals desire to 
affiliate to groups to satisfy their need for affiliation (e.g., Psychologist), but at the 
same time desire to view their group as distinctive from others (e.g., Social 
Psychologist). Similarly, individuals like to feel that their behaviour and attitudes are 
consensually validated (e.g., Festinger, 1954), and often demonstrate biases to validate 
their behaviours (see Marks & Miller, 1987 for a review on false-consensus effects); 
but can also demonstrate biases that inflate distinctiveness (false-uniqueness effects; 
e.g., Perloff & Brickman, 1982). 
 In his analysis of the human condition, Becker (1973) draws heavily upon the 
ideas of Otto Rank (1932), suggesting that these needs serve to protect against deep-
rooted anxieties about death. Human beings need to pursue a unique identity and a 
sense of distinctiveness to feel that they make their own valid worthwhile contribution, 
but at the same time need to identify with groups and belong to something beyond 
their own corporeal, physical existence. By straying too far one way or the other 
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humans open themselves up to fear of loneliness or to being no one. He refers to these 
opposing needs as the “absolute tension of dualism” (Becker, 1973, p.153).  
 The need to belong and feel distinctive might operate in accordance with the 
dual-components of worldviews (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997). First, 
TMT proposes that humans need to identify with worldviews, and feel that they are 
consensually validated, thus affirming the conceptions of oneself and reality. 
Pyzsczynski and colleagues (1996) demonstrate that when exposed to subtle death 
reminders, individuals exaggerate social consensus estimates for their attitudes that 
may implying a sense of belonging. Moreover, when existentially threatened, 
individuals may feel the need to affirm their common bonds with others by increasing 
their sense of belongingness (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2013). However, when one’s 
sense of a common bond is reduced (such as being separated from a loved one), this 
increases the accessibility of death-related constructs (Florian, Mikulincer, & 
Hirschberger, 2002; Mikulincer, Florian, Birnbaum, & Malishkevich, 2002); 
therefore, implying that when one’s sense of belonging is threatened, death-related 
thoughts become closer to conscious awareness. 
 The second component of worldviews is to promote a sense of value and self-
worth to the individual. Whilst traditionally considered as the self-esteem component 
of worldviews by TMT researchers, distinctiveness may also be an important 
motivational construct in satisfying this component. SIT suggests that achieving a 
sense of positive distinctiveness operates as a source of attaining self-esteem (Abrams 
& Hogg, 1988). Whilst this might suggest that distinctiveness only serves to achieve 
self-esteem, other researchers have suggested this need is separate from self-esteem 
maintenance, and findings appear to support its own unique contribution to identity 
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(e.g., Brewer, 1991; Vignoles et al., 2000, 2006). Therefore, the need to feel different 
from others may be an important motive; in feeling that one is unique with their own 
unique value, one may be attempting to buffer from death-related concerns. 
 Two studies have explicitly explored the role of distinctiveness and belonging 
in TMT processes. Firstly, Walsh and Smith (2007) explored how priming of the self 
or gender after MS may change desires for affiliation and uniqueness. Exploring 
behavioural choices to picking a colour pen (Study 1) or magazine (Study 2) where 
one choice represented uniqueness and the other inclusiveness, they found that 
participants in the MS condition who were primed with the self opted for the unique 
choice, whilst those primed with gender opted for the inclusive choice. Similarly, 
Simon, Greenberg, Arndt, Pyszczynski, Clement and Solomon (1997) demonstrate 
how threatening one’s sense of distinctiveness or belonging via false feedback on a 
personality test led to changes in social consensus estimates under MS. That is, when 
participants were informed that they were a social outsider, they inflated social 
consensus estimates to re-affirm their sense of belonging; whilst those that were 
informed they were a social conformer, underestimated social consensus estimates to 
re-affirm their sense of distinctiveness. As such, these studies demonstrate that when 
reminded of death, the need to satisfy inclusionary or uniqueness needs are an 
important component to worldviews. Additionally, Simon et al. (1997) also 
demonstrate that when one’s sense of belonging or distinctiveness is threatened, MS 
may motivate a need to re-affirm ones sense of the threatened motive. However, 
neither of these studies, in our view, necessarily demonstrates the need to balance these 
opposing needs (“tension of dualism”; Becker, 1973).  
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If reminders of death engender a need to balance these opposing motives, then 
MS may increase the accessibility of identities that satisfy both uniqueness and 
inclusionary desires. In other words, when reminded of death, there should exist a 
positive relationship between one’s sense of belonging and one’s sense of 
distinctiveness. This is because as one’s sense of belonging (or distinctiveness) 
increases, then so should the sense of the other motive to ensure these needs are 
harmonised. Otherwise, an individual may open themselves up to feelings of isolation 
or insignificance (depending upon which motive is not satisfied), that in either case 
would be existentially threatening. However, this relationship should be strongest (or 
only present) when reminded of death, as MS according to TMT heightens the need 
to affirm one’s worldview/sense of self. In line with Becker’s (1972) analysis, this 
should include the need to balance these opposing motives. 
Study 3 aims and hypotheses 
Study 1 and 2 of this thesis have so far demonstrated that the identity motives of 
meaning, self-esteem, continuity, efficacy, distinctiveness and belonging may be 
compromised when experiencing threat. Utilising a framework of TMT, we have 
outlined the possibility that these identity motives may serve more basic and vital 
functions of managing existential concerns. The present study attempts to explore this 
possibility.  
 Arndt and colleagues (2002) using spreading activation models have put 
forward a suggestion to the cognitive architecture underlying TMT. They suggest that 
if identifying with a worldview serves self-protective needs against the awareness of 
death, then when death becomes accessible, so should the most central elements of 
one’s worldview that an individual identifies with. Compatible with this analysis, IPT 
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(Breakwell, 1986; Vignoles et al., 2006) suggests that the subjective importance of 
each aspect or element of one’s self-definition, depends on the extent to which each 
identity element satisfies (or frustrates) these motives. In other words, those elements 
of oneself that confer a sense of self-esteem, efficacy, meaning, distinctiveness, 
belonging, and/or continuity should be construed more central to one’s identity. In 
testing this, Vignoles and colleagues (2002, 2006) have designed a method that 
attempts to capture a holistic snapshot of an individual’s identity structure, as well as 
measuring each identity element’s satisfaction (or frustration) of individual motives. 
We chose to deploy this method of assessing identity in our present study for a few 
reasons. 
 First, research exploring the role of identity in TMT has tended to focus on 
specific identities, preselected by researchers, and this reduces the generalisability of 
TMT processes on identity. Second, by allowing participants to freely recall aspects 
of themselves, we believe we can more accurately assess spreading activation claims 
made by Arndt et al. (2002). Third, TMT stresses the importance of immortality 
striving, and some research has suggested that social identities may be a particularly 
useful strategy to managing existential concerns (Castano & Dechesne, 2005). Again, 
by utilising an unconstrained method to explore identity, we believe we can more 
accurately assess whether these represent useful strategies in defending against death. 
The first study of this chapter assesses whether MS increases the tendency to 
affirm one sense of self as a source of these motives when asked to describe oneself. 
In addition, we also assessed whether MS affects attitudes towards Britain and 
Muslims, in line with TMT research on worldview defence (e.g., Greenberg et al., 
1992), as well as our interest in the current thesis in examining anti-Muslim attitudes. 
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To this end, we exposed participants to either a death reminder or aversive 
topic. Then after a delay, participants were asked to generate aspects (identity 
elements) about themselves and subsequently rate each aspect in terms of its relevance 
to the self-concept, and how much it satisfies the motives of esteem, efficacy, 
continuity, distinctiveness, belonging, and meaning. Aggregate scores of the motives 
were taken which would compare whether participants exposed to a death reminder 
wrote about themselves in ways that emphasised a sense of continuity, meaning, 
esteem, and efficacy. 
To explore whether distinctiveness and belonging needs required to be 
harmonised after a reminder of death, we assessed this in two ways. Firstly, plausibly 
an increased sense of belonging (or vice versa) would heighten the need to see oneself 
as distinctive at the same time to ensure a balance between the motives. Therefore, 
one might expect reminders of death to strengthen the relationship between the 
motives of distinctiveness and belonging. Alternatively, harmonising these motives 
could also result from having similar levels of each motive. Therefore, it is possible 
that reminders of death would decrease the discrepancy between one’s sense of 
belonging and one’s sense of distinctiveness. 
 Additionally, raters coded for whether these identity elements were either 
social identities or personal characteristics, as well as if they could be considered to 
have death transcendent properties. This could assess whether reminders of death 
emphasise defining oneself at a higher level of abstraction because of the 
transcendental properties of social groups (Castano & Dechesne, 2005). Finally, 
participants also rated an ostensibly random profile, that identified the individual as 
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either British or a Muslim. This could assess whether reminders of death engendered 
heightened anti-Muslim sentiment. 
H1: The MS group will demonstrate higher levels of DTA relative to the control after 
a brief delay. 
H2: The MS group will generate identity elements that are rated more central to their 
identity than the control group. 
H3: The MS group will rate their identity elements as higher in satisfaction of the 
motives of meaning, self-esteem, efficacy, and continuity. 
H4: Identity element ratings for the motives of belonging and distinctiveness will be 
more strongly associated in the MS condition. 
H5: The MS group will generate more identity elements that permit a sense of literal 
or symbolic immortality. 
H6: The MS group will generate more social identity elements than the control group. 
H7: The MS group will rate a British profile more favourably, but a Muslim profile 
less favourably relative to the control. 
Method 
Participants  
Eighty-three sixth form (high school11) students from schools in London and the 
South-East of England were recruited for the study. This sample size was determined 
                                                          
11 A problem with conducting TMT research is the need to ensure participants have not taken part in 
any prior TM research. This is because TM research attempts to either make death-related thoughts 
salient or measure the accessibility of death-related thoughts in a manner that does not arouse 
suspicion. As the current thesis has conducted multiple studies using TMT paradigms, these would all 
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by the number of participants that could be collected at the participating schools. Three 
participants’ data was removed from the study: 1 was removed because they did not 
complete the delay measures, and 2 were removed because their answers on the ‘Who 
Are You’ task indicated they did not take the task seriously. Therefore, the final 
sample consistent of 80 participants (39= Dental Pain; 41= Mortality Salience), with 
15 participants identifying as male, and 65 female (Mage = 16.70 SDage = .58). Of these, 
26 participants indicated that they were either not British or were a Muslim. These 
participants were therefore excluded from the analysis for profile ratings12. Ethical 
approval was given by the Psychology Departmental Ethics Committee at Royal 
Holloway, University of London. 
Materials and procedure 
Participants were fed a cover story that informed them that the study was investigating 
the relationship between personality and identity. Participants were tested in batches 
of 10-20 at a time, and were randomly allocated to either the dental pain (DP) or 
mortality salient (MS) condition.  
Participants first completed a filler personality measure, and then ostensibly 
answered a second personality measure that asked them two open-ended questions 
about their own death (Rosenblatt et al., 1989) or parallel questions about dental pain, 
a topic that is commonly used as a comparison in the TMT literature. This acted as the 
MS manipulation. 
                                                          
need to use unique samples that would be difficult to collect only using university students. Therefore, 
for practical reasons, some of the data in this thesis was collected from local high schools. 
12 An additional 3 participants did not provide answers to this task. 
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After completing the personality section, participants next completed the 20-
item short-form Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) and a filler word search. This is because existing TMT research 
suggests that distal defences are only activated after a brief delay when thoughts of 
death are outside of conscious awareness (e.g., Arndt et al., 1997b). The PANAS is 
commonly used as a delay task by TMT researchers because it can assess whether the 
effects of MS are the result of changes in affect. As expected, no differences were 
found on positive or negative affect because of the manipulation (p’s>.50). Finally, 
participants then completed a word-fragment task consisting of 20 words (e.g., 
Schimel et al., 2007). This is a traditional measure of DTA and was used here as check 
that the manipulation was successful. 6 of the 20 words could be completed in a death-
related manner. These were buried, dead, grave, killed, skull and coffin.  
Who Are You 
After completing these tasks, participants were then presented with the Who Are You 
task (Vignoles et al., 2002, 2006). Participants were asked to freely recall 10 aspects 
or identity elements about themselves without worrying about order or importance, but 
to answer quickly. The subsequent pages of the booklet then asked participants to rate 
each of their identity elements that they generated on eight questions. Two questions 
measured the perceived centrality of each identity element (α = .58)13. The other six 
questions all tapped into the relationship each element had with the six motives of self-
esteem, efficacy, continuity, distinctiveness, belonging and meaning. Scores within 
                                                          
13 A low reliability here might reflect that the analysis was conducted on the mean centrality scores, 
which might have increased the variability between the two measures. 
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each motive were averaged to produce an overall score for each motive or importance 
to identity. Higher scores reflect stronger satisfaction in the motive or centrality. 
Participants’ answers to the generation of identity elements were further coded 
for whether they were either a personal characteristic or a social identity and whether 
their answers indicated evidence of literal or symbolic immortality. Although 
researchers have argued cogently for a relational-level of self-representation (e.g., 
Sedikides & Brewer, 2001), social identities were determined as any element that 
indicated a group of two (or more) individuals (Turner, 1982). Evidence of 
immortality here was limited to a religious, ideological or spiritual belief; family or 
significant other; or an attachment to an eternal group (e.g., human, gender, ethnicity, 
nationality, sports teams). Sports teams are included here because prior research has 
suggested they may serve an immortality function, as sports teams may often 
memorialise deceased ex-players and fans (Dechesne, Greenberg, & Schimel, 2000)14. 
Multiple elements that indicated the same immortality strategy were only coded once 
(e.g., multiple family members listed was only counted as one immortality element). 
A random sub-set of 24 participants’ responses was also coded by a second rater who 
was blind to the experimental condition and hypotheses. There was general agreement 
between ratings for number of immortality elements (r=.77, p<.001), and the number 
of elements that were a personal characteristic or social identity (r=.97, p<.001). 
Additionally, both raters had strong agreement in whether answers included the 
presence of an immortality element (cohen’s kappa = .83, p <.001). 
                                                          
14 Whilst simply living up to the values promoted in one’s cultural worldview may offer an 
immortality function (e.g., Dechesne et al., 2003), practically this would be impossible to code for. As 
such for practical reasons, immortality in the present study was limited to only particular social 
identities with immortality attributes. 
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Profile rating 
Finally, participants were presented with a profile that they were informed had been 
randomly selected from a previous study where the Who Are You task had been used. 
This page looked the same as the page participants were presented with for this task, 
but already had 10 characteristics filled out. Participants saw a profile where the 
individual had written their answer to element 2 as identifying them as either British 
or a Muslim. The placing of this item was both to ensure it was seen by the participant, 
but also that it inferred a sense of importance to the person’s identity without arousing 
suspicion about the aims of this task. The other 9 answers were kept consistent 
between the profiles and indicated neutral and generic characteristics (happy, clever, 
kind, my family, my best friend, artistic, shy, quiet and messy). Participants were asked 
to rate this individual on Likert scales from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7) 
on two items that asked them how much they thought they were similar to this person 
and how much they think they would like this person. Pretesting the nine generic 
characteristics on the same scale suggested the ratings for these characteristics varied 
just above the theoretical mid-point of the scale (M = 4.80, SD = .92).  
At the end of the questionnaire, participants were asked to provide some short 
demographic information. This was purposefully placed at the end of the questionnaire 
packet to avoid any inadvertent order effects on the Who Are You task. Finally, 
participants were probed for suspicion about the study and debriefed. 
Results 
Death Thought Accessibility  
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to assess H1, where it was expected that 
the MS group would show higher levels of DTA. The findings indicated a significant 
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effect of MS (t (70.37) = 2.37, p=.021, d = .57), with those in the MS group completing 
more word-fragments in a death-related manner (M = 2.27, SD = .84) than those in the 
DP group (M = 1.74, SD = 1.12). Therefore, the manipulation was successful. 
Identity responses 
We first assessed the effect of MS on responses to the Who Are You task. Firstly, we 
checked to see whether MS had any unexpected effects on task engagement. There 
was no evidence that number of responses generated was affected by MS (t (78) = 
1.06, p>.250). We next tested the hypothesis (H6) that there would be evidence of 
changes in self-categorisation as a coping mechanism to MS. Scores for this were 
generated by obtaining a percentage of elements listed by participants that were coded 
as either personal characteristic or social identity. This hypothesis was not supported 
as there were no differences in the number of personal characteristics (t (78) = 0.45, 
p>.500) or social identities listed (t (78) = 0.39, p>.500).  
 Next, we assessed H5 as to whether reminders of death would increase the 
number of identity elements that contained themes of symbolic or literal immortality. 
To assess this, we conducted both an independent t-test and chi-square on the effect 
of MS on both number of immortality elements listed, as well as presence of 
immortality (yes/no). Firstly, the t-test revealed a significant effect of MS on number 
of immortality elements listed (t (73.85) = 2.21, p =.030, d = .49), with the MS group 
(M = .85, SD = .96) offering more immortality elements than the DP group (M = .46, 
SD = .72). This became highly significant even after controlling for the possibility that 
the number of social identities listed (expressed as a percentage of total identity 
elements) as a potential confound (F (1, 77) = 8.79, p=.004, η2=.102). However, the 
chi-square was not significant, although was trending in the expected pattern (χ² (1) = 
147 
 
2.61, p = .106, Phi = .18), with 51.2% of the MS group offering an immortality 
attachment, whilst 33.3% of the DP group offering an immortality attachment15. Taken 
together, it seemed that there was something special about the type of social identities 
listed by participants in the MS group, and that this was not the product of different 
engagement in the task or a general increase in the number of social identities being 
provided. 
Identity ratings 
A one-way MANOVA was conducted to assess the effect of MS on the rating of 
identity elements along the dimensions of centrality (H2) and the six motives (H3)16 
(see table 5 for descriptive statistics). The findings revealed that the MS group rated 
their identity elements as significantly more central to their identity (F (1, 78) = 4.33, 
p=.041, η2=.053), and as more satisfying to the motives of self-esteem (F (1, 78) = 
6.18, p=.015, η2=.073), meaning (F (1, 78) = 4.84, p=.031, η2=.058), continuity (F (1, 
78) = 5.13, p=.026, η2=.062) and self-efficacy (F (1, 78) = 4.54, p=.036, η2=.055). 
                                                          
15 We speculated that family attachments might have masked this finding given that it would likely be 
a very prominent response irrespective of experimental condition. We therefore followed up this by 
removing family as a response for immortality. Our findings suggested this was the case: chi-square 
(χ² (1) = 3.75, p = .053, Phi =.22; MS= 34.1% v DP = 15.4%). The same pattern as the main findings 
emerged when exploring number of immortality elements listed even after controlling for number of 
social identity elements. 
16 It should be noted that Vignoles et al. (2002, 2006) have advocated cogently the importance of 
exploring the relationship of centrality and identity motives using within-person correlations. 
However, given our focus here is not on the relationship between these constructs, but instead on how 
MS may increase the accessibility of one’s most central identity elements, we deploy a different 
analysis that explores the mean ratings. 
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There were no effects found for the motives of belonging and distinctiveness (p’s 
>.50)17.  
We also explored the effect of MS on identity ratings for social identities and 
personal characteristics separately. For personal characteristics, the findings 
demonstrated a near significant effect for identity elements being rated as more central 
to identity after MS (F (1, 78) = 3.62, p=.061, η2=.044). There was also a significant 
effect of MS leading to increased satisfaction of the esteem motive (F (1, 78) = 7.11, 
p=.009, η2=.084), and approaching significant effects for the efficacy motive (F (1, 
78) = 3.17, p=.079, η2=.039) and meaning motive (F (1, 78) = 2.83, p=.096, η2=.035). 
The continuity, distinctiveness and belonging motives were however not significant 
(p’s>.20). For social identities, the findings demonstrated only an approaching 
significant effect of MS on increased satisfaction in the continuity motive (F (1, 78) = 
3.80, p=.057, η2=.072); all other findings were non-significant (p’s>.10). However, 
the pattern of increased motive ratings was still present.18 
Table 5: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for centrality and the six 
motives.  
                                                          
17 Despite the manipulation revealed no difference in positive or negative affect, we nonetheless 
conducted follow-up analyses on the identity ratings using affect as a covariate. Whilst positive affect 
was a marginally significant covariate in identity ratings (p<.10), the pattern of increased centrality 
and motive strengths was still present. 
18 It should be noted that as not all participants provided a social identity, that this may have reduced 
power in conducting this analysis leading to the pattern of the marginally non-significant effects. 
 Overall  
 
Personal 
Characteristic 
Social Identity 
 MS  DP  MS  DP  MS  DP  
Centrality 5.42 (.72) 5.06 (.81) 5.36 (.74) 5.01 (.93) 5.40 (1.18) 5.35 (1.00) 
Self-Esteem 4.98 (.96) 4.39 (1.15) 4.89 (1.07) 4.19 (1.26) 5.44 (1.21) 4.86 (1.73) 
Self-Efficacy 5.04 (.90) 4.61 (.89) 4.99 (1.00) 4.58 (1.05) 5.08 (1.10) 4.61 (1.42) 
Continuity 5.29 (.92) 4.80 (1.02) 5.09 (1.08) 4.76 (1.25) 5.69 (1.40) 4.93 (1.38) 
Distinctiveness 4.40 (1.16) 4.46 (1.06) 4.54 (1.09) 4.48 (1.09) 3.50 (1.60) 4.16 (1.74) 
Belonging 4.55 (.96) 4.48 (1.01) 4.28 (1.04) 4.32 (1.15) 5.38 (1.32) 5.31 (1.52) 
Meaning 5.00 (1.00) 4.48 (1.14) 4.80 (1.11) 4.35 (1.28) 5.62 (1.23) 5.24 (1.66) 
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We now tested whether MS would strengthen the relationship between 
distinctiveness and belonging motives (H4). To assess this, we first considered how 
the two motives were related in each condition separately. Bivariate correlations 
demonstrated that in the MS condition, belonging and distinctiveness were positively 
related (r=.30, p=.029), but were unrelated in the DP condition (p>.25). This pattern 
also remained consistent when exploring personal distinctiveness and belonging for 
MS participants (r=.40, p=.005), and again was not present in the DP condition 
(p>.20). However, this pattern was not statistically significant for considering social 
identity elements (p>.10). It seemed therefore that there was some support for the idea 
that MS distinctiveness and belonging are ontologically entwined.  
An alternative possibility is that MS does not increase the association between 
the two motives, but reduces the discrepancy between them. Additional analyses were 
therefore conducted computing the difference between the motive strengths (e.g., 
distinctiveness scores minus belonging scores). Plausibly, if MS engenders a need to 
balance these two motives, then the discrepancy between motive strengths should be 
smaller after MS. However, this possibility was not supported (p>.50). We also 
explored the difference in motive strengths for both personal and social identity 
elements separately but again no support for this was found (p’s>.10). 
Profile ratings 
Finally, we sought to examine the hypothesis that MS would change ratings of a profile 
dependent upon whether that individual was identified as British or a Muslim (H7). 
To assess the effect of MS on responses to ratings of the Muslim and British profiles, 
only participants that identified themselves both as British and non-Muslim remained 
in the analysis. A preliminary analysis demonstrated that these two items loaded onto 
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one factor, so a composite score for profile rating was created (α = .71). A 2 (MS v 
DP) x 2 (British v Muslim) between-subjects’ ANOVA was conducted on profile 
rating. This revealed a main effect of MS on rating (F (1, 47) = 13.86, p=.001, 
η2=.228). MS participants (M= 3.76, SD= 1.43) generally rated the profiles less 
favourably than DP participants (M= 4.88, SD= 1.24). There was also an approaching 
significant effect of profile type (F (1, 47) = 3.01, p=.089, η2=.060). The British profile 
(M= 4.60, SD= 1.07) was rated marginally more favourable than the Muslim profile 
(M= 4.05, SD= 1.60). These effects were qualified by the expected interaction (F (1, 
47) = 5.57, p=.022, η2=.106). Planned comparisons (adjusted alpha = .025) using t-
tests were conducted assessing the effect of MS on each profile separately. There was 
a significant effect of MS on rating of the Muslim profile (t (19) = 3.61, p=.002, d= 
1.58), MS participants rated the Muslim profile more negatively than DP participants 
(see table 6). However, there was no effect of MS on the British profile (t (28) = 1.14, 
p>.250). 
Table 6: Means and standard deviations for ratings of the Muslim and British profiles. 
Different subscripts between columns denote significant differences (p<.01). 
 MS  
 
DP 
 M SD M SD 
British 4.35a 1.28 4.79a 0.87 
Muslim 3.00a 1.29 5.00b 1.24 
 
Discussion 
Our findings support the idea that all motives outlined in IPT may have existential 
buffering properties. Those who were reminded of their own death tended to generate 
aspects of themselves that were more central to identity, but importantly were 
increased in their satisfaction of the motives of meaning, self-esteem, continuity, and 
efficacy. Whilst reminders of death did not lead to increased satisfaction of the motives 
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distinctiveness and belonging, there was some mild support for a relationship between 
these motives in line with Becker’s (1973) idea of these acting as twin ontological 
motives. There was also increased evidence of literal or symbolic immortality in the 
identity elements generated by participants who were reminded of their own death, 
suggesting the importance of death transcendence in alleviating existential concerns. 
 Importantly, our findings demonstrate that striving for equanimity in the face 
of death awareness is not simply driven by concerns over attaining meaning and self-
esteem. Participants also listed aspects of themselves that conferred a strong sense of 
efficacy as well as continuity, and it is possible that these motives are emphasised at 
different levels of self-representation. Whilst it is possible that the reduced power in 
the social identity analysis led to the not statistically significant trends of increased 
self-esteem, efficacy and meaning after MS, perceptions of continuity were increased 
only for social identity elements. Moreover, whilst our findings did not demonstrate 
that participants were more likely to write about themselves at a higher level of 
abstraction, we did find that the social identities they did list tended to have specific 
immortal properties. Thus, our findings are somewhat consistent with the idea that 
social identities may be a useful resource for alleviating existential anxiety (Castano 
& Dechesne, 2005), but only to the extent that the group confers a sense of continuity 
and a possibility to either literally or symbolically transcend death (e.g., Lifton, 1973). 
The second study looks to explore further whether immortality striving is specifically 
associated with concerns over continuity. 
The first study only weakly supported the role of distinctiveness and 
belonging. Whilst there appeared to be a positive relationship between these motives, 
we were unable to reliably confirm an association between the two motives that would 
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suggested MS activated a need to harmonise the need to belong and feel distinctive. 
This difficulty in finding this association might reflect the nature of the task in which 
we aggregated scores across identity elements to achieve a general motive strength 
thus masking a relationship between these two constructs. 
 In sum, the present study so far has suggested that these motives may constitute 
important buffers to the awareness of death. Whilst the first study attempted to 
demonstrate that this is the result of being reminded of death rather than the result of 
being exposed to a negative or aversive topic, critics of TMT have suggested MS 
effects are not reducible to death-related concerns. Instead, MS manipulations are 
argued to reflect a more general threat of uncertainty (van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, 
Miedema, & Van den Ham, 2005), inconsistency (cf. continuity; McGregor, Zanna, 
Holmes & Spencer, 2001), control (e.g., Fritsche, Jonas, & Kessler, 2011) or meaning 
(Heine et al., 2006; Proulx & Heine, 2008) for example. These researchers have 
managed to find some support for these arguments by finding that non-MS induced 
threats can also lead to increased worldview affirmation and defence (e.g., Proulx & 
Heine, 2008, 2009). 
The problem with this line of questioning is that it erroneously posits the notion 
that TMT suggests that worldview defence is exclusive to reminders of death, and 
ignores the wider array of hypotheses that can be derived from TMT literature 
(Pyszczynski et al., 2015). The DTA hypothesis (Schimel et al., 2007) suggests that if 
a psychological structure buffers from existential concerns then threats to these 
motives (e.g., efficacy, continuity) should increase the accessibility of death-related 
constructs. In line with this theorising, research has demonstrated increased DTA after 
exposure to worldview threat (Hayes et al., 2015; Schimel et al., 2007), but also threats 
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to self-esteem (Hayes et al., 2008b) and meaning (Webber et al., 2015). We therefore 
set out to address in Study 2 whether threats to the motives of continuity, self-efficacy, 
distinctiveness, and belonging would increase DTA. In addition, we also sought to 
explore whether these different threats would produce different compensatory 
responses via generating aspects of oneself that are directed at restoring a sense of the 
threatened motive (cf. fluid compensation; Heine et al., 2006). We also explored the 
specific role that DTA may (if any) have in these responses.  
Finally, our findings from the first study also demonstrate that MS decreased 
favourability towards a Muslim, although we found no evidence of a reverse effect 
with a British profile. The lack of an increased preference for an in-group member 
diverges with traditional MS effects of an increased polarisation of attitudes towards 
the ingroup and outgroups (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990). As we did not include a 
manipulation check to confirm whether participants had noted the nationality of the 
profile, this could simply reflect the subtlety of the manipulation. However, we find 
this unlikely given the category status was placed purposefully high on the profile list, 
and that we found the expected finding with the Muslim profile. Another potential 
explanation is that there may have been potential downstream effects from participants 
having completed the task themselves. For example, participants may have explicitly 
been comparing aspects of the profile to what they had written. This might possibly 
explain the tendency for ratings under MS to generally become more unfavourable, 
although particularly when rating the Muslim profile. Another further explanation is 
that as participants were instructed to judge the profile it might be that participants felt 
that the British profile did not represent an ingroup exemplar. Previous findings have 
suggested that MS leads to a preference for stereotypic information (e.g., Schimel et 
al., 1999); it might be that the expected ingroup preference was not present because 
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the profile did not necessarily bolster one’s worldview despite being an apparent 
ingroup member. This would also fit the large change in attitudes towards the Muslim 
profile given that the profile would not be a typical exemplar of a Muslim either, and 
that MS leads to increased derogation of inconsistent group stereotypes (e.g., Fritsche 
et al., 2009; Schimel et al., 1999). In either case, we chose to deploy a more traditional 
measure of prejudice in the next study. 
Study 4 aims and hypotheses 
The next study aimed to assess the inverse of the first study. If reminders of death 
increase the need to see oneself as a source of these motives; then does threatening 
one’s sense of self as a source of these motives heighten DTA? To assess this, 
participants answered open-ended questions that were designed to threaten one’s sense 
of continuity, efficacy, distinctiveness, or belonging. They then completed a word-
stem task that acted as a measure of DTA. In line with the previous study, participants 
then generated aspects about themselves, rated these aspects for their importance to 
the self-concept and the extent to which they satisfied these motives. This could assess 
whether specific threats cause specific coping responses to alleviate the threat. Finally, 
participants were asked to rate their feelings towards Muslims and Britain to assess 
whether threats to these motives engendered increased anti-Muslim sentiment. 
H1: Threatening the motives of continuity, efficacy, distinctiveness, or belonging will 
increase levels of DTA relative to the control. 
H2: Threats to a specific motive will lead to a generation of identity elements that seek 
to re-establish the motive threatened. 
H3: DTA will be significantly related to the motive ratings of the specific motive that 
was threatened. 
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H4: Threats to continuity (but not distinctiveness, efficacy and belonging) will 
increase the generation of identity elements that confer a sense of symbolic or literal 
immortality.  
H5: Motive threats will lead to increased favourability towards Britain, but decreased 
favourability towards Muslims. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred-and-sixty-five participants from a (high-school) sixth-form college in the 
South-East of England, as well as university undergraduates took part19. This sample 
size was obtained by recruiting as many participants by a particular end date. Fourteen 
participants’ data was excluded from the final analysis. Three participants were 
removed because they did not complete all the motive measures on the Who Are You 
task, whilst the other 11 participants were removed because their answers to the 
experimental manipulation included death or death-related themes (4- TV; 4- Efficacy; 
3- Continuity). The final sample therefore consisted of 151 participants. 28 
participants were male, and 123 were females (Mage = 17.17 SDage = 1.02). Of these, 
26 participants indicated that they were either not British or were a Muslim, and were 
                                                          
19 To test if there were any differences between the two samples, separate analyses were run using the 
samples as a between-subjects factor. Analyses revealed only one effect of sample type on the 
efficacy motive (F (1, 141) = 5.23, p=.023, η2=.036). College students (M= 4.72, SD= 1.00) rated 
their identity elements as satisfying the motive of efficacy more strongly than university students 
(M=4.28, SD= 1.03). There was a marginal effect of sample type on feelings towards social groups (F 
(1, 115) = 2.91, p=.091, η2=.025). University students were generally more favourable in their ratings 
(M= 63.67, SD = 12.73) than college students (M= 58.68, SD= 12.12). Importantly, there was no 
evidence of sample type interacting with experimental condition on any of the dependent measures in 
the current study (p’s>.10). 
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excluded from the feeling thermometer analyses. Ethical approval was given by the 
Psychology Departmental Ethics Committee at Royal Holloway, University of 
London. 
Materials and Procedure 
A similar cover story and procedure was used to that in Study three. Participants were 
informed that the study was an investigation of one’s personality and emotions and 
how they relate to how they perceive themselves and others. They were tested in 
batches of 5-20. Participants first answered the same filler personality measure as used 
in Study one, before being presented with the experimental manipulation.  
The manipulation used a similar set-up as to the previous study, where 
participants were informed that answers to this question would be analysed to assess 
their personality (Rosenblatt et al. 1989). The manipulation consisted of an open-
ended question aimed to tap into a specific motive. Participants either answered a 
question that asked them to recall memories that threatened their sense of belonging 
or distinctiveness (taken from Pickett, Silver, & Brewer 2002), sense of continuity 
(adapted from McGregor et al., 2001; Shepherd et al., 2011) or sense of efficacy 
(adapted from Whitson & Galinksy, 2008; Shepherd et al., 2011). To economize the 
design, we did not include parallel conditions that explored meaning and self-esteem 
due to existing evidence for these motives and DTA (e.g., Hayes et al., 2008b; Webber 
et al., 2015). Participants in the control condition answered a parallel question about 
their memories of watching television (see Appendix, Attachment A for precise 
wordings of the experimental conditions). This control topic has been used in prior 
TMT research (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1992), but was also selected as we believed it to 
be sufficiently neutral in valence that it would unlikely arouse any type of threat that 
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we did not anticipate. Participants in each condition were asked to think of two 
memories in response to the question. 
After this, participants then completed the word-stem completion task as used 
in Study one. In line with research on the DTA hypothesis, this was presented 
immediately rather than after a brief delay (e.g., Schimel et al., 2007). Participants 
then completed the Who Are You task that included the same instructions as used in 
the previous study. Participants were asked to generate a list of identity elements then 
rate these elements along two items assessing centrality (α = .71), and six items that 
assessed each identity motive. As with the previous study, scores across each motive 
were averaged to produce an overall score for each motive or central-ness to identity. 
Higher scores reflect stronger satisfaction in the motive or centrality. 
In line with Study three, we again coded responses on this task for whether 
they were a personal characteristic or social identity, as well as whether they 
demonstrated evidence of immortality. Three coders who were blind to the 
experimental conditions and hypotheses, each coded a third of the sample (e.g., 50 
responses, one coder did 51) following the same coding instructions from the previous 
study. An additional coder rated a random 25% sub-sample of each of three coders 
(e.g., 13 responses from each coder) to examine reliability. There was a significant 
general agreement between the additional coder and the original coders for number of 
immortality elements (coder 1: r=.82, p=.001; coder 2: r=.94, p<.001; coder 3: r=.95, 
p<.001); as well as whether elements were personal characteristics or social identities 
(coder 1: r=.92, p<.001; coder 2: r =.98, p<.001; coder 3: r=.95, p<.001). Additionally, 
there was strong agreement between the additional coder and original coders in 
whether answers included the presence of an immortality element (coder 1: cohen’s 
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kappa = .67, p =.014; coder 2: cohen’s kappa = 1.00, p <.001; coder 3: cohen’s kappa 
= 1.00, p <.001). 
Finally, participants were then asked to rate their feelings towards a variety of 
social groups using an 11-point feeling-thermometer scale with 10 degree increments 
(e.g., Velasco-Gonzalez et al., 2008). These included both groups to whom they may 
belong to or not. These social groups were Britain, England, Their Family, Friends, 
Muslims, Christians, Americans, Europeans and Immigrants. The use of decoy groups 
was done to mask our real aim of assessing their attitudes towards Britain and 
Muslims. Higher scores on this scale reflected more positive feelings towards these 
groups. 
As the same with Study three, demographic information was collected at the 
end of the questionnaire. Upon completion, participants were probed for suspicion 
about the study and then debriefed. 
Results 
Death Thought Accessibility 
We first assessed H1 where it was expected that exposure to a motive threat would 
increase levels of DTA. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to assess whether DTA 
was higher in the motive threat conditions (v control). The finding was significant (F 
(4, 146) = 3.81, p = .006, η2=.095). Planned comparisons (adjusted alpha = .013) were 
run to investigate the effect of each motive threat condition to the control separately 
(for descriptive statistics, see table 7). DTA was significantly higher after belonging 
threat (p <.001, d = .96), with similar approaching significant effects after self-efficacy 
threat (p = .035, d = .56), continuity threat (p = .025, d = .61), and distinctiveness 
threat (p = .018, d = .68). No other comparisons were significant (p’s>.10). 
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Table 7: Means and standard deviations of levels of DTA by each condition. 
Different subscripts denote significant differences (p<.05) 
 Television Efficacy Continuity Belonging Distinctiveness 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
DTA 1.57a .90 2.10b .99 2.13b .96 2.53b 1.11 2.17b .87 
 
Identity responses 
As with the first study, we first assessed whether the manipulation had any unexpected 
effects on task engagement. There was no evidence that the manipulation affected the 
number of responses generated (F (4, 146) = .74, p=.564, η2=.020). We next explored 
whether the manipulation affected the types of elements listed. Scores for social 
identity and personal characteristic elements were again generated as a percentage of 
the total elements listed by the participant. There was no evidence that the 
manipulation affected the type of elements listed (F (4, 146) = 1.26, p=.287, 
η2=.033)20. 
We next assessed H4 that concerned whether threats to continuity increased 
the presence of writing about oneself in a way that conferred a sense of literal or 
symbolic immortality. A one-way ANOVA and chi-square test was conducted to 
assess whether the number of immortality elements listed; and the presence of 
immortality elements (Yes/No) respectively differed. The ANOVA demonstrated a 
marginal effect of the experimental condition on number of immortality elements (F 
(4, 146) = 2.13, p=.080, η2=.055), and marginally improved when controlling for the 
                                                          
20 Although there was no main effect of element type, further comparisons (corrected alpha =.005) did 
reveal that there was an almost significant difference in element types for self-efficacy and continuity 
threat (t (53.88) = 2.58, p=.013, d= .67). The number of social identities listed in the continuity threat 
condition was higher (M= 30.52, SD =22.33) than in the efficacy threat condition (M= 17.80, SD 
=15.68). Looked at in another way, participants in the efficacy condition provided more personal 
characteristics than those in the continuity condition. 
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percentage of elements that were social identities (F (4, 145) = 2.38, p=.054, η2=.062). 
Planned comparisons (adjusted alpha = .013) assessing the motive threats to the 
control revealed that there was only presence of a marginal effect of continuity threat 
(M=1.00, SD=.82) increasing the number of immortality elements over the control 
group (M=.57, SD=.73, p=.036). 
 The chi-square was also significant (χ² (4) = 12.14, p = .016, Phi = .28). 
Assessing each motive threat separately to the control (adjusted alpha = .013) revealed 
a similar pattern. A marginal effect was only present in the continuity v TV 
comparison (χ² (1) = 6.00, p = .014, Phi = .31). As expected, there was more presence 
of immortality in the continuity threat condition (74.2%) in comparison to the TV 
condition (43.3%). 
Identity ratings 
We next assessed whether specific motive threats would increase the need to affirm 
that specific motive when rating one’s identity (H2). A one-way MANOVA was 
conducted to assess the effect of the experimental manipulation on the rating of 
identity elements along the dimensions of centrality and the six motives (see table 8 
for descriptive statistics). There was only one significant main effect of the 
manipulation on distinctiveness ratings (F (4, 146) = 3.62, p=.008, η2=.090). 
Comparisons (adjusted alpha = .013) comparing the control to the motive threats 
revealed that distinctiveness was marginally increased after distinctiveness threat 
(p=.063), efficacy threat (p=.043) and significantly increased after belonging threat 
(p=.003). All other main effects were not significant (p’s>.10). 
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Table 8: Means and standard deviations for centrality and the six motives across all 
identity elements.  
 Television Efficacy Continuity Belonging Distinctiveness 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Centrality 5.30 .61 5.29 .73 5.32 .66 5.37 .72 5.15 .71 
Self-Esteem 4.50 1.04 4.50 .97 4.70 .97 5.07 .91 4.72 .97 
Self-Efficacy 4.40 1.07 4.60 .98 4.51 .90 4.92 .98 4.64 1.22 
Continuity 4.81 .92 4.84 1.26 5.10 .74 5.05 1.06 4.88 .99 
Distinctiveness 3.83 1.01 4.44 1.12 3.83 1.09 4.73 1.22 4.39 1.34 
Belonging 4.50 1.04 4.30 1.00 4.46 .85 4.70 1.01 4.61 1.13 
Meaning 4.92 1.34 4.89 1.16 4.85 1.06 5.23 .93 4.99 1.06 
 
Again, we also explored whether the manipulation affected ratings of personal 
characteristics and social identities separately. The findings for identity ratings of 
personal characteristics revealed a similar pattern to the global ratings with a 
marginally non-significant effect of distinctiveness ratings (F (4, 146) = 1.97, p=.103, 
η2=.051). All other effects were still highly non-significant (p’s>.20). For social 
identities, the findings revealed marginal effects of the manipulation on esteem ratings 
(F (4, 101) = 2.36, p=.058, η2=.085), efficacy ratings (F (4, 101) = 2.37, p=.057, 
η2=.086), distinctiveness ratings (F (4, 101) = 2.34, p=.060, η2=.085) and a significant 
main effect on belonging ratings (F (4, 101) = 2.59, p=.041, η2=.093). All other effects 
were non-significant (p’s>.15). 
Planned comparisons (adjusted alpha = .013) assessing the motive threats to 
the control revealed that social identity ratings of esteem were significantly higher 
after belonging threat (p=.010) and continuity threat (p=.016) although the latter was 
only approaching significant. Ratings of efficacy were also significantly higher after 
efficacy threat (p=.007), and belonging threat (p=.019), but again the latter was only 
approaching significant. Satisfaction of the distinctiveness motive was greater after 
belonging threat (p=.005), and marginally significant after efficacy threat (p=.035). 
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Finally, satisfaction of the belonging motive was increased after efficacy threat, but 
was only approach significant (p=.033). The descriptive statistics for ratings of social 
identity elements are presented in table 9. 
Finally, to assess whether the manipulation may have caused differences 
between experimental conditions, we also explored the data with post-hoc tests. There 
were only two effects found. For ratings of identity elements in general, the belonging 
threat group rated their elements as satisfying the distinctiveness motive more than the 
continuity threat group (p=.028). For social identity ratings, the belonging threat group 
rated their identity elements as marginally satisfying the belonging motive more than 
the efficacy threat group (p=.064). 
Table 9: Means and standard deviations for centrality and the six motives across 
social identity elements.  
 
Television 
(n=21) 
Efficacy 
(n=20) 
Continuity 
(n=24) 
Belonging 
(n=20) 
Distinctiveness 
(n=21) 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Centrality 5.29 1.04 5.52 1.14 5.51 1.02 5.48 1.11 4.79 1.28 
Self-Esteem 4.06 2.00 4.80 1.56 5.19 1.37 5.32 1.15 4.50 1.48 
Self-Efficacy 3.55 1.94 4.90 1.46 4.56 1.35 4.73 1.42 4.21 1.65 
Continuity 5.40 1.44 5.31 1.75 5.80 .72 5.49 1.37 5.22 1.06 
Distinctiveness 2.92 1.60 3.99 1.62 3.48 1.49 4.35 1.68 3.72 1.65 
Belonging 5.38 1.28 5.62 1.55 5.49 1.12 5.67 .95 4.92 1.75 
Meaning 5.22 1.53 4.89 1.16 5.90 .99 5.80 .94 5.25 1.36 
 
DTA and identity motives 
We also assessed H3 that DTA would be positively related to the ratings of the specific 
motive that was threatened. Pearson correlations on DTA and identity motives were 
conducted assessing each experimental group separately. Whilst there was no 
relationship of DTA to identity motives in the efficacy, continuity and belonging 
conditions (p’s>.20), there was a significant positive relationship in the distinctiveness 
163 
 
threat group between DTA and distinctiveness ratings as predicted (r=.39, p=.016). 
We also explored the relationship between DTA and identity ratings for both social 
identity and personal characteristic items separately. For personal characteristics, the 
same pattern emerged with only DTA being positively related to distinctiveness 
ratings after distinctiveness threat (r=.32, p=.043). For social identities, again the same 
pattern emerged with DTA positively related to distinctiveness ratings after 
distinctiveness threat (r=.38, p=.045), with an unexpected finding of a negative 
relationship between DTA and continuity after efficacy threat (r=-.42, p=.034). 
Social attitudes 
Finally, we assessed H5 that these motive threats would change feelings towards 
Britain and Muslims. Again, we only included participants who identified as British 
and non-Muslim. A 5 (Motive threat: TV vs. Efficacy vs. Continuity vs. 
Distinctiveness vs. Belonging) x 2 (Group type: Britain vs. Muslim) mixed ANOVA 
was conducted. The findings revealed a main effect of group type (F (4, 120) = 100.29, 
p<.001, η2=.455), with unsurprisingly Britain rated more favourably (M= 68.64, SD= 
16.08) than Muslims (M= 51.12, SD= 15.67). There was also a main effect of motive 
threat (F (4, 120) = 2.61, p=.039, η2=.080). Games-Howell tests revealed that 
continuity threat produced generally more favourable attitudes (M= 65.63, SD= 9.59) 
than the TV condition (M= 56.04, SD= 11.51)21. These effects were qualified by an 
approaching significant interaction (F (4, 120) = 2.02, p=.096, η2=.063).  
 To explore this interaction, we assessed the effect of the manipulation on both 
feelings towards Britain and Muslims separately (adjusted alpha =.025). There was a 
                                                          
21 Games-Howell was used because the Levene’s test suggested that homogeneity of variance was 
violated for attitudes towards Muslims (F (4, 120) = 3.12, p=.018). 
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main effect of motive threat on feelings towards Britain (F (4, 120) = 3.75, p=.007, 
η2=.111). However, there was no effect of motive threat on feelings towards Muslims 
(F (4, 120) = 1.04, p=.391, η2=.033). Planned comparisons assessing each motive 
threat to the control (adjusted alpha = .003) revealed that continuity threat significantly 
increased feelings towards Britain (p<.001), and there was an approaching significant 
effect of distinctiveness threat increasing feelings towards Britain (p=.086).  
 Although our primary focus was to explore attitudes towards Britain and 
Muslims, we nonetheless explored whether any other social groups were affected by 
the manipulation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there was a significant main effect on 
feelings towards England (F (4, 120) = 3.67, p=.007, η2=.109). This revealed the same 
pattern as the main analysis with only continuity increasing feelings towards England 
in comparison to the control (p<.001). The manipulation also affected feelings towards 
Americans (F (4, 120) = 2.51, p=.046, η2=.077), and marginally towards immigrants 
(F (4, 120) = 2.08, p=.088, η2=.065). However, exploring these using Tukey’s HSD 
demonstrated no pairwise comparison was significant (p’s>.10). No other effects of 
the manipulation on attitudes towards social groups were found (p’s>.10). The 
descriptive statistics are presented in table 10. 
Table 10: Mean and standard deviations for attitudes towards social groups. Higher 
scores reflect more positive attitudes. 
 
Television 
(n=24) 
Efficacy 
(n=24) 
Continuity 
(n=24) 
Belonging 
(n=27) 
Distinctiveness 
(n=26) 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Britain 61.7 16.1 66.7 16.6 77.8 12.0 67.4 14.0 69.2 17.6 
England 62.1 16.4 68.8 17.0 78.7 13.6 67.4 14.0 68.1 18.1 
Muslims 50.4 12.0 50.8 12.1 53.0 14.9 46.7 21.3 55.0 15.6 
Immigrants 48.3 14.9 53.8 17.9 55.7 14.1 44.8 19.3 55.8 18.2 
Americans 52.5 11.9 58.3 14.9 61.3 10.6 52.2 16.5 61.9 17.2 
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Discussion 
Study four offered converging support for the idea that the motives of efficacy, 
continuity, belonging and distinctiveness serve as important buffers in managing 
existential concerns. After writing about memories that served as autobiographical 
threats to these motives, DTA was higher than for those who did not write about 
threatening memories. This study, to our knowledge, is the first to provide evidence 
for the role of DTA in these motive threats, complementing the findings of Study 3 
and other MS studies that have suggested the importance of these motives in managing 
death awareness (e.g., Gailliot et al., 2006; Landau et al., 2009; Simon et al., 1997; 
Walsh & Smith, 2007). Importantly, this study demonstrates the increase of death-
related thoughts when exposed to these threats, which would conflict with other 
perspectives that suggest that TM findings can be explained by more general threats 
to uncertainty, inconsistency (cf. continuity), control or meaning (e.g., Heine et al., 
2006; Fritsche et al., 2011; McGregor et al., 2001; van den Bos, 2009). 
 Moreover, the findings suggest that immortality striving may particularly be 
the result of the need for self-continuity. The number of aspects that could be 
considered to have immortal properties was significantly higher after writing about 
memories that threatened continuity. Interestingly, whilst we were unable to find that 
threat affected attitudes towards outgroups; our findings did suggest that attitudes 
towards the ingroup were affected by continuity threat. Given that the ingroup under 
examination here falls under the umbrella of special cases of social identity with 
immortal properties, we suggest that this finding provides further evidence for the 
specificity of continuity concerns in immortality striving. 
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 However, we were unable to confirm the prediction that motive threats would 
activate aspects of oneself that are directed at restoring the threatened motive, and only 
provided mild support that DTA was related to motive ratings. This might suggest that 
our manipulation did not threaten the motive in question and DTA was elevated 
because of something else specific to the memories participants wrote about. 
However, given that we chose manipulations that have provided similar effects to 
those expected in the present study (McGregor et al., 2001; Pickett et al., 2002; 
Shepherd et al., 2011), and we removed any participants who wrote about death-
related themes, we find this explanation unlikely. Instead, we believe it more likely 
that the unconstrained method of measuring identity in the present study may have 
made it difficult to detect the expected effects. For example, it might be that only one 
element (or several elements) is required to cope with the threat. Thus, taking an 
aggregate score of each motive might have masked the finding from being detected. 
Alternatively, participants may not necessarily have responded to the threat in the way 
that we anticipated, as compensating for the threat is not the only way to cope with 
threat (see Vignoles, 2017 for examples of coping responses). For example, it is 
possible that participants simply denied the memory they wrote about as threatening 
which would prevent the need for changes to one’s identity structure (e.g., Breakwell, 
1986). 
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General Discussion 
The main aim of this chapter was to support the role of the motives of self-esteem, 
meaning, efficacy, continuity, belonging, and distinctiveness in managing concerns 
about the awareness of death. Two studies provided general support for this claim, 
with the first study demonstrating that reminders of death increased the accessibility 
of aspects of oneself that conferred a sense of these motives, and the second study 
demonstrating the inverse of this effect, namely, that threats to these motives increase 
the accessibility of death-related constructs. 
 These findings add to the literature exploring additional motives in TMT 
processes beyond self-esteem and meaning (e.g., Fritsche et al., 2008; Landau et al., 
2009; Simon et al., 1997; Walsh & Smith, 2007), and the first using the DTA 
hypothesis to demonstrate that threats to these motives increase the accessibility of 
death-related thoughts. These findings therefore provide strong convergent validity for 
the role of these motives in managing existential concerns. 
 It should be noted that whilst this study may be the first to demonstrate 
threatening these motives increases DTA, other studies have attempted to establish 
that these types of threats do not increase DTA, which would run counter to TMT 
claims about death awareness being a core human motive. We summarise the findings 
of these studies in table 11. 
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Table 11: A list of studies that have examined and failed to find the effect of motive 
threat on DTA. 
Study Study context Delay Finding 
Proulx & Heine 
(2008, study 1b) 
Exposure to a 
meaning threat 
secretly switching 
experimenter (v no 
experimenter 
change) 
Yes 
(PANAS) 
No effect of experimenter 
change on DTA (F <1) 
Proulx & Heine 
(2009, study 1) 
Exposure to a 
meaning threat via 
reading an 
incoherent (v 
coherent) story 
Yes 
(PANAS) 
No effect of meaning threat 
on DTA (F <1) 
Proulx & Heine 
(2009, study 2) 
Exposure to a 
meaning threat via 
reflecting on the 
self as incoherent 
(v coherent)  
Yes 
(PANAS) 
No effect of meaning threat 
on DTA (F <1) 
Navarette et al. 
(2004, study 2) 
Participants wrote 
either about their 
own death, being a 
victim of theft, 
being isolated 
from 
friends/family (v 
control) 
Yes 
(PANAS-
X) 
No main effect of 
experimental manipulation 
on DTA (F (3, 96) = 1.99, p 
=.12), but comparisons 
revealed that MS increased 
DTA (v control), but no 
other comparisons were 
significant. 
McGregor et al. 
(1998) 
Participants wrote 
about temporal 
discontinuity v 
their own death v 
television (control) 
Yes 
(reading 
task) 
MS increased DTA v 
control. No difference was 
found between temporal 
discontinuity and the control 
condition. 
   
The studies in the table all have one aspect in common with each other and 
uncommon from the present study. This concerns whether there is a delay between the 
experimental manipulation and the administration of the DTA task. TMT outlines a 
dual-process model whereby MS produces the engagement of proximal defences that 
seek to remove thoughts of death from conscious awareness (Pyszczynski et al., 1999). 
Once these thoughts have faded from conscious awareness, but remain highly 
accessible, distal defences such as worldview bolstering become active.  
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As such, DTA is low immediately after MS, and becomes elevated after a delay 
(e.g., Arndt et al., 1997b; Greenberg et al., 1994). In contrast, because threats to self-
esteem and worldviews do not involve explicit reminders of death (as is the case with 
the present study), proximal defences are bypassed, thus DTA should be elevated 
immediately and fade over time (Hayes et al., 2010). As such, it cannot be ruled out 
that the findings of the studies presented in the table are the result of the inclusion of 
a delay between the manipulation and administration of the word task.  
In fact, given that the manipulation used for continuity threat was almost 
identical to the McGregor et al. (1998) study, it would seem highly likely that this is 
the case. Moreover, Webber et al. (2015) also revisited the meaning threats used by 
Proulx and Heine (2009) but did not include a delay and found the expected increase 
in DTA. The question of whether DTA may underpin all threats remains, but a recent 
meta-analysis appears to support the idea that MS in comparison to meaning/certainty 
threats have different time courses that would fit the dual-process model of TMT 
(Martens, Burke, Schimel, & Faucher, 2011).  Whilst this study is not enough to 
conclusively state that DTA is an important mechanism in a range of threats, it is our 
opinion that no study exists that can counter this claim. However, more research is 
required to understand the compatibility (or differences) between these threat types. 
 A limitation of the present study is that the present analysis cannot state 
whether the roles of efficacy, distinctiveness, belonging, and continuity are 
independent from meaning and self-esteem. As we have outlined previously, these 
motives have been found to independently predict identity formation (e.g., Vignoles 
et al., 2006), but it is possible that when related to existential concerns these motives 
are subordinate to the motives of meaning and self-esteem. For example, continuity 
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may serve the meaning motive by providing a coherent narrative for which to 
understand oneself and the social reality, or that distinctiveness is a way of achieving 
and maintaining self-esteem (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986). As we were unable to 
confirm the compensatory response mechanisms to coping with each motive threat, 
we cannot rule out this possibility.  
This would seem likely a problem with our current method to measuring 
identity. Whilst the Who Are You task can increase the external validity of TM 
findings, the unconstrained responses at the same time may increase the variation in 
detecting effects. Indeed, it should be noted that the bias towards reporting individual-
level aspects of oneself causes some difficulty in interpreting findings regarding social 
identity. Certainly, further research is required to further validate and disentangle 
some of the effects identified in the present study. 
Existential, motive and intergroup threat: the same or different? 
In sum, these findings contribute towards a broader understanding of the relationship 
between TM processes and a cascade of fundamental human motives. We believe 
these findings are compatible with the findings of the first chapter where perceiving 
symbolic and realistic threats from Muslims (as outlined by ITT) were found to be 
compatible with a range of perceived motive-based threats to British identity (as 
suggested by IPT). As such, we have established an interface between IPT and ITT, 
and IPT and TMT that may suggest that these approaches explore similar ideas from 
different levels of analysis as suggested in the literature review. The next chapter 
therefore attempts to further the interface between these theories by considering 
whether intergroup threats may be conceptualised as existential threats as suggested 
by TMT.  
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 In addition, the present findings have also suggested that social identities, such 
as being British, may hold special importance in one’s identity repertoire, as they 
constitute an effective way of buffering from existential concerns due to the possibility 
of transcending death. Becker (1973) argues that this human pursuit for “immortality 
projects” is what causes prejudice due to different projects conflicting with each other 
and thus denying death transcendence. This analysis would therefore seem compatible 
with premises from the first two studies of this thesis on identification and beliefs 
being an antecedent of threat perception. We therefore sought to explore the role of 
ingroup identification and beliefs further in relation to worldview threat in the next 
study. 
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Chapter V: 
Is national essentialism and 
identification associated with levels 
of DTA when exposed to symbolic 
threats to worldview? 
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Abstract 
Our findings so far suggest that ingroup national identification and essentialist beliefs 
are potential antecedents of perceiving Muslims as a symbolic threat. Previous 
research has suggested that essentialist beliefs and social identities may act as 
existential anxiety-buffers. This study aimed to explore whether strength of ingroup 
identification and endorsement of essentialist ingroup beliefs is related to DTA when 
exposed to symbolic threats to worldview. An online experimental study was 
conducted that took measures of national identification and essentialist beliefs before 
participants were asked to read a news article that suggested Muslims posed a 
symbolic threat to worldview (v control). The findings demonstrated that DTA was 
elevated after exposure to threat, but this was particularly the case for those that were 
high in national identification or endorsed essentialist ingroup beliefs. Moreover, DTA 
was found to moderate the relationship between these measures and ingroup bias. The 
findings add to the growing literature on the links between social identity, 
essentialism, and existential anxiety.  
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Introduction 
“…there is a great deal of falseness and self-deception in the cultural causa-sui project, but 
there is also the necessity of this project. Man needs a "second" world, a world of humanly 
created meaning, a new reality that he can live, dramatize, nourish himself in. "Illusion" 
means creative play at its highest level. Cultural illusion is a necessary ideology of self-
justification, a heroic dimension that is life itself to the symbolic animal. To lose the security 
of heroic cultural illusion is to die”  
(Becker, 1973, p. 189) 
 
Previous research has pointed towards the idea that social groups, and beliefs about 
them, may constitute effective ways to alleviate concerns over awareness of the 
inevitability of death (Castano & Dechesne, 2005; Castano, Yzerbyt & Paladino, 
2004). One reason for this is because, in contrast to oneself whose mortal fate is 
inevitable, social groups are not necessarily subject to this outcome. Thus, identifying 
with social groups, especially when they are highly entitative, can be a useful strategy 
for alleviating existential anxiety (Castano, 2004b; Castano et al., 2004).  
However, social groups are merely humanly constructed symbolic entities. 
Consequently, they require continual and consensual validation, as well as defence, to 
maintain them as effective buffers from existential concerns (Greenberg et al., 1997). 
The extent to which these social identities need to be continually validated and 
defended is likely to depend on the importance of one’s social group to the individual 
self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). However, to our knowledge, no research has 
explored whether strength of social identification, and essentialist beliefs associated 
with identity, are related to levels of existential anxiety when exposed to symbolic 
threats to worldview. The current research aims to explore this gap, combining insights 
from SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), Essentialism (e.g., Haslam et al., 2000) and TMT 
(Greenberg et al., 1986). We first present a brief reminder of TMT, before exploring 
how SIT and essentialism can be deployed to assess existential threat. 
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Terror Management Theory 
TMT (Greenberg et al., 1997) proposes that the unique human awareness of the 
inevitability of death, juxtaposed with the biological desire to survive, provide the 
active ingredients to the potential for existential terror. To manage this, individuals 
invest in - and identify with - cultural worldviews that provide a stable, orderly and 
meaningful sense of reality, as well as associated standards of conduct that if lived up 
to can afford individuals with a sense of self-esteem, and the possibility to transcend 
death either literally or symbolically. As such, TMT proposes that, in part, the 
ubiquitous striving for self-esteem is to defend from the anxiety that stems from 
knowledge of one’s own corporeal existence. 
 However, cultural worldviews are not capable of eradicating the terror that 
comes from the knowledge of permanent annihilation of the self, instead only 
managing it so that individuals can go about their daily lives with relative equanimity 
despite the awareness of their inevitable mortality. Furthermore, as worldviews are 
merely symbolic constructions of reality, and there are very few objective metrics of 
one’s value, they require continual maintenance in the form of consensual validation 
(Pyszczynski et al., 2015). As such, those who share one's worldview increase the 
legitimacy of one’s worldview, whilst those who subscribe to alternative worldviews 
decrease this legitimacy.  
 Consequently, a core tenet of TMT is that if worldviews protect from 
existential anxiety, then reminders of mortality or threats to worldview increase the 
accessibility of death-related constructs and the need to maintain faith in one’s 
worldview (Greenberg et al., 1997). Research has generally supported these 
assumptions, demonstrating that reminders of mortality (in comparison to a negative 
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or neutral topic) increase desires to maintain faith in one’s worldview, and that threats 
to worldview increase the accessibility of death-related words, but not negative words 
(Schimel et al., 2007; for meta-analyses see Burke et al., 2010; Hayes et al., 2010). 
Social Identity Theory 
SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) proposes that knowledge of membership to groups is an 
important aspect of an individual’s self-concept. Because of this relevance to the self-
concept, individuals are motivated to view their social identities positively to maintain 
or enhance self-esteem. At the same time, any valued social identity would therefore 
require continual maintenance and defence from perceived threats due to its subjective 
importance to the self-concept. Indeed, considerable amounts of research have 
identified that strength of identification is an antecedent to threat perception (for 
review see Riek et al., 2006). 
 As such, SIT and TMT are complementary in two important respects. Firstly, 
they both acknowledge the need and striving for self-esteem in human behaviour; and 
secondly, they recognise the impact that culture and groups can have upon the self-
concept (Castano & Dechesne, 2005; Castano et al., 2004). Indeed, prior research has 
demonstrated social identity effects in TMT mechanisms. For example, reminders of 
death result in increased social identification to groups (e.g., Castano et al., 2002; 
Dechesne et al., 2000), more favourable views of ingroup members and more negative 
views of outgroup members (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990, 1992) and stronger in-group 
biases in minimal group settings (e.g., Harmon-Jones, Greenberg, Solomon, & Simon, 
1996).  In contrast, threatening one’s social group leads to increased DTA (Cohen et 
al., 2013; Hayes et al., 2008a; Hayes et al., 2015; Schimel et al., 2007). 
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What TMT research has not yet demonstrated is whether strength of social 
identification is associated with DTA when exposed to worldview threat. As 
previously stated, research in the Social Identity tradition has tended to demonstrate 
that strength of identification is associated with threat perception (e.g., Branscombe et 
al., 1999; Riek et al., 2006). In contrast, previous TMT research has only selected 
participants based on whether they are a member of the threatened group in question 
(e.g., Cohen et al., 2013) or participants that score highly on pre-measures of 
identification (e.g., Hayes et al., 2008a; Hayes et al., 2015; Schimel et al., 2007), thus 
are unable to demonstrate whether individual differences in strength of identification 
moderate levels of DTA when exposed to a threat to worldview, something that the 
present research seeks to address. In addition, to our knowledge, only one study has 
currently explored the possibility of potential individual differences in levels of DTA 
when exposed to worldview threat (Roylance et al., 2014), thus the present research 
would be a generally welcome addition to an underexplored avenue of TMT. 
Essentialism 
In addition to social identification as an antecedent of existential threat, the present 
research also explores whether essentialist beliefs also contribute towards a stable and 
orderly worldview. Essentialist beliefs about social groups have been found to 
constitute two factors: (1) natural kind beliefs that are the view that groups are natural 
and not socially constructed, thus having clear-cut boundaries and being historically 
invariant; (2) entitativity, that is the belief that groups have an essence that leads to 
group homogeneity and is informative about members (Haslam et al., 2000, 2002).  
Both these sets of essentialist beliefs are likely to contribute towards a stable 
and orderly worldview. Firstly, they constitute a meaning framework assisting the 
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perceiver to understand the social reality. Secondly, they suggest that certain groups 
are temporally enduring, which may be useful in alleviating existential anxiety 
(Castano & Dechesne, 2005). Thirdly, they also implicate the idea that group members 
are similar to each other that may infer a sense of consensual validation for one’s 
worldview (for similar ideas see Hogg, 2009). Indeed, Young (2003) has suggested 
that essentialism is a form of response to ontological insecurity as it emphasises that 
the self (and others) are unchanging, but also that the self has some essential and 
valued quality (either cultural or biological) that is associated with one’s group. Thus, 
essentialist beliefs about one’s own group may provide a distinctive identity with a 
clear group prototype that can offer an unambiguous worldview, maximise self-esteem 
processes and a possibility of death transcendence. 
Evidence for essentialist beliefs in managing existential anxiety comes from 
several studies. Keller (2005) reports that belief in genetic determinism about social 
categories, a type of essentialist belief, is positively related to fear of death scales. 
Experimental research demonstrates that primed thoughts of death increase the 
perception of group entitativity (Castano et al., 2002), and enhances perceptions of 
collective continuity, which in turn enhances entitativity and identification (Sani et al., 
2008; Herrera & Sani, 2013).  
Moreover, evidence for essentialist beliefs managing death anxiety can be 
viewed by exploring strategies that may seek to retain or enhance entitativity. Castano 
(2004b) found that after being subliminally primed with thoughts of death, participants 
made over-exclusion effects when categorising stimuli in a subsequent 
ingroup/outgroup task. That is, they were more likely to exclude targets with a low 
sense of in-groupness, but at the same time, more likely to include targets that had a 
179 
 
high degree of in-groupness. Thus, it seems that identification with social groups, 
particularly those that are highly entitative, may well be useful in managing existential 
anxiety (Castano & Dechesne, 2005). 
If essentialist beliefs about one’s own group serve as an anxiety-buffering 
mechanism, it would be likely that certain threats that impinge upon these beliefs may 
temporarily increase DTA in line with TMT proposals. For example, previous research 
has highlighted that essentialist beliefs increase the perception of symbolic threats to 
identity (e.g., Zagefka et al., 2012). This is because symbolic threats can include 
concerns over the loss of ingroup traditions, norms and values that may hinder death 
transcendence strategies for managing existential anxiety (Cinnirella, 2014; Castano 
& Dechesne, 2005). Secondly, essentialist beliefs can imply that the group is not 
susceptible to socio-cultural shaping (Zagefka et al., 2012), so perceived challenges to 
the ingroup can be considered in direct conflict to one’s worldview beliefs. Thirdly, 
symbolic threats can question the validity of the in-group’s norms, values and 
traditions, thus compromising the extent to which they can be used for self-esteem 
purposes (Cinnirella, 2014).  
The role of DTA in worldview defence 
An additional line of inquiry for the present research is to explore the role of DTA in 
producing worldview defence after experiencing threat. There is little existing 
research so far on the relationship of DTA to worldview defence, but some research 
has suggested that DTA mediates the relationship between threat and defence (Fransen 
et al., 2008; Vail et al., 2012a). The idea that DTA acts as a mediating variable between 
social identification, essentialism and ingroup bias would be compatible with literature 
on intergroup threat (e.g., Riek et al. 2006).  
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Other research has suggested that DTA exhibits an interactional mediation 
(Hayes et al., 2010). That is, DTA is related to worldview defence but only in the 
threat condition. For example, Das et al. (2009) observed that DTA was related to 
Islamophobic prejudice, but only in those who were exposed to terrorism news reports 
(for similar findings see Hayes et al., 2015). 
However, no research to our knowledge has explored how national 
essentialism and identification may produce differences in DTA levels after 
worldview threat and, in turn, how DTA is then subsequently related to worldview 
defence. Therefore, it is difficult to assess what role DTA will have in the present 
study. Whilst it is possible that DTA may mediate the relationship between these 
measures and defence in the threat condition, there may exist a more complex 
moderated relationship between these variables. This is because DTA itself is a proxy 
of existential anxiety, which is the motivating force in the need to affirm or defend 
one’s worldview (Hayes et al., 2010). Thus, it is possible to expect that those who 
highly identify or essentialise their ingroup demonstrate increased DTA when exposed 
to worldview threat, but there may be an important qualifying effect on defence 
between those who demonstrated differing levels of DTA. Supporting this possibility, 
Das et al (2009) found that prejudice towards Muslims varied as a function of both 
DTA and levels of dispositional self-esteem. However, given that there is little 
research concerning this aspect, and none (to our knowledge) using the measures in 
the present study, we will approach the role of DTA in an exploratory fashion.  
Study 5 aims and hypotheses 
In summary, the present study aims to expand upon existing research in several ways. 
First, in comparison to previous research that has explored how MS increases 
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identification or essentialist beliefs about one’s ingroup (e.g., Castano et al., 2002, 
Herrera & Sani, 2013; Sani et al., 2008), the present study aims to assess whether the 
inverse is true. Do those that highly identify and/or essentialise the ingroup 
demonstrate higher levels of DTA when exposed to threats to worldview? Second, by 
examining this question, we will expand upon prior research that has explored DTA 
and worldview threat by exploring whether there are individual differences in levels 
of DTA in the face of threat, something to which our knowledge has been generally 
overlooked by TMT researchers (but see Roylance et al., 2014).  
 To assess this possibility, we conducted an online study where participants first 
completed a measure of British national identification and essentialist beliefs. They 
were then randomly allocated to read a news article that focused on the incompatibility 
of Muslim and British worldviews (or a control article). Participants then completed a 
measure of DTA before finally rating their attitudes towards both Muslims and Britain. 
This therefore allowed us to assess whether differences in DTA after exposure to 
worldview threat, are associated with levels of national identity and essentialist 
beliefs. In addition, we could also therefore explore the relationship between DTA and 
prejudice. 
H1: Those exposed to the threatening article will demonstrate higher levels of DTA 
H2: Strength of identification and/or essentialist beliefs will be positively related to 
levels of DTA, but only when exposed to worldview threat. 
H3: Natural kind beliefs of discreteness and naturalness will be positively related to 
levels of DTA after worldview threat. 
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H4: National identification will be positively related to levels of DTA after worldview 
threat, particularly in those who also view the nation as highly entitative or of a natural 
kind. 
In addition, the present design allows us to assess the relationship between 
DTA and prejudice, as well as how this relationship may vary as a function of national 
identification and essentialism. Whilst we suspect that the relationship between DTA 
and defence will be limited to the threat group (e.g., an interactional mediation), some 
research has suggested that DTA may more straightforwardly mediate the link 
between the threat manipulation and defence. Additionally, to our knowledge, no 
research has explored the link between identification, essentialism, DTA, and 
prejudice thus making a-priori predictions difficult, so we will consider this aspect in 
an exploratory fashion.  
Method 
Participants 
148 British Non-Muslim nationals were recruited to take part in an online study via 
British-based internet forums and social media. This sample size was obtained by 
recruiting as many participants as possible by a certain end date. 6 participants were 
removed for either not completing all the measures, following task instructions 
properly or suspected to not have engaged with the study materials. 11 participants 
were removed from the final analysis due to their answers on the memory check 
indicating they had not engaged with the article content (7- Threat, 4- No Threat). 
Therefore, the final sample consisted of 131 participants (Mage = 28.3, SDage = 9.4), 
with 65 males, 66 females. Participants were randomly assigned to either the threat 
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group (n=66), or the no threat group (n=65). Participants had the opportunity to opt in 
to a lottery for participation with the chance to win a £50 Amazon voucher. 
Materials and procedure 
The survey was pitched as an investigation of memory for media content. Participants 
were informed that they would read a news article and after a delay answer questions 
regarding how well they could remember the content of the article. Participants were 
also informed that we were also interested in their beliefs and views about being 
British. 
 In the first part of the study, participants completed the scale of British 
identification used in Study 2 containing 7 items (Cinnirella, 1997), on a 7 point likert 
scale from (1) not all all to (7) extremely. These items provided a good level of 
reliability (α = .88) with a higher score on this scale reflecting stronger identification 
with being British. They then completed the scale of essentialism used in Study 2 that 
assesses the nine essentialist beliefs of discreteness, uniformity, informativeness, 
naturalness, immutability, stability, inherence, necessity, and exclusivity. Each scale 
had their own personalised scale anchors (see Haslam et al., 2000). The scales for 
necessity, uniformity, informativeness, inherence, and exclusivity were again reverse 
scored. 
 Participants were then informed they were beginning the learning phase of the 
study. During this phase, participants read one of two news articles. They were 
instructed to remember as much content about the article as possible as they would be 
later tested on it. Whilst the current research has suggested that Muslims are perceived 
to pose both a realistic and symbolic threat to identity (Study 1 and 2), to economise 
the design we only focused on symbolic threat, which generally has been shown to be 
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the strongest predictor of Islamophobic prejudice (Cinnirella, 2014). The symbolic 
worldview threat article was headlined: ‘British Muslims: Islamic values should be 
taught in our schools!’ coupled with a school classroom with a poster that said ‘British 
schools, Islamic rules’. The article discussed how British-Muslims wanted a change 
to the British school curriculum to implement more Islamic-related teaching and 
values. In addition, it also more broadly spoke of a rising Muslim population in the 
UK and the apparent desire some Muslims had for the implementation of Sharia Law 
in Britain. The control article discussed British summer weather and forecasting and 
was headlined: ‘Never Fear: The Great British Summer is finally here!’ with a picture 
of women enjoying the weather on a beach. The content of both articles was loosely 
based on an amalgamation of actual news stories but was created by the researchers 
for this study to ensure control over length and content (for full wordings of these 
articles see Appendix, Attachment B and C). 
 Participants were then informed they would complete a few delay measures 
before being asked to recall the content of the article. In fact, both delay measures 
were the dependent variables of this research. The first delay measure was a word-
stem task traditionally used to measure DTA (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1994; Schimel et 
al., 2007) that was used in Study 3 and 4 of this thesis.  
The second delay measure was a feeling-thermometer (e.g., Velasco-González 
et al., 2008) towards a variety of social groups. To maintain the cover story, this 
measure was pitched to participants as having the possibility to disrupt retention of 
learned information and a variety of social groups were given to avoid arousing 
suspicion. Responses were provided on an 11 point-Likert scale ranging from 
‘Intensely cold or unfavourable feeling’ (1) to ‘Intensely warm or favourable feeling’ 
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(11). Participants were asked to rate their feelings towards a variety of social groups: 
their friends, America, Britain, Christians, Muslims, Europeans, Immigrants, and 
British newspapers. 
 The final phase of the experiment consisted of a series of open-ended memory 
questions for participants to answer about the article they had just read. The final phase 
here was only included to maintain the cover story and to check these answers to 
ensure participants had engaged with the content of the article. On completion of these 
questions, participants were then debriefed and given the opportunity to enter a prize 
draw to win a £50 Amazon voucher. 
Results 
Death-Thought Accessibility 
Our first hypothesis (H1) stated that in comparison to the control condition, 
participants in the threat condition would exhibit higher DTA. An independent 
samples t-test was therefore conducted to assess the effect of the article type on DTA. 
The analyses revealed that article type had a significant effect on DTA (t (129) = 2.06, 
p = .041, d =0.35), with DTA significantly higher after being exposed to the threat 
article (M = 2.00, SD = 1.14) than the no threat article (M = 1.62, SD = 1.00).  
Feeling-Thermometer 
In addition, a 2 (threat v no threat) x 2 (Britain v Muslim) analysis was conducted to 
assess the effect of article type on feeling thermometer ratings of the ingroup and 
outgroup. Not surprisingly, there was a main effect of group being rated (F (1, 129, = 
115.89, p<.001, η2= .473). Britain was rated much more positively (M = 7.97, SD = 
1.58) than Muslims (M= 5.87, SD = 1.75). This was qualified by an interaction of 
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group type and article type (F (1, 129) = 12.17, p=.001, η2=.086). Planned 
comparisons (adjusted alpha = .025) demonstrated that there was an effect of article 
type on feelings towards Britain (t (129) = 2.49, p = .014, d = 0.43), with more positive 
feelings after the threat article than the no threat article. Additionally, the article also 
significantly affected feelings towards Muslims (t (129) = 2.28, p = .024, d =0.40), 
with more negative feelings when exposed to the threatening article than the no threat 
article (see table 12). 
Table 12: Means and standard deviations for group ratings by article type.  
 Threat  
 
No Threat 
 M SD M SD 
Britain 8.30 1.48 7.63 1.61 
Muslims 5.53 1.85 6.22 1.58 
 
Principal Components Analysis 
To assess the structure of essentialist beliefs about Britain, a principal components 
analysis was conducted using varimax rotation on the nine essentialism items. The 
analysis yielded a two-factor solution explaining 50.73% of the data, with all items 
receiving factor loadings greater than .50 (for precise loadings, see Appendix table 3). 
The factors were identical to those concerning British essentialist beliefs in Study 2. 
The first factor included the beliefs of discreteness, naturalness, immutability, and 
stability, whilst the second factor included the items of uniformity, informativeness, 
necessity, exclusivity and inherence. As such, they resemble the concepts of natural 
kind and entitativity beliefs (Haslam et al., 2000). Composite scores of these factors 
were produced for the main analyses. 
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National Identity and Essentialism 
We now turned to assess whether national identity and essentialism were associated 
with levels of DTA for those exposed to the threatening article (H2, H3 and H4). 
Preliminary analyses assessing the bivariate correlations between the variables for 
each condition independently suggested that national identity (r=.27, p=.014), natural 
kinds (r=.26, p=.017) and entitativity (r=.35, p=.002) were weakly correlated with 
DTA in the threat group, but not in the no threat group (p’s>.250). Additionally, 
exploring the subcomponents of natural kind beliefs suggested that discreteness was 
positively related to DTA (r = .26, p=.038), and stability was marginally related to 
DTA (r=.23, p=.063) after worldview threat, but again were not related in the control 
group (p’s>.20).  
To assess this further, regression analyses were conducted to assess the effect 
of the article type, national identity and the essentialism factors on DTA. The article 
type was coded as -1 = No Threat; 1 = Threat. The essentialism factors and national 
identity were also centred before interactions were produced by multiplying the 
variables in question together (Aiken & West, 1991). The findings revealed an 
approaching significant effect of national identity (β=.19, t=1.87, p=.064), and 
entitativity (β=.18, t=1.81, p=.072) on DTA.  These were qualified by an approaching 
significant three-way interaction between article type, national identity and entitativity 
(β=-.19, t=1.95, p=.054). We therefore, decomposed this three-way interaction by 
exploring the relationship between national identification and essentialism by each 
condition separately. 
This analysis revealed only a significant effect of entitativity and a near 
significant effect of national identity in the threat condition. That is, entitativity was 
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positively related to levels of DTA (β=.37, t=2.38, p=.023), whilst national identity 
had a marginal significant positive effect on levels of DTA (β=.30, t=1.94, p=.057). 
Natural kind beliefs, however, did not produce a significant effect on DTA scores 
(β=.22, t=1.42, p=.161), and follow–up analysis still suggested this was the case when 
each natural kind belief was explored separately (p’s>.30). For the no threat condition, 
none of the variables or interactions were significantly associated with levels of DTA 
(p’s>.10). Therefore, H2 was supported, with partial support for H3, but H4 was not 
supported. Importantly, as the findings demonstrated that DTA was only related to 
these measures in the threat condition, the conditions for DTA as mediating variable 
(at least at a global sample level) had not been met (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
Mediation analyses 
We now turned to assessing the role DTA has in the relationship between exposure to 
worldview threat and defence. As the current findings have found so far no support 
for DTA as a mediating variable at a global sample and prior research has suggested 
that DTA may only mediate the link between the experimental group and defence (e.g. 
interactional mediation; Hayes et al., 2010), we focused our analysis only on the 
experimental condition. 
To assess whether mediation had occurred in the threat condition, path analysis 
was conducted with Amos (version 21) using bootstrapping of 1000 samples with a 
95% confidence level to test for mediation effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). When 
the confidence level does not include zero, bootstrapping indicates that significant 
mediation has occurred. Effect sizes (ES) are given as standardised. A fully mediated 
model was tested, with pathways from the predictors and interactions to DTA, and 
DTA to in-group bias. Ingroup bias was computed by subtracting the scores assigned 
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about feelings towards Muslims to scores assigned to feelings towards Britain. A 
higher score therefore indicates greater in-group bias. Findings demonstrated that 
significant mediation had only occurred for the effect of entitativity on in-group bias 
(ES = .14, 95%Cl .01-.29), whilst all other confidence levels included zero suggesting 
DTA had not significantly mediated the relationship for these variables (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Mediation analysis of the effect of entitativity on ingroup bias when 
exposed to the threatening article. Coefficients are unstandardized and from the 
multiple regression analyses. Coefficients in parentheses demonstrate the direct 
effect of entitativity on bias when in the presence of DTA. *p<.06 
Moderation analyses 
We now assess the possibility that DTA acts as a moderating, rather than mediating, 
variable to ingroup bias in the threat condition. DTA scores were centred before the 
interactions were computed. Again, the dependent variable was ingroup bias. For the 
threat condition, regression analyses revealed that national identity (β=.76, t=2.60, 
p=.012) positively predicted in-group bias, and this was qualified by an interaction 
between DTA and national identity (β=.75, t=2.53, p=.014). There was also a two-way 
interaction between the essentialism factors (β=.60, t=2.09, p=.041), and a marginal 
interaction of DTA and entitativity (β=.61, t=1.95, p=.057). Finally, these effects were 
qualified by a marginal three-way interaction between DTA, entitativity and natural 
kind beliefs (β=.65, t=1.69, p=.097).  In the control condition, there was only an effect 
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of national identity (β=.76, t=2.60, p=.012) on in-group bias, and importantly no 
presence of an effect of DTA or an interaction with DTA on ingroup bias (p’s>.10). 
 Breaking down these interaction effects, firstly, the marginal three-way 
interaction appeared to be the result of a slightly diverging effect of the two-way 
interaction of entitativity and DTA at high and low levels of natural kind beliefs. That 
is, at low levels of natural kind beliefs, DTA appeared to be trending to decreasing 
levels of ingroup bias when entitativity was high, albeit this interaction was 
statistically non-significant (p>.10).  
 Decomposing the two-way interaction between entitativity and DTA (see 
figure 4), simple slopes analyses were conducted using 1 SD below and above the 
mean (Aiken & West, 1991). This demonstrated that at low levels of entitativity, there 
was no effect of DTA on ingroup bias (β=.20, p=.495), but at high levels of entitativity, 
DTA increased ingroup bias (β=.81, p=.036).  
 
Figure 4: The relationship between DTA and national entitativity on ingroup bias, 
plotted at +/- 1 SD below and above the mean. 
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Breaking down the interaction between national identity and DTA showed a 
similar effect on ingroup bias (see figure 5). That is, DTA exerted a significant effect 
on in-group bias at high (β=.95, p=.008), but not low levels of national identity (β=.20, 
p=.493). These analyses therefore appear consistent with the assertion that DTA acts 
as a motivating factor in producing worldview defence. 
 
Figure 5: The relationship between DTA and national identity on ingroup bias, plotted 
at +/- 1 SD below and above the mean. 
Despite support for both the mediating and moderating effect of DTA when 
exposed to threat, it appeared that there was stronger support for DTA as a moderating 
variable. However, to explore this question further, we created both the mediating and 
moderating models using Structural Equation Modelling in Amos (version 21) to 
explore which model fitted the threat data better. In both models, the residuals of the 
predictor variables were allowed to correlate, and only the significant pathways 
indicated by the regression analyses were input. To assess fit, we deployed chi-square 
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tests, root mean square of approximation (RMSEA), goodness of fit index (GFI) and 
the comparative fit index (CFI), whereby a good-fitting model would be indicated by 
a non-significant chi-square test, a value of RMSEA less than .06 and CFI/GFI greater 
than 0.95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Whilst neither model perfectly met the criteria across 
all fit tests, the moderating model fit the data considerably better across all indexes (χ² 
(9) = 16.67, p = .054; CFI = .973; GFI = .971; RMSEA = .115) than the mediating 
model (χ² (10) = 30.41, p = .001; CFI = .858; GFI = .919; RMSEA = .177). The 
mediating model in fact did not meet any of the criteria as a good-fitting model. 
Therefore, it was accepted that the moderating role of DTA was the superior model. 
Auxiliary analyses 
Despite the focus of the present study on exploring bias specifically through attitudes 
towards Britain and Muslims, we nonetheless explored whether the current 
manipulation affected any of the feelings towards the other social groups. There was 
a marginal effect of article type on feelings towards immigrants (t (129) = 2.28, 
p=.080), whilst all other social group ratings were not affected by the manipulation 
(p’s>.10). The threatening article decreased feelings towards immigrants (M= 6.08, 
SD = 1.63) in comparison to the no threat article (M=6.58, SD =1.68). Further 
regression analyses with ingroup bias (Britain – Immigrants) revealed a similar pattern 
of findings to the main analysis in the present study. That is national identification 
(β=.91, t=3.86, p<.001), natural kind (β=.55, t=2.31, p=.025) and entitativity beliefs 
(β=.53, t=2.10, p=.041) positively predicted ingroup bias. There was also a marginal 
interaction between the essentialism factors in predicting bias (β=.46, t=1.98, p=.053), 
that illustrated the same pattern with entitativity exhibiting a stronger effect on bias at 
high (β=.98, p=.006), than low levels of natural kind beliefs (β=.52, p=.041). 
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Interestingly, however, our analyses did not detect any effect or interaction with DTA 
on ingroup bias (p>.10). Thus, our findings seem to suggest that the role of DTA on 
ingroup bias was specific towards the source of the threat. 
Discussion 
The current study aimed to explore whether DTA levels would increase as a function 
of social identification and essentialist ingroup beliefs when exposed to a threat to 
worldview. The present findings support this assertion; social identification and 
entitativity beliefs positively predicted levels of DTA for those who were exposed to 
the threatening article. In addition, the findings also suggest that DTA acts in a 
moderating capacity to these measures on worldview defence, which is consistent with 
TMT assertions of DTA motivating worldview defence (Hayes et al., 2010). 
 The current findings contribute to the research that has proposed a link between 
existential anxiety, essentialism and social identity (e.g., Castano et al., 2002; Herrera 
& Sani, 2013; Sani et al., 2008), and research exploring worldview threat and DTA 
(e.g., Cohen et al., 2013; Hayes et al., 2008a, 2015; Schimel et al., 2007). The present 
research expands upon these findings in notable ways. Firstly, previous research 
exploring these links has deployed the mortality salience (MS) paradigm 
demonstrating that MS increases in-group identification and entitativity, whilst this is 
the first study, to our knowledge, to demonstrate that threats to these beliefs increase 
DTA. This provides good convergent validity for the links between existential anxiety, 
essentialism, and social identity. Secondly, whilst previous research has demonstrated 
that national worldview threat increases DTA, this is the first study to demonstrate 
individual differences in national essentialism and identification predict DTA levels 
when exposed to national worldview threat. This is important because individual 
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differences in DTA levels after exposure to worldview threat has largely been 
neglected by TMT researchers (but see Roylance et al., 2014).  We also believe these 
findings to be complementary to existing research on essentialism, identification and 
intergroup threat (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999; Riek et al., 2006; Zagefka et al., 
2012). 
 Why does exposure to symbolic threat increase DTA for strong identifiers and 
those who endorse essentialist in-group beliefs? The current design and study aims do 
not allow us to assess this question. However, we believe that our findings presented 
so far in this thesis can help shed light on this question. Our examination so far has 
suggested that the fundamental human motives of esteem, efficacy, meaning, 
continuity, belonging and distinctiveness are: (1) perceived to be threatened when 
experiencing intergroup threats such as the symbolic threat to worldview in the present 
study; (2) perceived threats to these motives are predicted by strength of social 
identification and essentialist beliefs; (3) these motives are related to TM processes in 
that MS causes a need to affirm these motives, and threats to these motives increases 
DTA. As such, we would suspect that strong identifiers and those that define the group 
in essentialist terms experience threat that compromises these motives that in turn 
increases the accessibility of death-related thoughts.  
Our findings also indicated that whilst exposure to the threatening article 
decreased feelings towards immigrants, the effect of DTA might have been specific to 
Muslims. We believe this decline in feelings towards immigrants and Muslims may 
reflect the blurred association between anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim prejudice 
(e.g., McLaren & Johnson, 2007; Pew, 2016), as in Western countries such as Britain, 
Muslims tend to be immigrants. However, we feel that as DTA may have exerted 
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specifically on anti-Muslim attitudes, this may highlight that DTA may be directly 
channelled towards the source of the threat. In other words, DTA drives hostility 
towards the source of the threat (e.g., Muslims), but at the same time more broadly 
affects attitudes towards immigrants by virtue of the fact that Muslims in the UK tend 
to be immigrants. Importantly, we believe this finding may offer novel and additional 
support for the role of DTA as an important mechanism in prejudice and defence, by 
suggesting that DTA (at least after worldview threat) may not lead to generalised, but 
instead specific forms, of defence to cope with the threat. 
 Additionally, it is worthwhile acknowledging that our findings also suggested 
there might be cases where levels of DTA may not lead to increased defence. Although 
statistically non-significant, our findings suggested that when natural kind beliefs were 
low and entitativity was high, DTA may lead to decreasing levels of bias. This is 
interesting as it suggests that DTA should not necessarily always be associated with 
hostility and defence (see Jonas & Fritsche, 2013; Vail, Juhl, Arndt, Vess, Routledge, 
& Rutjens, 2012 for similar ideas). Additionally, as DTA is an implicit measure of 
existential threat, it suggests that for some forms of essentialism the article might have 
been threatening in a slightly different way and in turn led to decreasing levels of bias. 
For example, as natural kind beliefs may imply ethnic conceptions of the national 
group that suggest the group is impermeable with rigid boundaries and is not prone to 
socio-cultural shaping (Pehrson et al., 2009; Zagefka et al., 2012), it might be that for 
these participants the article was threatening in the way that was intended. Therefore, 
high levels of DTA led to a need to defend this belief by decreasing feelings towards 
Muslims who are perceived to be trespassing and contaminating the ingroup. In 
contrast, when natural kind beliefs are low, it instead implies the group is malleable, 
permeable, and open to socio-cultural shaping. It is possible then that the articles 
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negative stance on the possibility of change, and presence of Muslims as British 
citizens might have also been somewhat threatening to participants with low levels of 
natural kind beliefs. Therefore, high levels of DTA would lead to decreasing levels of 
ingroup bias to affirm one’s beliefs about the nature of the national ingroup.  
 Some limitations of the present study should be addressed. First, one might be 
sceptical that the effects of the present study were the result of worldview threat and 
not MS itself. It is possible that the emphasis of the threat article on Muslims activated 
thoughts of terrorism that in turn activated DTA, rather than DTA being elevated 
because of a worldview threat that was independent of terrorism. This argument might 
have some validity given that sociological analyses of media reporting in the UK have 
noted the increased homogenisation of Muslims and terrorism (e.g., Moore et al., 
2008; Poole, 2011), and there is some evidence of think ‘Muslim’, think ‘terrorist’ 
effects (e.g., Park, Felix & Lee, 2007). Moreover, essentialist beliefs are often linked 
to stereotype endorsement (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2006).  
Despite this, we find it hard to reconcile this possible explanation with the 
present findings. Whilst studies may suggest that essentialism is related to stereotype 
endorsement, it is equally unrelated to stereotype knowledge (Bastian & Haslam, 
2006). Given it is the knowledge, not the endorsement of the stereotype, which would 
be the requirement for mortality to become salient, it is hard to see why social 
identification and essentialism would be positively associated with DTA if the present 
study merely reflects a nuanced MS paradigm. Nonetheless, future research exploring 
these ideas that can more accurately disentangle MS and worldview threat effects 
would be worthwhile. 
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Second, it should be acknowledged that this is the first time, to the best of our 
knowledge, the DTA measure has been deployed in an online format. Whilst our study 
may therefore demonstrate some promise in translating TMT research into an online 
format, there may be potentially less rigour in conducting TMT research online. 
Indeed, it is customary in TMT research to probe for suspicion at the end of the study 
but the current design did not permit us to do so. Whilst this may not necessarily be a 
limitation of our study, it may be worthwhile seeing whether TMT studies conducted 
online may produce differing findings to those conducted in the laboratory. Some of 
the marginal effects presented here might reflect an increase in random variance due 
to the design choice that might have masked some effects from being detected. 
 In summary, this research points to the idea that levels of DTA when exposed 
to threat may alter dependent on one’s strength of social identification and essentialist 
beliefs about the ingroup. It also elucidates further on the role of DTA in producing 
worldview defence. We believe that by furthering our understanding of the conditions 
when DTA is elevated, and the role of DTA in defensive responses, we can begin to 
understand how to combat the role of existential terror in intergroup conflict and 
prejudice. We believe this study marks an important step in that direction. 
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reducing prejudice 
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Abstract 
This study attempted to explore how intervention strategies based on shifting outgroup 
perceptions could be used to reduce prejudice towards Muslims. The present study 
explored the role of surprising category combinations, which have been argued to be 
an effective way of reducing prejudice because they elicit counter-stereotypic 
thinking. The role of essentialism and TMT were considered in relation to this idea to 
explore the efficacy of this strategy. An online experiment was conducted whereby 
participants were asked to reflect on a Muslim Priest (unsurprising) or Muslim Police 
Officer (surprising) category combination. Some participants were also reminded of 
death before this task via a sentence-unscrambling task. The findings suggested 
surprising category combinations concerning Muslims did not increase emergent 
attributes or reduce prejudice towards Muslims. In addition, MS did not affect 
responses on the category combination task, but did surprisingly lower perceptions of 
group entitativity. The present findings may call into question the issue of using 
surprising category combinations in reducing prejudice when one of the categories is 
dominant, although methodological issues may be present. In addition, the findings 
may also suggest that lowering perceptions of outgroup entitativity may be a subtle 
form of worldview defence.  
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Introduction 
The thesis so far has suggested that prejudice towards Muslims may be the result of 
perceiving Muslims as posing a realistic and/or symbolic threat that in turn can be 
considered to undermine the motives of meaning, self-esteem, efficacy, continuity, 
distinctiveness and belonging. In addition, the thesis has found that perceiving the 
category Muslims as highly entitative is a potential antecedent of threat perception, 
and this may particularly be the case when the group is also viewed as immutable. 
This is because perceiving the category Muslims as a homogenous, 
informative entity may increase the perceived threatening nature of the group. This is 
because it can increase the perception of intentionality and the collective responsibility 
of the group and its members in its actions (e.g., Castano et al., 2003b; Lickel et al., 
2003). Moreover, it is associated with stereotype endorsement (e.g., Bastian & 
Haslam, 2006; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2007), which in the case of Muslims is 
overwhelmingly negative (e.g., Moore et al., 2008; Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004). 
Finally, when this can be further attributed to a potentially immutable (e.g., biological) 
basis it might imply that the group cannot change, and that certain behaviours are 
“lurking beneath the surface” of all group members (Andreychik & Gill, 2015; Denson 
et al., 2006). 
 A feature of many prejudice reduction strategies is to challenge the prevailing 
representations of a group, particularly with counter-stereotypic information, with the 
aim that this information is incorporated into the representations of these groups (see 
Hewstone, 1994 for a review). One particular way that this has been proposed is via 
the use of surprising category combinations that are effective at reducing stereotyping, 
and represent a promising avenue for prejudice reduction (e.g., Hutter & Crisp, 2005; 
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Hutter, Crisp, Humphreys, Waters, & Moffitt, 2009; Vasiljevic & Crisp, 2013). 
However, whilst research has aimed to identify the cognitive processes underpinning 
surprising category combination effects (e.g., Hutter & Crisp, 2006; Siebler, 2008), 
little is known about the motivational bases to how people respond to surprising 
category combinations. Additionally, whilst research has suggested that exposure to 
surprising category combinations may be effective in reducing prejudice (Vasiljevic 
& Crisp, 2013), little is understood about the mechanisms through which surprising 
combinations might reduce prejudice. The current research attempts to address these 
issues both by utilising TMT to offer an existential perspective on human motivation 
(Greenberg et al., 1986), as well as essentialist beliefs about social categories (e.g., 
Haslam et al., 2000). 
Category combinations  
Recent work has suggested that exposure to surprising category combinations may be 
effective at reducing stereotyping, and represent a promising avenue for prejudice 
reduction (e.g., Hutter & Crisp, 2005; Hutter et al., 2009; Vasiljevic & Crisp, 2013). 
These studies show that when asked to generate attributes about a surprising category 
combination (e.g., a ‘female mechanic’ or a ‘male nurse’) that the combination 
increases the amount of emergent attributes, and decreases the amount of constituent 
attributes in comparison to those asked to think about an unsurprising category 
combination (e.g., Hastie, Schroeder, & Weber, 1990; Hutter & Crisp, 2005; Hutter et 
al., 2009; Kunda, Miller, & Claire, 1990). Emergent attributes are novel traits that are 
the result of reflecting on the category combination itself, rather than the result of 
reflecting on either of the constituent categories that make up this combination. In 
contrast, constituent attributes are traits that were present when thinking of either the 
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categories that make up the category combination. For example, if someone classified 
a ‘Harvard-educated bricklayer’ as non-materialistic, but did not use this to describe 
someone who is ‘Harvard-educated’ or a ‘bricklayer’ this would be an emergent, novel 
attribute. In that sense, emergent attributes can be considered non-stereotypic thinking, 
as they are new traits that arise from reflecting on the category combination itself; 
whilst constituent attributes can be considered stereotypic because they are inherited 
traits that derive from one of the single categories used to make up that combination. 
Some research has considered the cognitive processes underlying this effect. 
Hutter and Crisp (2006) have suggested that surprising category combinations produce 
inconsistencies with one’s schematic framework, which engages heightened cognitive 
activity to resolve this inconsistency. That is, there is an initial search of memory 
stores to locate information to frame the category combination, which in the case of a 
surprising combination will likely fail, causing then a switch to a more cognitively 
demanding process to understand the combination (Hutter et al., 2009). Supporting 
this two-step process, findings demonstrate that under high cognitive load, the 
generation of emergent attributes, but not constituent ones, is impaired when 
confronted with surprising category combinations (Hutter & Crisp, 2006). Moreover, 
there are longer response latencies associated with surprising combinations (Siebler, 
2008). 
 As surprising combinations produce an increase of thinking in non-stereotypic 
ways, it has been posited that this might be an effective way of reducing prejudice 
towards groups (Hutter & Crisp, 2005; Hutter et al., 2009; Vasiljevic & Crisp, 2013). 
This is presumed to be because not only do surprising combinations increase non-
stereotypic thinking that might lead to stereotype change, but they also maintain a 
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level of constituent inheritance from the superordinate category that may satisfy a level 
of typicality for generalisation to occur (Hutter & Crisp, 2005). Indeed, whilst little 
evidence exists to corroborate this claim, recent evidence has suggested that asking 
participants to generate surprising category combinations might lead to increases in 
generalised tolerance, egalitarianism and reduce prejudice towards a range of 
outgroups (Vasiljevic & Crisp, 2013). 
 More generally, the idea that surprising combinations may reduce prejudice 
through the increase in non-stereotypic thinking is not a new notion. A feature of many 
prejudice reduction strategies is to challenge negative stereotypes of groups with 
counter-stereotypic information, with this information being incorporated into the 
representations of these groups (see Hewstone, 1994 for a review). This work has 
generally shown that exposure to counter-stereotypic members of a group may be 
effective in changing negative stereotypes of a group (e.g., Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001; 
Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Hewstone & Hamberger, 2000; Weber & Crocker, 
1983), although only if the counter-stereotypic information is not extreme in deviation 
from the superordinate category (Rothbart & John, 1985; see Hewstone, 1994 on 
subtyping). As such, from the view of Hutter and Crisp (2005) surprising combinations 
meet these requirements for generalisation processes because they not only increase 
non-stereotypic thinking, but also retain a level of constituent inheritance.  
 However, whilst studies find that surprising combinations generate non-
stereotypic thinking, at the same time these attributes may be generated to causally 
explain the relationship between the two categories to resolve the inconsistency. For 
example, Hutter et al. (2009) found that whilst participants were more likely to use 
emergent attributes to describe an ‘Oxford-educated bricklayer’, they were also more 
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likely to use causal attributes that explained this association by attributing the person 
as unique and an underachiever. Whilst one view of this might be that the emergent 
attributes might generalise to the broader category, another view might be that 
participants generated attributes that aimed to resolve this inconsistency, namely “by 
writing it away”. In that sense, surprising combinations may not necessarily promote 
stereotype change (and in turn reduce prejudice), because the emergent attributes may 
isolate the combination in a way (e.g., by labelling it as ‘unique’) so that it bears no 
reflection on the superordinate category (e.g., subtyping; Hewstone, 1994). Indeed, 
research demonstrates that there is little to no stereotype change when the stereotype-
inconsistent information is distilled amongst a few exemplars (e.g., Weber & Crocker, 
1983).  
Therefore, in our view the question remains whether surprising combinations 
can lead to prejudice reduction, and under which conditions might surprising 
combinations most effect reductions in prejudice. We believe this question might be 
better explored not from a cognitive perspective of stereotyping, but from the literature 
that has proposed motivational bases for stereotyping and categorisation (e.g., Allport, 
1954; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and namely that of TMT 
(Greenberg et al., 1986).  
Terror Management Theory 
As we have outlined elsewhere in this thesis, at the heart of TMT lies the proposition 
that humans are motivated to maintain stable, meaningful worldviews to defend 
against the existential anxiety that stems from the awareness of the inevitability of 
death (Greenberg et al., 1986). Thus, from a TMT view, as stereotypes permit 
understanding the social reality with a sense of meaning and predictability, they may 
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serve an important function for worldviews in assuaging this anxiety (Schimel et al., 
1999). Importantly, Schimel and colleagues (1999) point out that this view of 
stereotyping is similar to cognitive perspectives, which suggest that stereotypes derive 
from strategies that aim to reduce cognitive effort.  
Supporting this assertion, research has identified that under MS individuals are 
more likely to engage in stereotyping (Greenberg et al., 1990; Schimel et al., 1999 
Study 1), and prefer stereotype-consistent exemplars (Schimel et al., 1999 Studies 3-
5). More importantly for the current research, another study by Schimel and colleagues 
(1999, Study 2), found that under MS participants who were confronted with sentence 
stems that suggested a stereotype-inconsistent behaviour was occurring (e.g., “Mary 
paid for their dinner”), were more likely to explain this perceived inconsistency (e.g., 
“because Tom forgot his wallet”). In that sense, one view of this finding might be that 
when confronted with surprising behaviours, participants were motivated to “write 
away” the inconsistency and in turn maintain a meaningful and predictable worldview.  
As such, we propose that the extent to which surprising category combinations 
decrease stereotyping (and in turn prejudice), might depend on the extent to which 
individuals are highly motivated to maintain a meaningful conception of reality. That 
is, when reminded of death, individuals should be motivated to affirm their worldview, 
and therefore increase their use of stereotyping because stereotypes are a way to view 
the social reality with a sense of predictability. However, this should be more difficult 
when exposed to a surprising category combination because it does not fit in with 
one’s worldview. As such, to reconcile this conflict, individuals may process the 
surprising combination in a way that minimises its impact on maintaining a 
meaningful worldview, for example, by ‘writing away’ the inconsistency. In other 
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words then, reminders of death should engender subtyping as a response to surprising 
combinations because it permits resolving the inconsistency in a way that maintains 
one’s worldview. As such, whilst it should be expected that surprising combinations 
will increase the number of emergent (e.g., non-stereotypic) attributes which in turn 
should reduce levels of prejudice, it is expected that MS will reduce the effectiveness 
of surprising category combinations on reducing prejudice. That is, whilst there should 
be an increase in emergent attributes irrespective of a death reminder, this increase 
should not lead to any changes in prejudice when reminded of death because the 
attributes generated should be ones that can encourage subtyping to retain a clear and 
orderly worldview. 
Essentialism 
An additional focus of this research is to consider the role that essentialist beliefs about 
social categories may play in surprising category combinations reducing prejudice. 
The current thesis has reviewed how essentialist beliefs about groups, particularly 
entitative and immutability beliefs, are associated with increased stereotyping of that 
group (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2007), and has found 
these beliefs to be predictive of perceiving Muslims as a symbolic and realistic threat 
(Study 2). As we have previously mentioned, this is because entitative beliefs imply 
that a group is homogenous, with an underlying essence that is informative about 
members, whilst immutability beliefs may imply that the group revolves around some 
unchanging (e.g., biological) determinant. As such, perceiving a group to be highly 
entitative and/or immutable increases the likelihood of stereotyping, which in the case 
of Muslims can be considered an antecedent of threat perception because these 
stereotypes are particularly negative.  
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 As stereotyping is associated with these beliefs, it is possible that surprising 
category combinations that elicit non-stereotypic thinking will lead to reductions in 
prejudice, in part (at least) due to revisions in these beliefs. For example, reflecting on 
a surprising category combination that does not fit the stereotypic framework of that 
group, may reduce the perception that the group is entitative because it implies the 
group is less homogenous and informative than originally thought. Considerable 
research (including found in the present thesis) demonstrates that when a group is 
viewed as highly entitative or as immutable (whether experimentally or 
dispositionally), it is associated with a range of negative intergroup outcomes, 
including prejudice and stereotyping (e.g., Abelson et al., 1998; Bastian & Haslam, 
2006; Castano et al., 2003b; Haslam et al., 2002; Spencer-Rodgers, et al., 2007). 
However, little research to our knowledge has explored whether exposure to certain 
information about outgroups can alter endorsement of these beliefs, and the extent to 
which this change may explain changes in prejudicial attitudes. 
 Despite this, research has supported the idea that perceptions of ingroup 
entitativity may increase (for example after MS; Castano et al., 2002; Herrera & Sani, 
2013), or decrease when the group’s norm is perceived to be subverted (Sani, 2005). 
Moreover, experimentally altering levels of interaction between group members can 
alter perceptions of group entitativity (Gaertner & Schopler, 1998). Therefore, it 
appears that entitativity beliefs are not static beliefs, but in part are dependent upon 
the information that is currently accessible or salient, as well as what is currently 
motivationally pressing.  
Moreover, findings have shown that attending integrated schools can reduce 
essentialist beliefs about ethnic groups in children (Deeb, Segall, Birnbaum, Eliyahu, 
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& Diesendruck, 2011). Their findings show that whilst essentialist beliefs were 
similarly high amongst all children in kindergarten, by age 7, and more noticeably by 
age 12, those who attended an integrated school demonstrated considerably lower 
levels of essentialist beliefs. The authors argue that these findings are supportive of 
the idea that as familiarity with a group increases, there is decreased likelihood to 
stereotype and hold essentialist beliefs. Taken together then, surprising category 
combinations that increase counter-stereotypic attributes, may decrease the extent to 
which a group is viewed as entitative, and in turn reduce prejudice towards that group. 
The current study tests this possibility. 
Study 6 aims and hypotheses 
In summary, the present research aims to explore whether exposure to surprising 
category combinations can reduce prejudice. The current research will explore this in 
relation to Islamophobic prejudice. Our focus on the perception of Muslims seems a 
new one for the literature of surprising category combinations (to our knowledge), 
which gives the study novelty, but also the ability to explore the effect of category 
combinations on a group that is highly stereotyped and negatively perceived in many 
Western countries.  
Additionally, the research aims to elucidate the motivational underpinnings of 
this effect by utilising TMT. It is believed that the extent to which surprising category 
combinations will reduce prejudice towards Muslims, will depend on the extent to 
which individuals will need to maintain a meaningful, stable and predictable 
worldview.  Finally, the present research seeks to specify the mechanisms that may 
facilitate surprising category combinations leading to reduced prejudice, namely by 
exploring the role of entitativity and immutability beliefs. 
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To explore this, an online experiment was conducted where death was first 
made salient or not, and then participants were asked to reflect on either a surprising 
(Muslim Police Officer) or unsurprising (Muslim Priest) category combination and to 
generate attributes for these categories. These attributes were then assessed to a 
different sample of participants who generated attributes for the constituent categories 
that make up these combinations (e.g., Muslim, Priest, and Police Officer). By 
comparing these samples, a score can be obtained for the number of novel, non-
stereotypic attributes elicited by the category combination (e.g., ones that were not 
listed when writing about the constituent categories that make up this combination).  
In addition, after completing these tasks, participants then answered some 
questions concerning their essentialist beliefs about the category Muslims, as well as 
some scales that assess their levels of prejudice towards Muslims. This allowed us to 
test whether the manipulations affected levels of prejudice towards Muslims, and 
whether any effect on prejudice was mediated by changes in essentialist beliefs. 
 H1: Those exposed to a surprising category combination will generate more emergent 
(non-stereotypic attributes), and less constituent (stereotypic) attributes. 
H2: Those exposed to a surprising category combination will demonstrate lower levels 
of prejudice towards Muslims, but only amongst those who have not previously been 
reminded of death. 
H3: Those exposed to a surprising category combination will demonstrate lower 
perceptions of entitativity and immutability, but only amongst those who have not 
previously been reminded of death. 
H4: Perceptions of entitativity and immutability will mediate the link between the 
experimental conditions and prejudice towards Muslims.  
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Method 
Participants 
One hundred-and-thirty-four participants were recruited from the online platform 
Crowdflower. Participants were paid $0.35 for taking part. Prior TMT research has 
suggested that 15-20 participants is sufficient to detect an effect with the MS 
manipulation (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1994; Rosenblatt et al., 1989) therefore we 
ensured to collect enough data to have a minimum of 15 participants per cell even after 
removal criteria (e.g., minimum sample size 60). The current sample size was also 
determined by the amount of the amount of available funds left for data collection. 
Two participants were removed for not meeting the sample criteria (British, Non-
Muslim), and 21 were removed for not completing all the measures in the study. 
Finally, 12 participants were removed because of their answers on the conjunction 
task. Three were removed for giving an insufficient amount of responses (less than 5 
responses), and 9 were removed because their answers were identical to another 
participant’s responses suggesting multiple participation. The final sample therefore 
consisted of 99 British non-Muslim participants (Mage = 36.7, SDage = 11.1), with 49 
males and 50 females. Ethical approval was given by the College Ethics Committee at 
Royal Holloway, University of London. 
 An additional sample of 63 undergraduate participants collected at the 
university was used to generate attributes of the constituent categories that made up 
the category combinations in the main study. 56 of this sample were female, and 7 
male (Mage = 19.0, SDage = 3.7). This samples response to the constituent categories 
could then be compared to the main samples category conjunction responses to explore 
the number of attributes listed that were constituent or emergent. This follows the 
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procedure used in existing research in this area (e.g., Hutter & Crisp, 2005; Goclowska 
& Crisp, 2013). 
Materials and Procedure 
The study was pitched as an exploration of individual differences in the beliefs and 
perceptions of social groups. Participants were informed they would be taking part in 
two tasks that would assess individual differences, before being asked questions about 
their beliefs and perceptions of social groups. Participants first completed some basic 
demographic information before continuing to the main part of the study. 
 The first task was the MS manipulation adapted from Hirschberger (2006), but 
was pitched to participants as a task that assessed pattern recognition via a sentence-
unscrambling task. Participants were told to unscramble a series of words to form a 
grammatically correct sentence and that their performance on this task was being 
timed. There were 20 sentences in total, 13 that were neutral in content and kept 
consistent between both conditions (e.g., “he washed the car at the weekend”). The 
other 7 sentences either included death-related themes or pain-related ones. Examples 
of the death-related sentences include: “they lowered the coffin into the ground” and 
“he dreamed that he died last night”; examples of pain-related sentences include: “he 
injured his shoulder playing tennis” and “she hurt her ankle as she fell”. The order of 
the twenty sentences was randomised for each participant. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the pain or death condition (see Appendix, Attachment D). 
 Participants then moved onto the second task which was the category 
combination task (e.g., Hutter & Crisp, 2005), and were presented with a category 
combination and instructed to think about what this person might be like if they met 
them. They were then instructed to spontaneously list 10 single-word adjectives to 
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describe this person. Participants were either randomly assigned to the unsurprising 
(Muslim Priest) or the surprising (Muslim Police Officer) category combination22. No 
time limit was given to completing this task, but participant’s responses on this task 
were timed. 
At the end of the task, participants were given a single item question that asked 
them to rate the difficulty of the task on a 7-point Likert scale from (1) extremely easy 
to (7) extremely difficult. On completion of these two tasks, participants then 
completed the dependent measures of the study. 
Measures. After completing these two tasks, participants were asked to complete 
measures of entitativity and immutability beliefs about Muslims. These items were 
modelled on the Haslam et al. (2000) scales that have been deployed in the current 
thesis, but were adapted for easier understanding of the items. The scale had seven 
items that tapped into different essentialist beliefs about social groups: “To what extent 
are members of this group similar to each other?” (uniformity); “To what extent is 
knowledge of this group membership informative about its members?” 
(informativeness); “To what extent does belonging to this group exclude members 
from being part of other groups?” (exclusivity); “To what extent does this group have 
an underlying reality, meaning that although members might have differences and 
similarities on the surface, underneath that they are basically the same?” (inherence); 
“To what extent does membership to this group require members to have necessary 
                                                          
22 We chose to deploy the term priest (rather than cleric) to ensure the category was understood by all 
participants. In addition, the category police officer was selected as the surprising category 
combination here because of its equivalence as a profession, but also that it contrasts with dominant 
social media representations of Muslims that are noticeable for deviance and terrorism (e.g., Moore et 
al., 2008). 
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features to be a member?” (necessity); “To what extent is membership to this group 
permanent?” (immutability); and “To what extent is membership to this group easy to 
change?” (immutability reversed). We used two items to measure immutability as our 
prior findings (as well as other research in this area) suggest that this belief should be 
independent from the other beliefs measured (as these other beliefs are a part of 
entitativity), therefore having two items would help assess the entitativity factor and 
immutability component of natural kind beliefs. Responses were given on a 7-point 
Likert scale from not at all (1) to extremely (7). 
Next participants completed a single-item feeling thermometer to assess 
participant’s levels of prejudice towards Muslims (e.g., Velasco-González et al., 
2008). Responses were provided on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Intensely 
cold or unfavourable feeling’ (1) to ‘Intensely warm or favourable feeling’ (11). 
We also used a five-item measure of contact intentions with Muslims (e.g., 
Velasco-González et al., 2008). These items were “I would be happy to have Muslims 
as next-door neighbours”; “I would be happy to have a Muslim as a close friend”; “I 
would be happy to work with a Muslim”; “I would be interested in meeting more 
Muslims”; and “I would go out with a Muslim”. These items were again assessed on 
a 7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). 
Finally, participants were presented with a survey page that indicated the study 
was over and gave them some brief information about the study’s aims of reducing 
prejudice towards Muslims. This page also provided participants with a link to an 
actual charity if they would like to “donate, volunteer, or simply know more about the 
work being done to reduce Islamophobic prejudice” (for full wordings of this page, 
see Appendix Attachment E). Unknown to participants, their behaviour on this page 
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was being assessed by the survey. The survey logged the number of clicks participants 
made on this page of the survey23, as well as the number of seconds spent on this page. 
These acted as behavioural measures to assess the effect of our experimental 
manipulations. On completion of this page, participants were directed to the actual 
debrief that explained the full aims of the study. 
Attribute coding 
Participant responses on the category conjunction task were compared to the in-house 
sample who was asked to consider attributes of each single category (e.g., ‘police 
officer’ or ‘muslim’). A rater who was blind to the experimental conditions and 
hypotheses was asked to code answers on the category conjunction task as to whether 
each attribute was emergent or constituent. Emergent attributes are those that are only 
used in relation to category combination, and not when describing either of the single 
categories that make up this combination. In contrast, a constituent attribute is an 
answer is given that was provided when thinking about either of the constituent 
categories that make up the category combination. Answers that included a repetition 
of the same idea or attribute (e.g., ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’) were only counted once. 
This procedure is the same that has been used in previous research deploying this task 
(e.g., Goclowska & Crisp, 2013; Hutter & Crisp, 2005). A second rater coded a 
random 25% subsample of the answers to ensure consistency in the coding. There was 
strong agreement between the raters for both constituent attributes (r = .85, p <.001) 
and emergent attributes (r = .92, p <.001). Scores for both constituent and emergent 
attributes were calculated into percentages of the total attributes listed to account for 
                                                          
23 The findings indicated that only 9 participants clicked on this page of the survey, thus there was not 
enough variable data to extrapolate anything meaningful from the ‘click’ variable, so will be 
discussed no further. 
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any potential differences in the number of attributions listed by participants. As these 
scores were expressed as a percentage and therefore directly proportional to each 
other, we computed an attribute index score (constituent minus emergent attributes) 
for levels of stereotyping mirroring prior research in this area (Hutter et al., 2009). 
Therefore, scores above zero reflect more constituent attributes, whilst scores below 
zero reflect more emergent attributes written about the category combination. 
Results 
Task timing and difficulty 
We first explored whether there was any difference in the time taken to complete the 
category conjunction task as well as its difficulty dependent on the type of category 
combination. We also considered whether the MS manipulation might have affected 
this. A 2 (Combination type: surprising v unsurprising) x 2 (MS: yes v no) ANOVA 
found a significant main effect of conjunction type on difficulty ratings (F (1, 95) = 
5.97, p =.016, η2=.059) and a near significant effect of conjunction type on time taken 
(F (1, 95) = 3.83, p =.053, η2=.039). No other effects were significant (p’s>.10). For 
the significant effect of difficulty ratings, the findings suggested that participants 
exposed to the surprising combination (M = 4.45, SD = 1.53) found the task harder 
than those writing about the unsurprising combination (M = 3.67, SD = 1.75). 
Similarly, amount of time spent was longer for the surprising combination (M = 
139.53, SD = 101.44) than the unsurprising combination (M = 105.30, SD = 68.58). 
Taken together, it suggests that the surprising category combination required more 
cognitive effort to generate attributes, thus the manipulation could be considered 
successful and replicates prior research in this area (e.g., Siebler, 2008, see table 13 
for descriptive statistics). 
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Attributes 
We now turned to our first hypothesis (H1) that surprising category combinations 
would be related to an increase in emergent and decrease in constituent attributions. A 
2 (Combination type: surprising v unsurprising) x 2 (MS: yes v no) independent 
measures ANOVA was conducted to assess the effect of the category conjunction type 
on stereotyping, as well as the effects of MS. The findings suggested there was no 
difference in level of stereotyping as a function of either experimental manipulation 
or the interaction between them (p’s>.40). The descriptive statistics are provided in 
table 13. Therefore, H1 was not supported. 
Table 13: Means (standard deviations in parentheses) of stereotyping, time taken and 
difficulty ratings as a function of category combination and MS 
 Unsurprising Surprising 
 Death Pain Death Pain 
Stereotyping 1.76 (51.39) 15.52 (55.30) 10.80 (45.67) 13.56 (57.54) 
Time taken (s) 99.31 (60.75) 109.91 (75.02) 117.93 (77.82) 160.33 (117.65) 
Difficulty 3.40 (1.82) 3.88 (1.70) 4.54 (1.45) 4.37 (1.62) 
 
Dependent measures 
We first conducted a factor analysis using varimax rotation to assess the factor 
structure of the essentialism and contact items. The analysis yielded a three-factor 
solution, with the contact items constituting one factor, and the essentialism items 
constituting two distinct factors. However, the third factor was dropped for a few 
reasons. Firstly, the third factor only explained a small amount of variance in 
comparison to the other two factors, and only consisted of two items, which were not 
the expected immutability items (informativeness and the reversed immutability item). 
Finally, the informativeness item loaded more strongly in the other essentialism factor. 
Therefore, for parsimony we only explored one factor of essentialism that included 
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the beliefs of uniformity, inherence, necessity, immutability, exclusivity, and 
informativeness (for full loadings see Appendix, table 4). This factor resembles the 
entitativity factor found by Haslam et al. (2000, 2002) and the preceding studies in 
this thesis, although now includes beliefs of immutability. Composite scores of contact 
intentions (α = .94) and entitativity beliefs (α = .82) were computed. 
 We now explored H3 that suggested that surprising combinations would 
reduce levels of essentialist beliefs but only when death was not salient. We conducted 
a 2 (Combination type: surprising v unsurprising) x 2 (MS: yes v no) ANOVA on 
entitativity ratings of Muslims. This produced only a near significant effect of MS (F 
(1, 95) = 3.13, p =.080, η2=.032), which surprisingly suggested that entitativity scores 
were lower after being reminded of death (M = 4.07, SD = 1.22) than when reminded 
of pain (M = 4.50, SD = 1.12). No other effect was significant (p’s >.50, see table 14 
for descriptive statistics). As such, H3 was not supported and in fact, the findings 
suggested there was a marginal effect in the opposite direction. 
Next, we explored whether the experimental manipulations had affected 
prejudice or contact intentions towards Muslims (H2). Both ANOVAs suggested that 
the experimental manipulations, and the interaction between experimental conditions, 
had no effect on contact intentions or feelings towards Muslims (p’s>.30, see table 2). 
As the findings failed to show any indication that the experimental manipulations had 
affected feelings or contact intentions towards Muslims, the requirements of mediation 
had not been met (Baron & Kenny, 1986), thus H4 was not supported. 
 Finally, we also explored whether the experimental manipulations had any 
behavioural effect towards information regarding a donation campaign towards 
fighting Islamophobia. A 2x2 ANOVA indicated that there was a marginal effect of 
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category conjunction on time spent reading about the charity aims (F (1, 95) = 3.51, p 
=.064, η2=.036), with the surprising combination (M = 8.35, SD = 7.54) leading to 
marginally longer time spent on the page than the unsurprising combination (M = 5.98, 
SD = 4.22). No other effects were significant (p’s>.50). The descriptive statistics are 
presented in table 14 below.  
Table 14: Means (standard deviations in parentheses) of entitativity, contact 
intentions, prejudice and time spent on the charity page as a function of category 
combination and MS 
 Unsurprising Surprising 
 Death Pain Death Pain 
Entitativity 4.13 (1.33) 4.55 (1.07) 4.03 (1.16) 4.45 (1.18) 
Contact 4.35 (2.24) 4.78 (1.62) 4.69 (1.69) 4.38 (1.66) 
Prejudice 5.45 (3.33) 6.12 (2.78) 6.31 (2.66) 6.04 (2.78) 
Behavioural (s) 5.83 (4.06) 6.10 (4.41) 8.31 (7.37) 8.38 (7.85) 
 
Discussion 
The findings of the study did not support the idea that prejudice can be reduced by 
exposure to surprising category combinations, and there was no evidence that this 
effect might be qualified by TMT processes. Additionally, the present study found 
no support for an increase in emergent attributes when reflecting on a surprising 
category combination. Therefore, the present research is inconsistent with both the 
literature on surprising combinations (e.g., Hattie et al., 1990; Hutter & Crisp, 2005; 
Kunda et al., 1990) and TMT research on stereotyping (e.g., Schimel et al., 1999). 
 What might account for these inconsistent findings? There are few possible 
explanations. Firstly, it is possible that the combination was not very surprising to 
participants, or that potentially our unsurprising category actually elicited some 
surprise. The latter might be plausible given the use of the term ‘Priest’ that is more 
associated with Christian rather than Muslim culture. As we did not include a direct 
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manipulation check to measure surprise this cannot be ruled out, however we find 
both possibilities unlikely for two reasons. Firstly, the surprising combination was 
made specifically to be counter-stereotypic to media reporting and representations of 
Muslims (e.g., Moore et al., 2008; Poole, 2002). Secondly, our findings did suggest 
that participants found the surprising combination subjectively more difficult, and 
they took longer to generate attributes, which is consistent with some of the research 
in this area that suggests that surprising combinations elicit a two-step process to 
understanding the target (e.g., Hutter & Crisp, 2006; Siebler, 2008). Therefore, the 
current findings seem to support the idea that the manipulation did work as intended. 
 Another possible reason to account for the findings is that the category 
Muslims may potentially have been dominant when reflecting on either category 
combination. Research has highlighted that whilst individuals may belong to 
multiple categories, these categories may not necessarily have equal weighting in 
framing the individual. That is, one category may be dominant over the other, and 
the individual may be simplified by deriving impressions from the dominant social 
category (e.g., McCrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995). Given as we have outlined 
elsewhere, that Muslims are ‘hyper-visible’ in the UK media (e.g., Jaspal & 
Cinnirella, 2010), it might be that this category was viewed as dominant in 
processing the individual. Importantly, in instances of category dominance, the other 
category is actively suppressed, leading to longer response times for attributional 
decision-making (McCrae et al., 1995). Therefore, this explanation might account for 
the longer response times to the surprising category combination, as there may have 
been active suppression of the competing way to classify the individual.  
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 Finally, it is also worthwhile noting that the finding may be masked by the 
different samples used to gather data for the constituent categories and the 
combination categories. The sample used to devise the attributes of the constituent 
categories was collected at the university and could be considered a young, liberal 
demographic who might be more susceptible to providing socially desirable 
responses about Muslims. In contrast, the main sample was collected online and was 
middle-aged (Mage = 36.7). Thus, the attributes of the category Muslims might not 
have entirely encompassed the representations of Muslims portrayed in the British 
media. This is particularly evident when looking at the raw data. Some negatively 
valanced attributes (e.g., radical, dangerous, intolerant) were classified as emergent 
attributes as the in-house sample did not list these as attributes of Muslims, despite 
the fact that these attributes are in line with media representations and commonly 
associated stereotypes of Muslims (e.g., Moore et al., 2008; Pew, 2011; Poole, 2002; 
Saeed, 2007).  
 It is worth noting that if the typical finding was masked due to socially 
desirable responding and/or affected because of category dominance, then this would 
add some important qualifications to the claim made in existing research that 
surprising category combinations may be an effective way at reducing prejudice 
(Hutter & Crisp, 2005; Vasiljevic & Crisp, 2013). That is, the present study did not 
find any changes in either desire for contact or levels of prejudice towards 
Muslims24. For example, as we previously outlined, it might be that surprising 
                                                          
24 It should be noted that the present study did find behavioural changes towards Muslims, with an 
increase in amount of time spent reading about the aims of the study and a Muslim-based charity 
when writing about the surprising combination. However, it is hard to explain why participants in this 
case might exhibit a different behavioural response, but not an actual change in their subjective 
attitudes. We suspect therefore that this might have been measuring something else instead, for 
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combinations elicit emergent attributes only to the extent that they resolve 
inconsistencies but keep the superordinate stereotype intact. Alternatively, surprising 
combinations may be ineffective at reducing prejudice towards groups where the 
category is perceived as dominant and informative, as perhaps is the case with 
Muslims. However, further research is needed to disentangle these potential effects, 
and corroborate these ideas more clearly. 
 Additionally, the present study did not support that surprising category 
combinations and MS would affect levels of entitativity, and in fact, the findings 
suggested that perceptions of entitativity were lower after MS, which was opposite to 
what was expected. This finding runs counter to other research in this area that 
suggests that entitativity is increased after MS (Castano et al., 2002; Herrera & Sani, 
2013). However, this difference may be representative of when entitativity is 
attributed to the ingroup in comparison to the outgroup. For example, when 
attributed to the ingroup, entitativity provides clear prototypes of “who we are”, that 
therefore furnish one’s worldview with clear norms and standards of conduct to live 
up to. Moreover, ingroup entitativity may offer “celestial value” to the group in that 
it transforms the group into something meaningful that operates on a different level 
of existence to the self (Castano, 2004a).  
In contrast, when attributed to the outgroup, entitativity provides clear 
prototypes of “who they are” which can increase the perceived threatening nature of 
the group because it increases the sense of intentionality and cohesion (e.g., Castano 
                                                          
example, resource depletion. This is because surprising combinations are believed to activate 
executive functioning to resolve inconsistencies (e.g., Hutter & Crisp 2006; Hutter et al., 2009) that 
might have depleted subsequent available resources, in turn leading to longer response times in 
completing the study (see Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000; Richeson & Trawalter, 2005). 
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et al., 2003b). Moreover, these beliefs transform it into a “real” group that 
consequently might offer validity to the alternative worldview, and in turn 
undermine the degree that one can subscribe to one’s own worldview (see Solomon 
et al., 1991). As such, decreasing the perception that the category Muslims is 
entitative might constitute a subtle type of worldview defence by dismissing the 
group as less “real” than the ingroup thus minimising the threat.  
If lowering perceptions of group entitativity acted as a subtle worldview 
defence, but high perceptions of entitativity are associated with stereotyping which is 
expected after MS, then the question remains how might one expect MS to lead to 
both increasing and decreasing levels of entitativity? Potentially, this could be 
explained by exploring more closely the sub-facets of entitative beliefs. One view of 
entitativity is that it concerns the extent to which a social aggregate constitutes a 
‘group’ relying on indices of similarity, proximity, and common fate/goals 
(Campbell, 1958). Therefore, these ideas suggest that group entitativity has rich 
inductive potential, which is informative about group members (e.g., Haslam et al., 
2000; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). On the other hand, entitativity might also be viewed 
to suggest that the group is highly reified; the belief that the group has some sort of 
an underlying reality or ‘celestial properties’ (e.g., Castano & Dechesne, 2005; 
Haslam et al., 2000). At least in the case of Muslims, believing this group to be 
highly reified, might imply a sense of validity to an Islamic worldview because it 
suggests a sense that the group is “real” and legitimate. Thus, one possible 
reconciliation might be that MS might lead to both increasing and decreasing levels 
of entitativity dependent on the precise belief being examined.  
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To explore this idea, we ran a MANOVA with the essentialist beliefs as 
separate dependent variables. Wilks’ Lambda test suggested there was no 
multivariate effect of MS on these beliefs, but the univariate analyses suggested that 
MS decreased perceptions of necessity (p=.050), immutability (p=.080) and 
inherence (p=.085). Therefore, it seems that this effect might be reducible to specific 
essentialist components. However, we did not find that MS increased perceptions 
that the group was informative or homogenous. Future research should explore this 
further. 
In summary, this study attempted to explore whether prejudice towards 
Muslims could be reduced by exposure to a surprising category combination. The 
present findings suggested that this was not the case, possibly because Muslim is 
viewed as a ‘dominant’ category, but the current study may present some issues with 
interpretation due to the different demographics between the samples that were used 
to compare the data. In addition, whilst MS did not affect prejudice towards Muslims 
or interact with the category combination to affect stereotyping, MS did lower levels 
of entitativity, possibly as a subtle worldview defence mechanism. Further research 
in this area is needed because understanding ways in which stereotypes associated 
with groups may be changed, and the conditions under which this change may occur, 
is beneficial to understanding how to best combat prejudice.    
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Chapter VII: 
Ingroup-based strategies to reducing 
prejudice 
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Abstract 
The present study explored whether reminders of tolerance, via the use of essentialist 
narratives about national identity, could improve attitudes and relations towards 
Muslims. The study also explored how different reminders of death, such as terrorism, 
may affect the extent to which tolerance produces positive intergroup outcomes. An 
online experiment was conducted were participants either read: a paragraph about the 
tolerant roots of British identity; Christian roots of British identity or a control passage. 
In addition, participants also watched: a video concerning the Death of Diana (MS); 
the 7/7 bombings (TS); or a control video. The findings of the study suggested that 
tolerance did decrease opposition to Muslim rights, but only when reminded of death. 
When participants were reminded of terrorism, tolerance reminders increased the 
opposition to Muslim rights. The findings of the present study are discussed in relation 
to both practical and theoretical implications, with the key implication being that 
reminders of prosocial ingroup norms are effective at improving intergroup relations, 
but only when they are not perceived to be threatened. 
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Introduction 
So far in the thesis we have explored how national essentialism and identification are 
antecedents of threat perception and prejudice. In addition, research has shown that 
one’s social identity and beliefs about one’s social group may hold anxiety-buffering 
functions that shield individuals from the terror that arises from knowledge of one’s 
inevitable demise (e.g., Castano & Dechesne, 2005; Keller, 2005). This is because 
they can often be important sources of one’s sense of distinctiveness, belonging, 
continuity, meaning, self-esteem and efficacy, which in turn may be beneficial in 
alleviating existential concerns as suggested by studies 3 and 4 (but see also Sani et 
al., 2007; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2013). 
 If those who strongly identify and/or hold essentialist beliefs about Britain are 
most commonly associated with holding prejudicial attitudes towards Muslims, then 
in our view, it should follow that any prejudice reduction strategy should be designed 
with these individuals in mind. Fortunately, prejudice should not be considered an 
automatic outcome of essentialising or strongly identifying with one’s own group, 
instead depending on the contents and also context in which they are used (e.g., 
Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Verkuyten, 2003). Therefore, one potential way to reduce 
prejudice is to promote prosocial values associated with one’s social identity, which 
in turn may lead to more positive intergroup relations. One particular value that may 
be beneficial to facilitating positive intergroup relations is that of tolerance (e.g., 
Greenberg et al., 1992; Smeekes et al., 2012; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014a).  
 The current aim of this research therefore is to explore how promoting 
tolerance as a key British value, particularly with essentialist narratives, may reduce 
prejudice and opposition towards Muslims. This is not only because recent research 
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has demonstrated that historical, essentialist narratives can be appealing to 
understanding us, in turn shaping attitudes towards other groups (e.g., Smeekes & 
Verkuyten, 2013; Smeekes et al., 2011, 2012; Zagefka et al., 2012), but also because 
essentialism may buffer from existential concerns (e.g., Castano & Dechesne, 2005; 
Herrera & Sani, 2013; Keller, 2005). The present research also explores the role of 
social identification in this prejudice reduction strategy, as this approach may be 
particularly effective for those who highly identify and are more inclined to act in 
accordance with the group’s norms and beliefs (Doosje et al., 1999). Finally, the 
present research also considers some of the potential limitations of such an approach; 
namely that the extent to which promoting tolerance as a way to reducing prejudice 
depends on the degree to which that value is not perceived to be challenged or under 
threat. 
Essentialism 
Essentialist beliefs, whether pertaining to one’s sense of a group as natural kind or as 
highly entitative, are both descriptive and normative. This is because they provide 
clear descriptions of “who we are”, and how “we” should behave and relate to others 
(Hogg, 2009; Smeekes et al., 2012; Zagefka et al., 2012). In that sense, essentialist 
beliefs can lead to increased concerns over group change and contamination, but also 
the need to defend the ingroup from these changes (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2013; 
Zagefka et al., 2012). Therefore, for example, when one’s nation is defined in ethnic, 
natural kind terms this can lead to the rejection of minority groups who are perceived 
not to have membership ‘in their blood’ and are contaminating the ingroup (e.g., 
Pehrson et al., 2009; Zagefka et al., 2012). Similarly, when one’s group is highly 
entitative, it can increase sensitivity to those who are perceived to deviate from the 
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group prototype (Hogg, 2009), for example as we have argued to be the case so far 
with Muslims due to media reporting characterising them as deviant and threatening 
to traditional British values (e.g., Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010, Poole, 2002). These 
concerns over losses or revisions to the ingroup may represent an existential threat 
because these groups can afford a sense of death transcendence (Castano & Dechesne, 
2005; Sani et al., 2007). Indeed, as we have seen identified in the present thesis, one’s 
nation may represent a special type of social identity in that it can alleviate existential 
concerns surrounding continuity (studies 3 and 4). Moreover, those high in national 
essentialism are associated with increased levels of DTA after exposure to symbolic 
threats to worldview (Study 5). 
 As such, essentialist beliefs can be associated with perceiving threat and 
prejudice from others, but this does not mean that essentialist beliefs should always 
lead to increasing levels of prejudice. For example, some essentialist beliefs about 
homosexuality are associated with decreasing levels of prejudice (Haslam et al., 2002; 
Haslam & Levy, 2006). This is because essentialist beliefs about homosexuality imply 
that it is biologically determined and immutable, thus suggesting that it is natural. 
Therefore, essentialism should not be viewed as inherently oppressive, nor de-
essentialism inherently progressive (Verkuyten, 2003). Instead, it depends on the 
content that is essentialised and the context in which they are used. For example, 
essentialist discourse surrounding culture and ethnicity can be used to both support 
and reject notions of multiculturalism (Verkuyten, 2003). This is because on one hand, 
essentialist notions can be used to reject the feasibility of culture adoption, but on the 
other, they can also be used to argue for respecting the existence of other cultures and 
the right to one’s own cultural identity.  
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 Nations may particularly be the kind of group that is viewed in essentialist 
terms because they are often perceived as having shared roots, heritage, and history 
(Bhabha, 1989; Connor, 1994; Smith, 2001). This sense of a shared cultural heritage 
may satisfy a sense that “we” will live on, and by extension a part of the self will also 
endure (Castano & Dechesne, 2005; Condor, 1996). However, because of this need to 
preserve one’s cultural traditions, customs, and beliefs, this can make individuals 
resistant to change and oppose social developments that undermine this sense of 
continuity (Jetten & Hutchinson, 2011; Jetten & Wohl, 2012; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 
2013). As such, this might lead to hostility towards others who are perceived to 
challenge and/or usurp national cultural traditions (e.g., a symbolic threat), such as 
seems to be the case with Muslims in many Western nations (Cinnirella, 2014). 
Therefore, the extent to which individuals will display prejudice and opposition to 
change depends on the understanding of one’s national identity, and the way in which 
it is (if at all) essentialised (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Verkuyten, 2003). 
 Across Europe and the US, national heritage and identity may often be viewed 
to be deeply embedded within Christian traditions (Alba, 2005; Colley, 1992). This 
view of national identity places Islam and Muslims as being in conflict with these 
beliefs, and as such they are positioned as a perceived threat to the continuation of 
one’s national cultural heritage (Smeekes et al., 2011). Consequently, when 
individuals view their nation’s core identity to be built upon Christian traditions, they 
will be motivated to defend their national group from those that impinge upon these 
beliefs. In part, this is because this may lead to fears of the group ceasing to exist as a 
collective, which would also represent an annihilation of the symbolic individual self. 
Indeed, Dutch participants who were asked to reflect on the existential threat 
associated with loss of their culture (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2013), or were reminded 
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of the Christian roots of Dutch identity (Smeekes et al., 2011; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 
2014a) demonstrated increased opposition to Muslim rights. 
 Of course, one’s national history may also be framed in different ways that 
lead to a more positive reception to cultural diversity. For example, representations of 
Britain may be entrenched in ideas of tolerance and freedom (Hopkins & Reicher, 
1996; Liu & Hilton, 2005; Strong, 1998). By doing so, this may imply the need to be 
accepting of others cultural beliefs. Supporting this, Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, 
Hopkins, and Levine (2006) found that Bulgarians who opposed the oppression of 
Jews in World War II tended to conceptualise their national identity as being rooted 
in religious tolerance. More recently, Smeekes and colleagues (2012; see also 
Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014a) found that those who endorsed historical notions of 
Dutch identity as being embedded in tolerance (Studies 1 and 2), or were reminded of 
their nation’s tolerant roots (Study 3) demonstrated decreased levels of opposition 
towards Muslim rights, via decreased perceptions of Muslims as a continuity or 
symbolic threat. Therefore, by viewing tolerance as a core component to one’s national 
culture, it reduces the threatening nature of Muslims as their presence and traditions 
are viewed as less in direct conflict with one’s own. 
National identification 
As we have outlined, essentialist national beliefs are a key component to national 
identity, being both descriptive and normative in nature. That is, they prescribe clearly 
defined, rigid boundaries and prototypes of “who we are” that shape how members 
behave and relate to others. This can lead to increased opposition to others who are 
believed to be threatening the nature of one’s identity, for example by not meeting the 
necessary requirements for membership or deviating from the unambiguous group 
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prototype. By defending one’s national culture, this ensures the continuation of the 
collective and the part of the self that identifies with it.  
 Of course, not everyone will necessarily feel the need to preserve the group 
identity equally. As we have outlined and found in the thesis so far, strength of national 
identification is an antecedent of perceiving Muslims as a symbolic and realistic threat 
(Studies 1 and 2), as well as an existential threat (Study 5). From an SIT perspective, 
this is because as one increasingly identifies with the ingroup it becomes subjectively 
more relevant to the self-concept, thus motivating a need to defend the group from 
perceived threats (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999). As such, as has commonly been 
identified in the literature and this thesis, strength of national identification is a 
predictor of anti-Muslim attitudes (e.g., Ciftci, 2012; Velasco-González et al., 2008). 
This would imply that prejudice reduction strategies might be best suited at targeting 
those high in national identification. 
 It is fortunate then that those who also strongly identify with the ingroup are 
also more inclined to act in accordance with the group’s norms and beliefs (Doosje et 
al. 1999). Therefore, those who highly identify and define their nation in ethnic, 
natural terms or perceive their group as highly entitative, tend to hold stronger anti-
minority or Muslim attitudes (e.g., Effron & Knowles, 2015; Pehrson et al., 2009), not 
just because they perceive Muslims as threatening, but also because they are acting in 
accordance with their groups’ beliefs. In other words, the way in which strongly 
identified group members behave is affected by how they understand their own 
national identity (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). As such, when someone considers 
tolerance as a key component of their national identity, they should be more likely to 
respond positively towards Muslims, especially if that specific norm is salient. 
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Supporting this idea, Smeekes and Verkuyten (2012) found that the effects of a 
historically tolerant national past decreased opposition for Muslim rights, but 
particularly for those who strongly identified with the ingroup (for similar findings see 
Butz, Plant, & Doerr, 2007). 
Terror Management Theory 
The current approach to understanding prejudice has placed strong emphasis on the 
need to maintain faith in cultural worldviews, and the standards promoted within them, 
to defend against the awareness of death (Greenberg et al., 1986). As we have 
previously outlined, essentialist beliefs may serve a particular anxiety buffering 
function. This is because they provide a way to imbue the world with a sense of 
meaning, for example, by suggesting that groups are naturally existing and are 
furnished with relatively unambiguous prototypes (see Castano & Dechesne, 2005; 
Hogg, 2009; Keller, 2005), but also because they imbue groups with ‘celestial’ 
properties that promise the possibility of death transcendence (Castano, 2004a). Thus, 
when reminded of death, individuals tend to increase perceptions of group entitativity, 
which in turn increases identification (e.g., Castano et al., 2002; Herrera & Sani, 
2013). 
 Consequently, essentialist notions about one’s own nation might be quite 
appealing because they may assuage existential-related concerns. At the same time, 
TMT asserts that individuals need to live up to the standards promoted within their 
worldview, which can often mean defending one’s worldview from those that are 
perceived to impinge on the validity of one’s own (Greenberg et al., 1986). Thus, 
generally, MS can increase derogation and prejudice towards others (e.g., Das et al., 
2009; Greenberg et al., 1990; for a review see Burke et al., 2010). 
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 However, fortunately, prejudice and hostility should not be considered an 
automatic outcome of MS. This is because whilst MS engenders a need to maintain 
faith, and live up to the standards and norms promoted within one’s worldview, these 
norms do not necessarily need to be aggressive (Jonas & Fritsche, 2013). Indeed, as 
we have outlined, the contents of one’s national identity can be complex and important 
in understanding the relationship between ingroup identification and outgroup 
discrimination (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). For example, when the Christian roots of 
British identity are salient, this may engender hostility and prejudice towards Muslims 
because they impinge upon the validity of Christian national traditions; but when the 
tolerant roots of British identity are salient, this may engender the need to be tolerant 
and accepting of Muslims. 
 Therefore, TMT would predict that the effects of MS are dependent on what 
aspect of one’s worldview is “most salient, accessible or psychologically pressing” 
(Dechesne et al., 2003, p.733). Supporting this assertion, Greenberg, and colleagues 
(1992) found that conservatives, not liberals, responded to MS with increased 
derogation. They suggested that this is because liberal worldviews place a strong 
emphasis on tolerance. In a follow-up study, they found that those who were reminded 
of the value of tolerance before MS did not demonstrate increased worldview defence. 
Similar findings have been found when participants have been reminded of the norms 
of egalitarianism (Gailliot, Stillman, Schmeichel, Maner, & Plant, 2008) and fairness 
(Jonas, Sullivan, & Greenberg, 2013) 
 Moreover, descriptive norms (such as essentialist beliefs) about the ingroup 
produce similar effects as to when participants are reminded of a certain value. For 
example, Abdollahi, Henthorn, and Pyszczynski (2010) found that social consensus 
234 
 
estimates on martyrdom could affect their support for violent attacks. That is, when 
social consensus was high for pro-martyrdom, MS increased support for martyrdom, 
but when it was high for anti-martyrdom, MS did not lead to increases in support. 
Relatedly, Giannakakis and Fristche (2011) found that when participants were 
informed that the ingroup is highly collectivistic, MS led to increased ingroup bias, 
but when informed that the ingroup is highly individualistic, MS decreased ingroup 
bias. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, adhering to group norms led to reduced bias 
towards one’s own group. 
 Taken together then, essentialist beliefs about one’s nation are both descriptive 
and normative (Zagefka et al., 2012), which may act as a blueprint for how group 
members approach relations with other groups. However, the precise reaction to others 
is dependent on how the group is essentialised (Verkuyten, 2003). This effect may be 
most particularly prominent after MS, because essentialist beliefs may reduce 
existential concerns, thus leading to increased affiliation and desire to live up to the 
collectively shared norms promoted within one’s national worldview. In addition, this 
may particularly be the case for those who strongly identify with the ingroup as they 
are most likely to act in accordance with group norms (Doojse et al., 1999; Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), but are also the ones that are most likely 
to hold negative attitudes towards Muslims (e.g., Ciftci, 2012; Velasco-González et 
al., 2008). 
Does promoting tolerance always lead to less prejudice? 
The approach outlined so far to reducing prejudice would seem promising with ideas 
of essentialism, SIT and TMT converging on the notion that when the tolerant norms 
of the nation are made salient, this should decrease prejudice and opposition towards 
235 
 
Muslims, particularly amongst those who are high identifiers, and thus most likely to 
hold anti-Muslim attitudes. However, will promoting tolerance always produce 
positive intergroup relations? Unfortunately, we suspect the answer is likely no. 
Whilst tolerance might promote more acceptance of those who hold different beliefs, 
the extent to which tolerance will reduce prejudice depends on the extent to which this 
norm is not viewed to be challenged.  
This might be particularly the case for Muslims who are often characterised as 
being intolerant of others practices, beliefs and traditions, perhaps most notably 
through the Rushdie Affair (e.g., Ansari, 2004; Abbas, 2007). More recently, however, 
this view of intolerance may be most prominent through the perceived threat of 
terrorism that suggests a desire to annihilate Westernised worldviews. In the UK 
media, the value of British tolerance has often been contrasted with Muslim 
intolerance (Poole, 2002, 2011; Saeed, 2007), thereby placing Muslims as 
symbolically threatening to this value. When this sense of tolerance is perceived to be 
threatened, there is an almost paradoxical acceptance of the need to be intolerant 
towards those who threaten this value (Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton, & 
Radley, 1988). Indeed, analyses of the British media reporting has suggested that there 
is a certain ‘threshold of tolerance’ towards Muslims, which when crossed permits the 
withdrawal of this tolerance and the acceptability of becoming intolerant (Richardson, 
2009). This might particularly be the case after incidents of Islamic-related terrorism, 
with Prime Minister Theresa May describing Britain as having “far too much 
tolerance” of Islamic extremism, and former Prime Minister David Cameron 
suggesting that Islamic extremism wishes to “destroy everything…[Britain] stands 
for: peace, tolerance, liberty” (Guardian, 2017; Independent, 2015). 
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As such, whilst MS may increase the need to affiliate with the salient norms of 
one’s worldview, thereby decreasing opposition to Muslim rights and prejudice 
towards Muslims, we suspect that when MS is in the form of Islamic-related terrorism, 
this might have the reverse effect and lead to increased opposition in defence of the 
value of tolerance. Supporting this assertion, Dechesne and colleagues (2003) have 
proposed two additional hypotheses to TMT that aim to elucidate the link between 
DTA and defence. They propose that the extent to which certain social information 
enhances or reduces MS effects on defence, depends on the extent to which these 
behaviours are related. That is, when there is no relationship between the social 
information and behaviour, the information is likely to insulate from the effects of MS 
and mitigate defensive reactions (substitution hypothesis). For example, when self-
esteem is bolstered, defensive reactions towards others are reduced (e.g., Arndt & 
Greenberg, 1999; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). However, when there is a relationship 
between the social information and behaviour, this information is likely to enhance 
the effects of MS on defensive reactions (contingency hypothesis). For example, if the 
domain of self-esteem that is bolstered is subsequently called into question, then this 
produces a contingency effect, which increases the effect of MS on worldview defence 
(Arndt & Greenberg, 1999). It should be noted that the ideas of substitution and 
contingency effects to MS remains largely untested, and we look to extend this idea 
beyond the effects of self-esteem by demonstrating that reminders of prosocial values 
can in fact lead to increased opposition towards others when this value is perceived to 
be threatened. 
 In addition, it should also be noted that our idea that reminders of terrorism 
and other types of death may evoke different reactions might be considered somewhat 
contrary to some existing TMT research that has explicitly compared MS and 
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terrorism reminders (e.g., Landau et al., 2004). Firstly, it should be noted that in studies 
where MS and terrorism are directly compared, there was no expected difference in 
direction of the effects because both MS and terrorism were expected to increase 
support for George Bush and his counter-terrorism policies (Landau et al., 2004). 
Second, research has identified that contrasted with traditional MS manipulations, 
different ways of thinking about death can produce different effects (e.g., Cozzolino, 
Staples, Meyers, & Samboceti, 2004; Florian & Mikulincer, 1997; Fritsche et al., 
2008). For example, Florian and Mikulincer (1997) found that making either the inter- 
or intra-personal aspects of death salient led to increased severity ratings for 
transgressions dependent on whether they were inter- or intra-personal in nature. 
Finally, as we have outlined, TMT has a long history of demonstrating that reactions 
towards others is dependent upon aspects of one’s worldview that are most central, 
accessible or salient (Dechesne et al., 2003). Thus, we propose that whilst mortality 
reminders (or threats to worldview) may evoke an increase in DTA that produces the 
need to affirm and behave in line with one’s worldview, the way in which this is 
channelled is dependent upon the way that the mortality reminder (or worldview 
threat) is concretised. In the case of terrorism, this should be a reminder of how Islamic 
extremism is intolerant towards the beliefs of one’s own group, which places Muslims 
in direct conflict with the value of tolerance. This would therefore produce a 
contingency effect whereby there is a need to defend this value, even if it means 
paradoxically behaving in ways that are intolerant. 
Study 7 aims and hypotheses 
The aims of this study are to explore how prejudice towards Muslims, as well as 
opposition towards Muslim rights, can be reduced by reminders of national tolerance, 
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particularly when it is essentialised. In addition, we also want to explore how strength 
of national identification moderates the effect of tolerance on these outcomes. Finally, 
we also want to explore the role TMT processes in these outcomes. Whilst MS should 
increase adherence to salient worldview norms, thus enhancing the effect of tolerance 
on prejudice reduction and opposition towards Muslim rights, we believe that this will 
be dependent on the type of mortality reminder. When the terrorism is salient, this 
should place Muslims in direct conflict of the salient norm, leading to increased 
opposition and prejudice towards Muslims. 
 An online study was conducted with British nationals that first assessed their 
levels of national identification. Participants were then exposed to a historical 
essentialism reminder that either suggested Christian or tolerant values were a core 
component of British identity. Participants were also asked to watch a video, which 
would remind them of death (MS), terrorism (TS), or a control video. Finally, they 
were asked to rate their attitudes, support for Muslim rights and desire for contact with 
Muslims.  
H1: Relative to the control, those who are exposed to Christian essentialist narratives 
about British identity will demonstrate increased opposition, prejudice, and decreased 
desire for contact with Muslims. However, those who are exposed to tolerant 
essentialist narratives of British identity will demonstrate decreased opposition, 
prejudice, and increased desire for contact.  
H2a: This effect of Christian/tolerance primes will be most pronounced when death is 
made salient.  
H2b: However, the direction of the tolerance prime will depend on the type of 
mortality reminder. Those exposed to MS/tolerance will display lower levels of 
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prejudice, opposition towards Muslims and increased desire for contact, but those 
exposed to terrorism salience (TS) will displayer higher levels of prejudice, 
opposition, and decreased desire for contact with Muslims. 
H3: Strength of national identification will moderate the above effects. That is, these 
effects will be strongest amongst those who highly identify with the ingroup. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred-and-seventy-two participants were recruited from the online platform 
Crowdflower. Participants were paid $0.40 for taking part. As mentioned in the 
previous study, prior TMT research has generally found 15 to 20 participants per cell 
sufficient to detect an effect (e.g. Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Therefore, we sought to 
obtain a sample that would provide a minimum of 15 participants per cell even after 
removal criteria was applied (e.g., minimum sample size 135). Again, sample size was 
also determined by the amount of available research funds left. Six participants were 
removed for not meeting the sample inclusion criteria (British, Non-Muslim), and 18 
were removed because they did not complete all the measures in the study. Finally, 
eight participants were removed because either they did not answer the experimental 
manipulation check or their answer indicated that they did not engage seriously with 
the experimental task. The final sample therefore consisted of 140 participants (Mage 
= 35.5, SDage = 11.3), with an exactly equal split of males and females. Eighty-five 
participants reported being a Christian (60.7%), 36 atheist (25.7%), 14 agnostic (10%), 
3 Jewish (2.1%), and 2 Buddhist (1.4%). Ethical approval was given by the College 
Ethics Committee at Royal Holloway, University of London. 
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Materials and Procedure 
The survey was pitched as an exploration of national history and the perception of 
social groups. Participants were first asked to complete some basic demographic 
information before continuing to the main part of the study. 
 The first part of the study was the British identification scale containing 7 items 
(Cinnirella, 1997) used in Studies 2 and 5. These items provided a good level of 
reliability (α = .89) with a higher score on this scale reflecting stronger identification 
with being British. Responses were provided on a seven-point Likert scale with 
extremely (7) and not at all (1) as the scale anchors. 
 Next participants were informed they would take part in a writing task about 
national history. The task was adapted from Smeekes and Verkuyten (2014b, Study 3) 
to reflect both natural kind and entitative beliefs, as well some content adapted to 
reflect actual British history. Participants were randomly assigned one of three 
passages to read and to write a few short sentences about what they had just read. 
Those in the Christian essentialism condition read the following: 
“Historians have convincingly shown that Britain is originally a Christian country. 
Christian norms and values have been a central part of the British identity since the 
Middle Ages. The British have always been inspired by Christian traditions and 
customs, and these traditions can still be found everywhere in present British society. 
The generational passing down of these values is a key historical aspect of British 
identity. It is this common feature that binds British members together, makes them 
similar to each other, uniting them in having the same common goals and fate.” 
Participants assigned to the tolerant essentialism condition read the following passage: 
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“Historians have convincingly shown that people from different backgrounds have 
been living together for a very long time in Britain. Since the Middle Ages, Britain has 
been in favour of liberty and tolerance welcoming various Germanic communities to 
Britain, continuing later into more modern migration of groups such as the 
Huguenots, Africans and Indians. This history of tolerance and freedom provides the 
roots of British identity, that has been passed down generationally, and these 
traditions can still be found everywhere in present British society. It is this common 
feature that binds British members together, makes them similar to each other, uniting 
them in having the same common goals and fate.” 
Participants assigned to the control condition were asked to read a short 
paragraph on the invention of the first telephone (see Appendix, Attachment E). After 
the writing task, participants were immediately presented with the second 
experimental manipulation. Participants were informed they would watch a short 
video (<4 minutes) concerning national history (see Appendix, Attachment F). This 
acted as the MS manipulation for the present study. Participants either watched a short 
television news clip concerning the 7/7 London Underground bombings (Terrorism 
Salience; TS), the death of Princess Diana (Mortality Salience; MS), or Andy Murray 
winning Wimbledon (control). We chose to use this as a control despite the difference 
in valence because we believed that this patriotic event might increase identification, 
which would provide an appropriate comparison to the effect that MS also has on 
identification (e.g., Castano et al., 2002; Herrera & Sani, 2013). Participants were 
informed that they would not be able to continue with the study until they had watched 
the video, and the next page button was set-up so that it would not appear until after 
180 seconds. The next page of the study asked participants to describe their thoughts 
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and feelings on what they had watched. After taking part in both tasks, participants 
were then presented with the dependent measures of the study. 
Measures. A single-item feeling thermometer was taken to assess participant’s levels 
of prejudice towards Muslims (e.g., Velasco-González et al., 2008). Responses were 
provided on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Intensely cold or unfavourable 
feeling’ (1) to ‘Intensely warm or favourable feeling’ (11). 
We used a five-item scale of Opposition to Muslim Rights adapted from 
previous research (e.g., Smeekes et al., 2012; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014a). These 
items were: “The right to establish own Islamic schools should always exist in 
Britain”; “British TV should broadcast more programmes by and for Muslims”; “In 
Britain, the wearing of a headscarf should not be forbidden”; “The British 
government does not really listen to what Muslims want” and “In Britain, more 
measures against discrimination of Muslims are needed”. These were assessed on a 
7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7), therefore 
a lower score reflects increased opposition to Muslim rights. 
We also used a five-item measure of contact intentions with Muslims (e.g., 
Velasco-González et al., 2008). These items were “I would be happy to have Muslims 
as next-door neighbours”; “I would be happy to have a Muslim as a close friend”; “I 
would be happy to work with a Muslim”; “I would be interested in meeting more 
Muslims”; and “I would go out with a Muslim”. These items were again assessed on 
a 7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7), 
therefore a lower score reflects decreased desire for contact with Muslims. 
Finally, participants were presented with a survey page that indicated the study 
was over and gave them some brief information about the study’s aims of reducing 
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prejudice towards Muslims. This was the same set-up was used in Study 6. Unknown 
to participants, their behaviour on this page was being assessed by the survey. The 
survey logged the number of clicks participants made on this page of the survey25, as 
well as the number of seconds spent on this page. These acted as a behavioural 
measure to assess the effect of our experimental manipulations. On completion of this 
page, participants were directed to the actual debrief that explained the full aims of the 
study. 
Results 
We first investigated the effect of the experimental manipulations on attitudes towards 
Muslims, opposition to Muslim rights and contact intentions towards Muslims. A 
factor analysis using varimax rotation on the contact intentions and Muslim right items 
confirmed a two-factor solution, but suggested that the item “In Britain, the wearing 
of a headscarf should not be forbidden”, did not load well on the opposition rights 
factor (<.50) and loaded across both factors equally well. Therefore, this item was 
dropped from the analysis (for full loadings, see Appendix table 5). Composite scores 
of the contact intentions (α = .91) and opposition rights (α = .80) were computed. 
 A 3 (Video: MS v TS v Control) x 3 (Essentialism: Christian v Tolerance v 
Control) between-subjects MANOVA was conducted on the feeling thermometer 
scores, as well as opposition rights and contact intentions26. This was to assess H1 and 
                                                          
25 Like with the previous study, the findings indicated that only 18 participants clicked on this page of 
the survey, therefore this produced very little variation for any meaningful analysis. Additionally, 
analyses on the behavioural timings showed no effects as a result of the experimental manipulations, 
so this variable will be discussed no further.  
26 Given that one of the experimental conditions concerns Christian historical roots of British identity 
we also explored whether religious affiliation affected these results. There was an approaching 
significant interaction of Christian (Yes v No) x Video type on opposition towards Muslim rights (F 
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H2 regarding the effect of the essentialism and MS primes on prejudice and 
discrimination towards Muslims. No effects were found concerning contact intentions 
(p’s>.10). However, there was a main effect of video type on feelings towards 
Muslims (F (2, 131) = 5.90, p=.004, η2=.083). Bonferroni tests indicated that this main 
effect on feelings towards Muslims was that both the TS (M = 5.09, SD = 3.16. p=.001) 
and MS (M = 5.69, SD =2.42, p=.021) videos resulted in more negative feelings 
towards Muslims than the control video (M=7.00, SD =2.15). No other effects on 
feeling thermometer scores were significant (see table 15 for descriptive statistics). 
Table 15: Means (standard deviations in parentheses) of feeling thermometer scores 
towards Muslims 
 TS MS Control 
Control 5.10 (3.29) 5.65 (2.32) 6.46 (1.90) 
Christian 4.83 (3.54) 5.88 (1.96) 7.29 (2.47) 
Tolerance 5.31 (2.81) 5.53 (3.04) 7.11 (2.07) 
 
 The findings also demonstrated a marginal effect of video type on opposition 
to Muslim rights (F (2, 131) = 2.64, p=.075, η2=.039). Bonferroni tests indicated that 
this marginal effect of opposition towards Muslim rights was that the TS (M=3.68, 
SD=1.47) resulted in a significant effect of increased opposition towards Muslim 
rights in comparison to both the control (M = 4.13, SD = 1.09, p=.045) and the MS 
video (M = 4.10, SD = 1.09, p=.049). This was qualified by an interaction between 
video type and essentialism on opposition towards Muslim rights (F (4, 131) = 2.81, 
p=.028, η2=.079). Exploring this interaction (see table 16 for descriptive statistics) by 
assessing the effect of essentialism prime by each video separately (corrected alpha = 
                                                          
(2, 121) = 2.86, p=.061, η2=.045). This essentially demonstrated that when exposed to the control 
video, Christian participants demonstrated lower levels of opposition to Muslim rights (p=.045). 
Importantly, there was no evidence that religious affiliation interacted with the passage manipulations, 
and moreover it did not change the pattern of the main findings. 
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.017), demonstrated marginal effects of essentialism on opposition to Muslim rights 
in only the TS (F (2, 42) = 2.55, p=.090, η2=.108) and MS videos (F (2, 45) = 2.72, 
p=.077, η2=.108). Bonferroni tests demonstrated that the tolerance prime marginally 
increased opposition to Muslim rights (v control) when exposed to the TS video 
(p=.033), whilst the tolerance prime (v control) marginally decreased opposition to 
Muslim rights when exposed to the MS video (p=.025).  
Looked at differently, there was a significant effect (adjusted alpha = .017) of 
video type on opposition to Muslim rights when primed with tolerance (F (2, 42) = 
6.52, p=.003, η2=.237). Bonferroni tests showed that the tolerance prime increased 
opposition when exposed to TS (p=.011), and decreased opposition when exposed to 
MS although the latter trend was non-significant (p=.324). However, the two death-
related conditions differed significantly from each other (p=.001). Therefore, H1 that 
regarded the main effect of essentialism was not supported; but H2a and H2b were 
supported as the findings suggested that reminders of death and essentialism prime 
interacted to affect opposition towards Muslim rights, and that the direction of this 
effect depended on the type of death reminder. 
Table 16: Means (standard deviations in parentheses) of scores on opposition towards 
Muslim rights.  
 TS MS Control 
Control 4.06 (1.49) 3.72 (.98) 4.17 (1.30) 
Christian 3.85 (1.25) 4.06 (.82) 4.09 (1.12) 
Tolerance 2.94 (1.47) 4.58 (1.30) 4.15 (.95) 
 
National identity 
We now turned to whether national identity would moderate the effects of the 
experimental manipulations on the dependent variables in the current study (H3). 
Separate regression analyses were conducted with the outcomes of attitudes, 
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opposition rights, contact intentions, and timings concerning reading about a Muslim 
Charity. Two separate dummy variables were created for the essentialism 
manipulations (Aiken & West, 1991). The Christian essentialism manipulation (1= 
Christian, -1 = tolerance, -1 = control), and the tolerance essentialism manipulation 
(1= tolerance, -1 = Christian, -1= control). The same procedure was applied to the 
video manipulations, such that a TS variable (1 = TS, -1 = MS, -1 = Control) and a MS 
variable (1 = MS, -1 = TS, -1 = Control) were produced. British national identity was 
standardised before interactions between the variables were produced (Aiken & West, 
1991). 
 The findings demonstrated that whilst there was a significant negative 
relationship of identity on opposition to Muslim rights (β = -.19, t=2.06, p=.042), and 
a marginal negative relationship to contact intentions (β = -.16, t=1.68, p=.096), British 
identity did not significantly interact with any of the experimental manipulations 
(p’s>.10). In fact, even with the presence of British identity as a predictor, the analyses 
revealed a similar pattern of findings to the main analysis. This was further supported 
by using British identity as a covariate. The interaction between essentialism and video 
type on opposition rights became even more significant (F (4, 130) = 3.00, p=.021, 
η2=.085). 
Discussion 
The aims of the present study were to explore whether reminders of tolerance (via 
exposure to essentialist narratives) as a key British value would lead to more positive 
responses towards Muslims, and the extent to which this effect was moderated by 
national identification and MS/TS. Our findings supported that tolerance did lead to 
less opposition towards Muslim rights, but this was dependent on what mortality 
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reminder participants were exposed to. Those who were exposed to MS demonstrated 
decreased opposition, but those who were exposed to TS demonstrated increased 
opposition. Our findings therefore suggest that reminders of ingroup tolerance might 
be an effective way of improving intergroup relations, but only if that value is not 
considered to be under threat. In our view, these findings have several theoretical and 
practical implications. 
 Firstly, the present study expands upon research exploring the effects of 
tolerance reminders on improving intergroup relations (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1992. 
Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2012), by demonstrating that reminders of tolerance can have 
beneficial or harmful effects dependent on whether that value is perceived to be 
challenged by the outgroup in question. This has important practical implications 
given that it is common for world leaders to remind individuals to be tolerant after 
terrorist attacks. Our findings suggest that this should lead to greater intolerance 
towards Muslims due to the representation of Islam and Muslims in most Western 
news media, which tends to position both as contradictory with the value of tolerance. 
We believe it to be noteworthy that after the recent terrorist attacks on French and 
British soil, neither Prime Minister Theresa May nor former Prime Minister David 
Cameron made efforts to remind British citizens that the vast majority of Muslims are 
tolerant of other beliefs. Instead, the choice was to focus on the perceived threat to 
this value and/or the extent that British citizens need to be tolerant themselves. As our 
findings reflect, this sort of discourse is likely to be a recipe for disaster in ongoing 
intergroup relations.  
 Additionally, our findings add to the research that suggests that different MS 
manipulations may evoke subtle differences in worldview affirmation and defence 
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(e.g., Cozzolino et al., 2004; Florian & Mikulincer, 1997; Fritsche et al., 2008). Firstly, 
our present findings add to this by suggesting that TS and MS should not necessarily 
be considered to produce the same response. This is because TS is an amalgamation 
of both a reminder of one’s mortality (a physical threat) and a threat to worldview 
(symbolic threat). Therefore, terrorism represents a hybridised threat that may make 
Islamophobia a special type of prejudice (Cinnirella, 2012; Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010). 
Secondly, we believe our finding, that reminders of tolerance and TS produce 
increased opposition to Muslim rights, to be consistent with the proposition by 
Dechesne et al. (2003) on contingency effects to MS and defence. To our knowledge, 
little MS research has explored the idea of contingency effects outside of MS and self-
esteem (e.g., Arndt & Greenberg, 1999), so our findings are a welcome addition by 
demonstrating that they can be applied to ingroup norms and beliefs.  
 However, it should be mentioned that our findings are not entirely consistent 
with prior research in this area. Firstly, whilst tolerance did affect levels of opposition 
to Muslim rights, there was no evidence that reminders of the Christian roots of British 
national identity affected opposition (in contrast to the findings in the Netherlands of 
Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014a; Smeekes et al., 2011). There are a few possible reasons 
for this. Firstly, it is possible that this manipulation will have only been effective for 
those who self-identify as Christian. However, we find this unlikely as religious 
affiliation showed no interaction with the essentialism prime. Secondly, it is possible 
that the Christian roots of British identity were already salient and/or accessible to 
participants in the control group. Thirdly, participants might have just rejected the 
notion of the Christian roots of British identity. This might be likely as whilst recent 
surveys have highlighted that Christianity is viewed as an important feature of British 
national identity, this view is generally held by a minority of British people (Pew, 
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2016). However, as we did not include a manipulation check, in our view, either of 
these reasons is possible, and further research is required to disentangle these 
explanations. 
 Secondly, whilst our findings did demonstrate that tolerance affected 
opposition to Muslim rights, this was only apparent in the TS/MS groups, but Smeekes 
et al. (2012; see also Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014a) found that it affected levels of 
opposition without the need to manipulate thoughts of death. However, it should be 
noted that their results only demonstrated an indirect effect of the prime, not a direct 
effect, in that the manipulation directly affected levels of perceived threat, which in 
turn affected opposition. In that sense, our findings might not actually be inconsistent 
with this research, as we did not include a measure of perceived threat. In contrast, 
because our hypothesis was that TS/MS would increase the magnitude of this effect 
on opposition to Muslim rights, it is possible that this increase made it detectable, but 
the precise actual relationship should still be considered indirect through changes in 
threat perception. Again, future research could test for this possibility. 
 The third difference with the findings of this research is that we did not find 
that strength of national identification moderated the effects of the essentialism 
primes, whilst Smeekes et al. (2012) found that the value of tolerance was effective at 
lowering opposition only in those who strongly identified with being Dutch. We 
suspect this might be representative of the fact that we also included TS/MS 
manipulations, which have been found to increase national identification (e.g., 
Castano et al., 2002; Herrera & Sani, 2013), whereas our measure of national 
identification was taken before the manipulations in line with the procedure used by 
Smeekes and colleagues. It is therefore possible that these manipulations caused 
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changes in identification, which in turn led to changes in the need to affirm these 
beliefs. Therefore, in future work it might be better to include the measure of national 
identification after such manipulations or to trial before and after positioning of this 
measure to test for order effects. 
Additionally, it should be noted that whilst our findings suggest that reminders 
of tolerance and TS/MS can affect opposition towards Muslim rights, there was little 
evidence to suggest that they led to any attitudinal change towards Muslims or desire 
for contact. In fact, the present findings suggested that MS/TS both decreased positive 
attitudes towards Muslims. We suspect this discrepancy might be because whilst the 
value of tolerance implies the need to be accepting of other’s beliefs and rights to 
practice them, it does not imply the need to feel favourable towards those who hold 
different beliefs (e.g., van der Noll et al., 2010). Thus, there may have been a need to 
behave in line with one’s collectively shared norms, but at the same time decrease 
positivity towards those who subscribe to the alternative worldview. Secondly, TMT 
research has also identified that once one has defended one’s worldview, this mitigates 
further need for defence (e.g., Hayes et al., 2008a, Hayes et al., 2015). Therefore, once 
participants had affirmed or defended their need to be tolerant in line with their 
worldview beliefs, there was no further need for defence. This might explain why there 
was no effect on contact intentions as this measure was deployed last.  
Some limitations of the present research should be acknowledged. First, as we 
have mentioned, the present research lacked the inclusion of manipulation checks that 
would help support the conclusions of the present research. For example, whilst 
unlikely, there might be alternative explanations for the diverging effects of MS/TS 
other than the perception of tolerance threat. Second, whilst the present research has 
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emphasised the role of essentialist beliefs in national identification and intergroup 
relations, the present research did not actually compare a de-essentialist narrative that 
would have been able to explicitly assess the effect of essentialist beliefs about one’s 
nation. Future research should explore this, because it would be interesting to see what 
outcomes de-essentialist narratives have on intergroup relations, particularly after MS. 
Finally, whilst the current findings demonstrate the applicability of historical, 
essentialist tolerant reminders to a different national context (Smeekes et al., 2012), 
further research is still needed to see how reminders of tolerance translate to a range 
of intergroup contexts. It would be interesting to see whether these findings can be 
observed in other social identities that are not so enduring and historically vibrant as 
one’s national identity, as this identity might particularly be a special case that is useful 
in alleviating existential concerns. 
In summary, the present findings suggest that essentialist notions about 
tolerance as a key ingroup value can be effective at promoting more positive 
intergroup relations, possibly because of the need to adhere to collective norms that 
can buffer from existential-related concerns. This approach might be a promising 
avenue to promoting more positive intergroup relations, but as highlighted in the 
present study, there is a need not only to consider representations of the ingroup, but 
also representations of the outgroup. Otherwise, as our findings suggest, prosocial 
norms can turn destructive in the facilitation of positive intergroup relations. 
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Chapter VIII: 
General discussion 
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The aim of this thesis was to explore multiple socio-psychological perspectives on 
identity, threat, and coping as a means of exploring the antecedents of Islamophobic 
prejudice in the UK. In particular, the present thesis explored the IRM (Cinnirella, 
2014); which attempts to combine the insights of SIT, ITT, TMT, and IPT to provide 
a parsimonious framework to understanding prejudice. By doing so, the IRM attempts 
to achieve an approach that is greater than the sum of its parts. 
 Moreover, in the literature review chapter of this thesis two particular revisions 
to the IRM were proposed. Firstly, the inclusion of essentialist beliefs, both pertaining 
to the ingroup and outgroup, to explore additional antecedents of threat perception 
alongside strength of national identification. Second, was the attempt to redefine the 
concept of threat perception that could sufficiently incorporate the hypotheses that 
could be derived from TMT. By doing so, the IRM’s redefined concept of threat 
perception positions TMT’s notion of existential anxiety as of paramount importance 
in understanding prejudicial attitudes. This is reflected in the five experimental studies 
conducted in this thesis that explore hypotheses derived from TMT. 
 With the theoretical multiplicity of the IRM, it would be impossible to cover 
all the theoretical arguments advocated by such an approach in one thesis alone. 
Therefore, the present research covered in the thesis represents initial exploratory 
findings of some of the key arguments of the IRM. In particular, the present thesis 
sought to explore four potential areas of interest: 
(i) The interface between intergroup threats (as suggested by ITT) and motive-based 
threats (as suggested by IPT) 
(ii) How identity motives (as suggested by IPT) buffer from the awareness of the 
inevitability of death (as suggested by TMT) 
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(iii) How essentialist beliefs (both ingroup and outgroup) and national identification 
are antecedents of intergroup threat perception. Moreover, how essentialist ingroup 
beliefs and national identification are related to levels of existential anxiety when 
exposed to symbolic worldview threat. 
(iv) How existential anxiety is related to Islamophobic prejudice, and whether DTA is 
an important mechanism underpinning prejudicial attitudes 
In addition, based on the findings of the first five studies of this thesis, two 
potential strategies to reducing prejudice towards Muslims were explored. The first 
explored how interventions that challenge outgroups representations (via a category 
combination task) could reduce prejudice towards Muslims. The second considered 
how ingroup representations (via the promotion of tolerance as an ingroup norm) could 
promote more positive relations and decrease prejudice towards Muslims. As the 
current approach explored in the thesis places strong emphasis on TMT, both 
interventions were explicitly tested in relation to its theorising. 
Key summary of the findings and avenues for future research 
The present thesis presents a number of cross-sectional and experimental studies to 
explore Islamophobic prejudice utilising the IRM. The included research highlighted, 
in our view, a number of key findings that have both practical and theoretical 
implications for understanding prejudice.  
Intergroup threat 
The first two studies of the thesis examined the extent to which symbolic and realistic 
intergroup threats (as suggested by ITT), when broken down into their constituent 
elements, consisted of multiple threats to identity motives (as suggested by IPT). More 
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specifically, this research supported the idea that symbolic, physical and economic 
threats perceived to be posed by Muslims are related to threats to the motives of 
esteem, efficacy, continuity, meaning, distinctiveness and belonging in relation to 
British identity.  In our view, the present findings elucidate the motivational processes 
that may underpin the threat-prejudice link which has been largely ignored by ITT 
researchers, and also provides a more encompassing range of motives related to 
identity processes than are traditionally examined in SIT.  
 What is the benefit of such an approach? We believe by understanding more 
clearly the impact that realistic and symbolic threats have upon identity processes, this 
can in turn lead to greater understanding of how to combat prejudice. For example, 
although we did not examine the relationship of personal and collective threats on 
identity motives in the present thesis, one of the benefits of the IRM is its ability to 
explain threat and prejudice at multiple levels of analysis; from the intrapsychic, 
interpersonal, intergroup, and societal levels (Cinnirella, 2014). The IRM would 
therefore suggest that certain motives might particularly be threatened at multiple 
levels. For example, continuity might be compromised at a collective level through 
concern over changes or losses to ingroup values and fear that the ingroup might cease 
to exist, but also at a personal level as terrorism threatens personal existence 
(Cinnirella, 2014). 
 The possibility then that realistic and symbolic threats might threaten multiple 
motives at multiple levels may particularly hinder restoration strategies aimed to 
restore that motive, proliferating the use of prejudice as a coping response to identity 
threat. For example, when personal control is threatened, individuals might 
compensate for this lack of control by turning to groups or vice versa (e.g., Kay et al., 
256 
 
2009; Shepherd et al., 2011; see also Heine et al., 2006 on fluid compensation). 
However, when this motive is perceived to be threatened at multiple levels, individuals 
may seek alternative strategies to enhancing this motive, for example by endorsing 
social representations of Muslims that seek to limit their rights and/or delegitimise 
British-Muslims in an attempt to take back control (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010). 
 Of course, it should be noted that the current thesis (and the IRM) has carried 
an assumption that the number of motive threats that are implicated in realistic and 
symbolic threats (particularly when threatened at multiple levels) crystallises their 
effect on prejudice by reducing alternative coping mechanisms to coping with the 
threat. A potential issue with this approach is that it is not made clear why prejudice 
remains a more viable alternative to coping with threat than other coping responses 
(e.g., identity readjustment; remooring and denial), nor has the current thesis explored 
whether the number of motives threatened increases the use of prejudice and decreases 
the use of alternative strategies.  
 Whilst future research should explore this idea as it would have useful 
implications as to why and when prejudice is used as a response to threat perception, 
and how alternative strategies can be promoted that reduce prejudice. We would 
tentatively suggest that the extent to which certain strategies are deployed after threat 
perception depends on the extent to which these threats might be accommodated into 
one’s identity repertoire. Accommodation (such as IPT’s assertions of identity 
readjustment and remooring) has long been considered a coping response to threat  
perception (for example see ideas on cognitive consistency, Festinger, 1957; see also 
Solomon et al., 1991 for types of responses to threat). It is possible that 
accommodation responses to threat are hindered when multiple motives are 
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compromised because it would require considerable revision to one’s identity structure 
(cf. Hayes et al., 2015). This might particularly be the case in high identifiers because 
their social group is subjectively important to their sense of self. Therefore, 
accommodation as a strategy is likely to be used when it involves modification to 
peripheral, not central, elements of one’s identity. Supporting this idea, Hayes and 
colleagues (2015) found that participants responded to threat with increased 
derogation (cf. prejudice) when they could not accommodate for the threat. Likewise, 
when participants accommodated for the threat, they were less likely to engage in 
derogation. Importantly, accommodation operated through the modification to 
peripheral but not central beliefs that led to reduced derogation. 
 As such, it is possible that when perceiving threats, individuals first seek to 
accommodate for the information through such strategies as identity readjustment. The 
number of motives that are compromised by this threat might make accommodation 
strategies difficult (especially amongst high identifiers), which in turn leads to 
prejudice as a response to coping with the threat. As such, this view of prejudice would 
imply that it is a consequence of the inability to accommodate for the information. 
This might suggest that intervention strategies that do not require considerable 
changes to one’s identity (especially central identity elements) might be most effective 
at reducing prejudice. Future research could explore this idea. 
 Additionally, we believe an approach that explores realistic and symbolic 
threats from a motive perspective might be able to detect individual differences in how 
threats are both concretised and responded to. Prior IPT research has identified that 
there are individual differences in the emphasis placed upon each motive in identity 
formation (Vignoles et al., 2002). For example, Vignoles and Moncaster (2007) 
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describe how previous data has shown that one participant’s strength of identification 
may be highly correlated with self-esteem concerns (r = .90), whilst another 
participant’s strength of identification may be unrelated to self-esteem concerns (r = - 
.07), suggesting that other motives are more important in their identity formation. 
 If individual differences exist in the extent to which motives are related to 
identity structures, then it is plausible that this may also affect the extent to which 
realistic and symbolic threats are viewed, and subsequently responded to. For 
example, those whose identity structures are strongly related to continuity concerns 
may be particularly concerned over threats to the continuity of the group and its 
continued existence, whilst those whose identity structures are not guided by 
continuity may concretise the threat in a different way. This in turn would also lead to 
different responses in how the threat is responded to (see Breakwell, 1986; 
Branscombe et al., 1999 for types of responses to different threats).  
 Supporting this possibility, Vignoles and Moncaster (2007) suggested that 
differential emphasis of identity motives within one’s identity repertoire could predict 
ingroup and outgroup evaluations. They proposed that as the need to belong is satisfied 
through inclusion to the ingroup, and distinctiveness needs are satisfied by contrasting 
with an outgroup, that different emphasis on these motives in one’s identity structure 
would be relevant to predicting subsequent ingroup and outgroup evaluations. Their 
findings demonstrated that for those high in national identification, both 
distinctiveness and belonging motive strengths were related to ingroup bias, albeit in 
slightly different ways. The belonging motive was related to increases in evaluations 
of the ingroup, whereas the distinctiveness motived was related to decreases in 
evaluations of the outgroup. As such, both belonging and distinctiveness concerns led 
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to intergroup discrimination, but the way in which it is expressed is dependent on what 
motives are most relevant to one’s self-concept.  We believe this idea to be particularly 
worthwhile exploring because if threats and responses to threat are dependent on the 
strength of each motive in one’s identity repertoire, then this might also imply that 
intervention strategies designed to reduce prejudice might be most effective by being 
tailored towards one’s identity structure.  
Existential anxiety 
The reformulated proposal of the IRM put forward by the present thesis has placed the 
notion of existential anxiety of paramount importance in explaining prejudice. 
Expanding upon the initial research that was conducted in this thesis that suggested 
that self-esteem, efficacy, meaning, continuity, distinctiveness, and belonging 
concerns were implicated in intergroup threats, studies 3 and 4 explored whether these 
motives offered anxiety-buffering functions against the awareness of death. Study 
three found that after MS individuals were more likely to write about central aspects 
of themselves that more strongly satisfied the motives of self-esteem, meaning, 
continuity and efficacy. Study four found that threats to the motives of continuity, 
efficacy, distinctiveness and belonging led to increases in DTA. The present findings 
therefore suggest that a wider range of motives than is traditionally examined in TMT 
may have anxiety-buffering functions, and suggests that when these motives are 
compromised (such as when experiencing intergroup threat) DTA is elevated. 
Therefore, in our opinion, these findings support the notion that intergroup, motive, 
and existential threat are complementary definitions of threat that can be combined in 
such a way that can provide an overarching understanding of threat from multiple 
levels of analysis.  
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 However, our findings suggested that whilst MS led to a generalised increase 
in these motives (except for distinctiveness and belonging), threats to specific motives 
did not lead to increases in the motive that was under attack. We suspect that this might 
be because of the way in which we measured identity and the motives via the ‘Who 
Are You’ task. Whilst this unconstrained method can provide a holistic snapshot of 
one’s identity, and responses to MS, it at the same time might have increased 
variability in responses potentially masking effects from being detected. For example, 
if one’s sense of distinctiveness is threatened, they might respond to this 
distinctiveness threat by affirming their uniqueness in another identity element. 
Presumably, a threat to this motive does not require an individual to generate ten 
aspects themselves that confer a sense of uniqueness, and the threat can be alleviated 
by affirming just one or two aspects oneself. Therefore, the unconstrained method 
taking aggregate levels across all identity elements might have masked the presence 
of this finding.  
 One way this could be improved is by pre-selecting an identity (e.g., national 
identity) for participants to rate across these motives. Alternatively, research could 
also develop dependent measures or materials that are specifically designed to tap into 
each motive. For example, prior TMT research has used social consensus estimates to 
demonstrate differences in inclusionary and uniqueness needs (Simon et al., 1997).  
Similarly, other research has used vignettes (such as political candidate statements) 
that strongly espouse a specific motive. For example, Shepherd and colleagues (2011) 
compared the effect of MS/control threat primes on endorsement of political 
candidates that espoused strong sense of order (e.g., efficacy) or immortality (e.g., 
continuity). They found that MS (relative to control threat) increased support for the 
candidate espousing continuity, whilst control threat (relative to MS) increased 
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support for candidate espousing efficacy themes. However, creating multiple 
conditions that tap into each motive might be impractical given the number of motives 
that were under examination in the present thesis. Indeed, we believe this issue 
represents the difficulty of measuring the influence or effect of multiple motives, and 
why IPT has struggled to gain traction with researchers (see Vignoles, 2014).  
 It should also be acknowledged though that fluidly compensating for one’s 
sense of distinctiveness after having it threatened (as an example), is not necessarily 
the only way in which this threat can be responded to. As we have already mentioned, 
individuals can respond to threats in various ways and the strategy used may depend 
on various psychological and situational factors (e.g., Breakwell, 1986; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986). For example, a person could write about a time when they did not feel 
unique, but simply deny the experience as threatening altogether. By denying the 
experience as threatening this may prevent the need to realign, adjust or alter one’s 
identity structure in response to the threat. Other strategies might also include 
distancing or reducing identification with the aspect of themselves that was threatened 
to mitigate its impact upon the self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Alternatively, a 
person might also re-moor the identity in such a way that it retains its distinctiveness 
(cf. Ethier & Deaux, 1994). For example, a British national experiencing their national 
distinctiveness is threatened might re-define the nation in such a way that it elicits 
different intergroup comparisons by which its distinctiveness can be maintained. In 
short then, it is also possible that individuals will have chosen to cope with the threat 
in various ways than what we had expected.  
 Future research in this area could again explore individual differences in 
motive strengths to one’s self-concept. It is possible that these differences will shape 
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reactions after MS and worldview threat. For example, as we have already outlined, 
there appear to be individual differences in the importance of motives for identity 
processes. Therefore, whilst our present findings suggested that MS leads to increases 
in continuity, self-esteem, meaning, and efficacy, it is possible those who highly 
emphasise continuity in their identity structure will respond to MS in ways that 
emphasises continuity. Similarly, if responses to MS are specific dependent on 
individual identity structures, then another interesting question is whether threats to 
motives that are relatively unimportant in one’s identity formation would still lead to 
increases in DTA. Taking the two participants as an example again where self-esteem 
concerns were either highly correlated or uncorrelated to identity centrality (Vignoles 
& Moncaster, 2007), it is possible that exposure to self-esteem threats might only be 
existentially threatening to the one whose self-esteem is highly relevant to their self-
concept.  
 This proposal might have some validity to it given that the present thesis has 
found individual differences in levels of DTA after exposure to worldview threat 
(Study 5). The exploration of individual differences in DTA levels after threat has 
been somewhat neglected so far in TMT research (but see Roylance et al., 2014), and 
the present thesis offers the novel contribution of demonstrating that strength of 
national identification and essentialist ingroup beliefs predict DTA levels after 
exposure to national worldview threat. This complements research supporting that MS 
increases national identification and essentialist beliefs (e.g., Castano et al., 2002; 
Herrera & Sani, 2013), and extends prior research exploring national worldview threat 
that has only explored strong identifiers (e.g., Schimel et al., 2007). Future research 
could explore whether this is specific to the context of national identities, or whether 
it is applicable to a range of social identities. As we have mentioned elsewhere in the 
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thesis, national identity might be particularly useful in assuaging existential concerns, 
as it constitutes a group that is particularly enduring. 
 Our findings also suggested that DTA was an important mechanism driving 
ingroup bias. That is, whilst it was those who highly essentialised or identified with 
being British that were most likely to demonstrate increased levels of DTA; ingroup 
bias was particularly evident amongst those who were strong in national identification 
or essentialism and did exhibit higher levels of DTA. In other words, our findings 
appear consistent with the TMT assertion that DTA is the motivating force behind 
worldview defence (e.g., Hayes et al., 2010). Our findings also support the idea that 
DTA exhibits an interactional mediation between threats and defence (e.g., Das et al., 
2009), with the novel contribution of exploring this in relation to social identification 
and essentialist beliefs something which to our knowledge so far has previously only 
been tested using the MS hypothesis (e.g., Castano et al., 2002; Herrera & Sani, 2013). 
 This research therefore adds to the literature suggesting that DTA is an 
important mechanism underpinning prejudicial attitudes. A question however remains 
as to whether DTA always produces a need for defence (Hayes et al., 2010). Whilst 
the present thesis has particularly focused on DTA producing prejudicial responses, 
as we have mentioned previously (and potentially is hinted at in the data of Study 5), 
prejudice should not be considered an automatic response to increased DTA. Instead, 
the way in which DTA is responded to depend on the salient, accessible, or central 
components of one’s worldview (Dechesne et al., 2003). To that end, some research 
has identified that the relationship between DTA and defence can be attenuated by 
increasing the salience of alternative anxiety buffers. For example, as we have already 
mentioned in the literature review chapter, fortifying self-esteem can mitigate 
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defensive reactions as long as the domain in which it is bolstered is not challenged 
(Arndt & Greenberg, 1999). Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that it is explicit, 
but not implicit, self-esteem that produces defensive reactions after MS (e.g., 
Schmeichel, Gailliot, Filardo, McGregor, Gitter, & Baumeister, 2009). 
Alternatively, it might be possible to channel DTA into positive behaviours 
through, for example, increasing the salience of close relationships (e.g., Mikulincer, 
Florian, & Hirschberger, 2004) or children (e.g., Fritsche, Jonas, Fischer, Koranyi, 
Berger, & Fleischmann, 2007). This is because offspring and close relationships may 
offer a way to transcend death, and constitute important sources of self-esteem, that 
may help alleviate concerns over one’s personal mortality (Florian et al., 2002). 
Moreover, this could be especially promising as prior research has highlighted that 
DTA decreases after one’s worldview is affirmed, thus rendering no need for further 
defence (e.g., Hayes et al., 2015). The possibility that DTA could be redirected into 
less harmful outcomes for intergroup relations represents a promising avenue for 
prejudice reduction (for more on this see Jonas & Fritsche, 2013; see also Vail et al., 
2012b for an overview of positive trajectories of existential anxiety).  
 Another interesting question that arises from the present findings, given that 
they demonstrate that DTA is elevated after a range of threat types, is whether DTA 
may underpin all types of threat (Hayes et al., 2010). As we have outlined in the 
discussion of Chapter IV, whilst there is some evidence that other types of threat can 
produce worldview defence, and not increase DTA (e.g., Proulx & Heine, 2008, 2009), 
these studies in our view are fatally flawed. This is because they have included a delay 
before measuring DTA, when non-death related threats should not require a delay to 
generate an increase in DTA because proximal defences are bypassed (e.g., 
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Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Therefore, it is very possible that these studies did not find 
an increase in DTA because it had dissipated through the inclusion of a delay. Indeed, 
the present thesis used the same manipulation by McGregor et al. (1998) and did find 
an increase in DTA. Similarly, the studies conducted by Proulx and Heine (2008, 
2009) have been found to increase DTA when a delay has not been included (Webber 
et al., 2015). That is of course not to say that all threats should necessarily increase 
DTA. One possibility that has been highlighted is that certain types of threats may be 
strong enough to elicit defence, but not strong enough to increase DTA (Hayes et al., 
2010; Webber et al., 2015). However, it is important for research in this area to design 
studies that appropriately account for the different time courses of different threat 
types (for a meta-analysis see Martens et al., 2011). 
Antecedents of threat perception 
Another avenue of interest for the present thesis was to explore antecedents of 
perceiving Muslims as a symbolic and realistic threat. In the original conceptualisation 
of the IRM, only one antecedent was identified, SIT’s notion of strength of 
identification moderating threat perception and response (e.g., Branscombe et al., 
1999). The thesis looked to expand upon this aspect of the IRM by including 
entitativity and natural kind beliefs, two types of essentialist beliefs (Haslam et al., 
2000). The thesis also considered how these belief types may be differentially related 
to threat perception and prejudice, dependent on whether they concerned the ingroup 
or the outgroup. 
 Across three studies, essentialism and identification were found to be 
predictors of threat perception (Studies 1, 2, and 5). Firstly, regarding outgroup 
essentialism (Study 2), entitative beliefs were associated with perceiving Muslims as 
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a threat because entitativity can imply that knowledge of group membership is richly 
informative and is therefore often linked to stereotype endorsement (e.g., Spencer-
Rodgers et al., 2007). Our findings however also suggested that when the group was 
also viewed as a natural kind, that this increased the relationship between entitativity 
and threat. This is because whilst entitativity can lead to stereotype endorsement, 
natural kind beliefs can provide explanations for the existence of these stereotypes (cf. 
Lee et al., 2013). Therefore, natural kind beliefs can imply that the members of certain 
group members are “lurking beneath the surface” of all group members (Denson et al., 
2006), particularly if they emphasise a biological or genetic component to the group 
(Andreychik & Gill, 2015; Jayaratne et al., 2006). To our knowledge, little research 
has explored the interface between entitativity and natural kind beliefs in relation to 
prejudice (but see Andreychik & Gill, 2015), so the present findings offer useful 
additions to a neglected aspect of essentialism research. 
 Regarding ingroup essentialism, both entitativity and natural kind beliefs were 
associated with perceiving Muslims as a threat (Study 2). This is because both natural 
kind and entitative beliefs can lead to clear descriptions over “who we are” and “who 
we are not”. For example, entitativity can increase the clarity of ingroup prototypes 
that in turn can lead to increased sensitivity to those who deviate from these prototypes 
(e.g., Hogg, 2009). In contrast, natural kind beliefs can imply that the group has rigid, 
clear-cut boundaries of membership, and that the group is natural and not prone to 
socio-cultural shaping. Therefore, these beliefs might imply ethnic conceptions of 
British identity that exclude Muslims as members and suggest they are contaminating 
the ingroup (e.g., Pehrson et al., 2009; Zagefka et al., 2012). Importantly, our findings 
also suggested that the relationship between national identification and threat 
perception is moderated by levels of national entitativity; supporting perhaps the idea, 
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that entitativity licenses the use of biases amongst strong identifiers to defend 
collective interests (Effron & Knowles, 2015). Our research therefore is consistent 
with the proposition that it is important to go beyond ideas of SIT’s notion of strength 
of identification moderating threat perception, and consider the contents associated 
with one’s social identity (e.g., Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). 
 Interestingly, our findings also suggested that the relationship between 
essentialist beliefs and threat perception may go beyond simple notions of a two 
dimensional structure to essentialism. That is, our findings also suggested that specific 
components of natural kind beliefs may be associated with threat perception, and the 
specific components that are associated with threat may depend on whether they relate 
to us or them (Study two). For British natural kind beliefs, discreteness and naturalness 
were strong predictors of threat perception, whilst for Muslim natural kind beliefs 
stability and immutability were predictors of threat perception. In our opinion, these 
findings are consistent with the notion that ingroup natural kind beliefs are related to 
threat perception over concerns of the group having impermeable, clear-cut 
boundaries and resistant to socio-cultural shaping; whilst outgroup natural kind beliefs 
are related to threat perception when they imply a biological, immutable component 
to group behaviour.  
 Finally, our research also supported the idea that national ingroup essentialism 
and identification (Study five) constitute anxiety-buffers from death-related thoughts 
(e.g., Castano & Dechesne, 2005). The present research, to our knowledge, was the 
first to explore essentialism and strength of identification as antecedents of threat 
perception using the DTA hypothesis. This provides strong convergent validity for the 
interface between TMT, SIT, and essentialist beliefs. In addition, we believe that this 
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finding to be compatible with the previous findings of ingroup essentialism and 
identification being antecedents of symbolic and realistic threats, but further suggest 
that one reason why these might be related to threats is because they constitute 
important anxiety-buffers from existential concerns.  
 However, it should be noted that the findings of Study two and five were not 
entirely consistent with each other. In the second study, we found that entitativity 
beliefs moderated the effect of national identity on realistic and symbolic threat, but 
this was not apparent when exploring existential threat. This was surprising given that 
entitativity has been argued to provide groups with “celestial” value that might be 
useful in death transcendence (Castano, 2004a), but also provide relatively 
unambiguous group prototypes that provide a clear set of norms to live up to. 
Secondly, whilst our findings from Study five did suggest that entitativity beliefs were 
independently related to existential threat, natural kind beliefs (nor its subcomponents) 
did not predict DTA. However, that is not to say that natural kind beliefs were entirely 
unrelated with DTA; as they were correlated with each other, and like with Study two 
this particularly concerned the discreteness component of natural kind beliefs. 
Therefore, we believe this to be partially consistent with our previous findings. We 
suspect these discrepancies might reflect differences in sample sizes of the two studies 
(Study two: n=368; Study five: n=66), as it is possible that there was not enough power 
in Study five to detect some of the findings that were present in Study two.  
 Additionally, what our findings did stress is that levels of DTA constitute an 
important qualifying role between those who are high in national group essentialism 
or identification. Why might individuals of similar levels of national essentialism and 
identification have different levels of DTA, and why in turn is this important in 
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predicting increased group bias? We suspect, as we have mentioned before, that this 
is because it is important to go beyond generic relationships between these constructs 
and prejudice, and to examine the contents that are associated with them (e.g., Reicher 
& Hopkins, 2001; Verkuyten, 2003). Whilst we can only speculate what exactly 
differentiated these individuals in the current study, this might be related to the extent 
that different high national identifiers (or those high in national essentialism) endorsed 
multicultural conceptions of British society. For those that did endorse a multicultural 
British society, the contents of article may not have been threatening because it 
affirmed their belief of equality, diversity and opportunity towards those of any 
background or faith thus keeping levels of DTA at baseline. As DTA levels are low, 
this would not lead to the need to defend or affirm one’s worldview. In contrast, for 
those that did find the article threatening, their DTA levels would be high, thus 
producing a need to defend one’s worldview. As such, we suspect that DTA was able 
to discriminate between different types of essentialist and identity contents, and in turn 
producing changes in defence. However, further research is required to examine this 
possibility. 
Reducing prejudice: promoting prosocial norms is not enough 
The final study conducted in this thesis explored the extent to which promoting 
tolerance through essentialist, historical narratives about British identity could lead to 
both increasing and decreasing levels of opposition to Muslim rights dependent on 
whether that norm was perceived to be challenged by Muslims. The findings suggested 
that whilst MS led to increased adherence to the salient norm of tolerance, thus 
decreasing opposition to Muslim rights, in contrast, TS led to increased defence of the 
salient norm, thus increasing opposition to Muslim rights. Whilst prior work in this 
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area has suggested that promoting prosocial norms such as tolerance might be a useful 
strategy to improving intergroup relations (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1992; Smeekes et 
al., 2012), our present findings suggest that promoting prosocial ingroup norms is not 
necessarily enough. If that norm is perceived to be under threat by the outgroup, then 
promoting prosocial norms might lead to increased, rather than decreased, levels of 
hostility and discrimination. 
 In our opinion this finding represents the need for researchers to not only 
consider how ingroup representations can change attitudes towards outgroups, but also 
how the outgroup is represented vis-à-vis the ingroup. If the outgroup is perceived to 
be challenging the ingroup norm, this can be symbolically threatening, subsequently 
leading to the defence of this norm. This is particularly the case of Islamophobia in 
the UK, where media representations have often focused on the alleged intolerance of 
Muslims towards those who hold different beliefs (e.g., Richardson 2009). This 
perception of intolerance can lead to the acceptance to withdraw one’s own tolerance, 
and increase objection towards the other belief system in defence of this norm.  
 Future research could explore whether this finding might translate to other 
prosocial norms beyond tolerance. For example, researchers have investigated the 
extent to which egalitarianism might also produce more positive group relations and 
decreased prejudice (e.g., Gailliot et al., 2008). Again, it seems plausible that the 
extent to which egalitarianism produces the desired effect, depends on the extent to 
which the outgroup is also viewed to value this norm. In the case of Muslims, 
egalitarianism might have opposite effects given that media representations of Islam 
often focus on the oppression of women and their perceived treatment of second-class 
citizens through focusing on issues such as the veil (e.g., Poole, 2002). As such, it is 
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possible that when reminded of this incompatibility, ingroup members will be 
prepared to defend this norm, even if it means paradoxically not behaving in line with 
this norm. In general, prosocial norms have previously been described as a moral 
dilemma in the sense that it can often require acceptance of other beliefs that one might 
disagree with (Billig et al., 1988; Smeekes et al, 2012). In our opinion, our findings 
represent this dilemma by demonstrating that the decision to uphold this norm may 
depend on the extent to which individuals perceive this norm not to be challenged, 
otherwise this norm may be withdrawn, leading to increased hostility. Morever, 
evidence of this dilemma is further reinforced by the MS/tolerance group that 
demonstrated decreased opposition to Muslim rights, but also increased levels of 
prejudice. 
 It is worth mentioning that our findings particularly suggested that tolerance 
changed opposition when death was made salient, supporting TMT assertions of the 
functions of worldviews, and the need to live up to the values promoted within them 
(Greenberg et al., 1986). However, our findings suggested that the type of death 
reminder was important in the direction of this opposition. In our view, this highlights 
a neglected aspect of MS in that different types of threat can produce different 
reactions (but see Cozzolino et al., 2004; Florian & Mikulincer, 1997; Fritsche et al., 
2008), even if DTA may underpin both types of threat. This is because reactions after 
MS are contingent upon the salient, accessible, or central information to one’s 
worldview (Dechesne et al., 2003). Therefore, not all types of MS should necessarily 
be considered equal; instead, the meaning attached to the threat is important in 
determing how it is responded to. Indeed, our findings from Study 5 also indicated 
that the way in which DTA exerts itself might be specific to the way in which it was 
increased. Future research should explore how other death reminders may produce 
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differential reactions, because this can help us understand how various natural forms 
of MS shape behaviours in different ways. 
 More generally, our findings coalesce with other TMT research that suggest 
that MS can promote peaceful, positive outcomes as well as increased hostility and 
prejudice (see Jonas & Fritsche, 2013; Niesta et al., 2008), and that these reactions 
after MS are contingent upon the salient or accessible information (e.g., Gailliot et al., 
2008; Greenberg et al., 1992). This is because by living up to the standards of one’s 
worldview, individuals can feel that a valued symbolic aspect of oneself may live on 
beyond the physical annihilation of the self. If alleviating existential concerns is a core 
motive behind human behaviour, then possible interventions for reducing prejudice 
might be most effective if they attempt to buffer from these concerns. Thus, perhaps 
one strategy for promoting positive intergroup relations might be to focus on the 
generational continuity of prosocial values. Recent research exploring value 
transmission between parent and child has found that this is stronger amongst self-
transcendent (e.g., helping, caring) than self-enhancement (e.g., power, achievement) 
values (Doering, Makarova, Herzog, & Bardi, 2017). If a core motive driving human 
behaviour is to feel an aspect of oneself as enduring, then perhaps promoting the 
knowledge of certain values as more enduring might be an effective way of promoting 
certain prosocial behaviours. Of course, as the current thesis has shown, there is a 
pressing need to ensure that the other group is viewed not to be threatening this value; 
otherwise prosocial values can have destructive outcomes for intergroup relations. 
Future research could test whether interventions that target both ingroup and outgroup 
perceptions are most effective at prejudice reduction. 
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Limitations of the present research 
As with all research in Psychology, the present research conducted in the thesis is not 
without limitations. Firstly, much of the conducted research in this thesis suffers from 
a lack of statistical power. This makes certain effects harder to detect and may account 
for several marginal effects reported in the present thesis; it also increases the chance 
of making a type II error (Cohen, 1992). Moreover, the number of analyses conducted 
in this thesis, and comparisons made, also increases the chance of making a type I 
error (Gelman & Loken, 2013). Secondly, and related to the first issue, the present 
thesis does not include a replication of the findings. This is especially important, given 
the reliability crisis that is currently ongoing in Psychology. It would be worthwhile 
to conduct further research that aims to repeat some of the findings in the present 
research, not only to demonstrate their reliability, but also to provide further support 
for some of the conclusions that have been drawn in the thesis. For example, some of 
the conclusions of the experimental research conducted in the thesis could have been 
strengthened by inclusion of additional measures and manipulation checks. 
  The present thesis is also limited to how the IRM can be used to explain 
Islamophobic prejudice in the UK, so it would be worthwhile exploring the extent to 
which this approach can apply to other prejudices and intergroup contexts. As we 
outlined in the literature review chapter, the IRM attempts to offer a general model of 
prejudice, but the precise relationships between intergroup and motive threat may be 
specific to the intergroup context and dependent upon dominant social media 
representations of the ingroup vis-à-vis the outgroup. Researchers therefore need to 
pay close attention to media representations in understanding and formulating 
predictions of the precise relationships between intergroup threats and identity 
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motives. We would suggest that the approach might particularly be applicable to 
settings where there is a lot of negative media coverage of the outgroups of interest 
(Cinnirella, 2014). For example, we suspect that the IRM may extend to understanding 
anti-EU or anti-immigration attitudes in Britain, as well explaining reactions towards 
Muslims in a range of Western countries. It might also be germane to understanding 
conflicts that particularly centre on ‘eternal’ groups that might constitute special 
identities due to their anxiety-buffering properties. 
 In addition, whilst the IRM places strong emphasis on media representations, 
the current thesis did not particularly explore the role of media representations on 
threat perception. Whilst there is considerable research to support the idea of media 
representations being important in individual attitudes (e.g., McCombs & Shaw, 
1972), for practical reasons of limiting the scope of this thesis we did not choose to 
pursue this as an avenue of interest. Nonetheless, this is an aspect of the IRM that 
should be investigated further. It is possible that this could be tested experimentally, 
for example by exposing participants to different media articles that emphasise 
different identity motives being threatened to see whether the relationships between 
intergroup threats and motive threats change. However, we suspect that a qualitative 
approach exploring reactions of British nationals to media news content about 
Muslims might be more richly informative about the relationships between these types 
of threats.   
 Finally, we believe it is worthwhile to focus on some potential issues the IRM 
might have with parsimony and falsifiability. An ongoing challenge for Psychologists 
is to continue expanding knowledge of human behaviour but at the same time retain 
parsimony in the concepts that are used to explain such behaviour. To that end, a 
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criticism that could be levied at the IRM is that a multi-theoretical approach that 
proposes multiple motives and various levels of analysis lacks parsimony in its 
explanation of prejudice. This might be a worthwhile criticism given that our findings 
did show that there was considerable shared variance between the motive threats. 
Moreover, the lack of multi-item scales to measure these threats meant that it was not 
possible to conduct analyses that could more accurately model the unique contribution 
of each threat type, or their legitimacy as separate types of threat. 
 Whilst it might not have been all that surprising to find considerable shared 
variance between the motive threats, given that our rationale around intergroup threats 
is that they can be broken down into constituent elements of motive threats, an 
interesting question concerning parsimony is whether all six motives are needed to 
explain intergroup threat and prejudice. Whilst prior research has identified these six 
motives as independently contributing towards identity formation (Vignoles et al., 
2006), there is a possibility that some motives might be more important than others in 
explaining prejudice. For example, unlike IPT, some other theories covered in the 
present thesis place certain motives, such as self-esteem, as superordinate (e.g., 
Greenberg et al., 1986; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Therefore, threats to these other 
motives may simply represent nuanced threats to self-esteem for example. 
Nonetheless, as we have mentioned, one possible benefit to this perspective might be 
the understanding of individual differences in the way threat types are concretised, and 
responded to, dependent on the emphasis of identity motives within personal identity 
structures (e.g., Vignoles et al., 2002; Vignoles & Moncaster, 2007).  
 Finally, it could be argued that as the IRM does not propose generic 
relationships between identity motives and intergroup threats, instead suggesting they 
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are dependent on media representations, this might make the approach somewhat 
unfalsifiable. Discrepant findings between researchers could easily be positioned as 
reflective of subtle differences in media representations or intergroup settings, with 
little accompanying rationale provided, and the approach might make a-priori 
predictions about the relationships between intergroup threats and motive threats 
rather difficult. This might particularly be an issue because of the IPT component of 
the IRM, as IPT has been criticised for some of its theorising being unfalsifiable and 
difficult to test (see Vignoles, 2014). In contrast, TMT is a parsimonious framework, 
with a strong history of producing empirically testable hypotheses (Pyszczynski et al., 
1997; see also Pyszczynski et al., 2015 for more on this point). Therefore, the choice 
to place TMT front and centre of the IRM may not just be a theoretically beneficial 
one, but a pragmatic one too. However, additional exploration into how the IRM could 
be refined further is required. 
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Appendices 
Table 1: Factor loadings of the essentialist beliefs in Study 2 for categories Britain 
and Muslims. 
 Britain Muslims 
 1 2 1 2 
Discreteness .09 .63 .11 .61 
Naturalness .03 .70 .11 .16 
Immutability -.12 .64 .24 .70 
Stability .07 .63 .01 .72 
Necessity .64 -.04 .60 .17 
Uniformity .78 .01 .64 .41 
Informativeness .67 .11 .69 -.03 
Inherence .53 .09 .74 .06 
Exclusivity .56 -.06 .50 .43 
Variance (%) 23.09 19.11 23.47 20.00 
     
Table 2: Standardised effect sizes (ES) and 95% confidence levels for the 
bootstrapping analyses of mediation effects in Study 2 
Dependent variable Predictors ES 95%Cl 
Esteem threat  British Identity (BI) .14* .075 - .204 
 British Natural Kind 
(BNK) 
.06 -.011 - .124 
 British Entitativity (BE) .09* .033 - .152 
 Muslim Natural Kind 
(MNK) 
.05 -.006 - .105 
 Muslim Entitativity (ME) .13* .063 - .188 
 BI x BE .07* .001 - .140 
 MNK x ME .08* .017 - 142 
 MNK x BE .09* .024 - .161 
    
Efficacy threat  BI .19* .096 - .271 
 BNK .09* .001 - .183 
 BE .12* .055 - .211 
 MNK .08* .003 - .156 
 ME .17* .083 - .259 
 BI x BE .11* .010 - .204 
 MNK x ME .11* .031 - .196 
 MNK x BE .08* .021 - .203 
    
Continuity threat BI .19* .101 - .273 
 BNK .09 -.003 - .172 
 BE .11* .045 - .196 
 MNK .06 -.019 - .130 
 ME .18* .095 - .259 
 BI x BE .09 .000 - .181 
 MNK x ME .11* .033 - .191 
 MNK x BE* .11* .032 - .206 
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Distinctiveness threat BI .19* .102 - .269 
 BNK .08 -.012 - .164 
 BE .11* .042 - .195 
 MNK .06 -.010 - .132 
 ME .17* .086 - .249 
 BI x BE .09* .002 - .185 
 MNK x ME .10*  .025 - .184 
 MNK x BE .12* .036 - .206 
    
Belonging threat BI .18* .095 - .252 
 BNK .09 .000 - .167 
 BE .11* .044 - .186 
 MNK .06 -.011 - .129 
 ME .17* .090 - .247 
 BI x BE .09* .009 - .183 
 MNK x ME .11* .031 - .182 
 MNK x BE .11* .026 - .192 
    
Meaning threat BI .19* .099 - .278 
 BNK .09 -.002 - .178 
 BE .12* .049 - .210 
 MNK .08* .001 - .150 
 ME .18* .087 - .259 
 BI x BE .10* .009 - .201 
 MNK x ME .11* .030- .195 
 MNK x BE .12* .023 - .206 
    
Prejudice towards Muslims BI .14* .073 - .195 
 BNK .08* .011 - .145 
 BE .09* .032 - .149 
 ME .14* .074 - .203 
 BI x BE .07* .006 - .136 
 MNK x ME .09* .034 - .157 
 MNK x BE .09* .019 - .156 
 Economic threat .08* .025 - .126 
 Symbolic threat .23* .149 - .313 
 Terrorism .12* .065 - .194 
*significant mediation has occurred because confidence level does not include zero 
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Table 3: Factor loadings of the British essentialism items in Study 5. 
 Natural Kinds Entitativity 
Discreteness .71 
.76 
.83 
.79 
-.07 
.07 
.00 
.19 
.00 
27.06 
.15 
-.04 
.04 
-.03 
.52 
.80 
.68 
.70 
.50 
23.66 
Naturalness 
Immutability 
Stability 
Necessity 
Uniformity 
Informativeness 
Inherence 
Exclusivity 
Variance (%) 
     
Table 4: Factor loadings of the Muslim essentialist beliefs and contact intention items 
in Study 6. F1 represents the contact factor, F2 represents the entitativity factor, and 
F3 was the factor that was dropped from the final analysis 
 F1 F2 F3 
Muslim neighbours .92 -.04 -.20 
Muslim friends .93 .10 .02 
Muslim co-workers .93 .01 .08 
Meet more Muslims .91 -.03 -.13 
Date Muslims .79 -.01 -.23 
Uniformity .02 .84 -.01 
Informativeness .12 .57 -.43 
Exclusivity -.22 .72 -.13 
Inherence .10 .80 -.13 
Necessity -.01 .72 .22 
Immutability .08 .71 .40 
Immutability (R) -.23 .04 .86 
Variance (%) 34.58 26.93 10.77 
 
Table 5: Factor loadings of the Muslim opposition and contact intention items in 
Study 7. 
 Contact intentions Opposition rights 
Islamic schools .17 
.35 
.49 
.07 
.17 
.86 
.90 
.91 
.84 
.62 
38.91 
.72 
.74 
.47 
.81 
.77 
.26 
.14 
.13 
.18 
.42 
28.51 
Islamic TV 
Muslim Headscarf 
Listen to Muslims 
Discrimination Laws 
Muslim neighbours 
Muslim friends 
Muslim co-workers 
Meet more Muslims 
Date Muslims 
Variance (%) 
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Attachment A 
Experimental manipulations used in Study 4. Distinctiveness and belonging threats 
were taken from Pickett et al. (2002), whilst continuity (McGregor et al., 2001; 
Shepherd et al., 2011) and efficacy (Whiston & Galinsky, 2008; Shepherd et al., 2011) 
were slightly adapted to match the wordings of these manipulations.  
Belonging threat 
Please take a moment and think of times when you felt very different from people. In 
other words, think of times and situations where you did not feel that you fit in with 
other people around you and that you “stuck out.” Please write a brief description of 
two memories of such times. 
Distinctiveness threat 
Please take a moment and think of times when you felt overly similar to other people. 
In other words, think of times and situations where you felt that you were so much like 
other people around you that you did not have your own identity. Please write a brief 
description of two memories of such times. 
Efficacy threat 
Please take a moment and think of times when something happened that you did not 
feel competent and/or have any control over the situation. In other words, think of 
times in which you felt a complete lack of control or competency over what happened. 
Please write a brief description of two memories of such times. 
 
Continuity threat 
Please take a moment and think of how things currently are different from your past, 
and how things currently will be different in your future. In other words, think about 
times that show how unconnected your past, present and future are. Please write a 
brief description of two such instances. 
 
Control group 
Please take a moment and think of times when you were watching television and how 
you felt when watching television. In other words, think specifically about the emotions 
you felt when watching television and your experience of watching television. Please 
write a brief description of two such instances. 
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Attachment B 
Experimental article of a symbolic threat to worldview used in Study 5. 
BRITISH MUSLIMS: ISLAMIC VALUES SHOULD BE 
TAUGHT IN OUR SCHOOLS! 
‘Islamic-British’ rule should reign supreme in schools 
 
 
As more Muslims enter Britain, swelling densely populated cities to the brink of 
crisis, concerns loom over how our schools should be run. 
 
Islam is now the second leading religion in Britain according to recent census data, 
and with the Muslim population growing faster than the overall population, census 
predictions cause fear that by 2050 Islam will dominate Britain. 
 
There are currently over 140 Islamic Faith Schools in Britain, but with the Muslim 
population set to unsustainably outnumber these schools, British Muslims are now 
demanding that British schools implement a more ‘representative’ school curriculum 
that includes teaching Islamic history and values. 
 
Under the new regime, all schools will provide a MUSLIM ONLY prayer room, 
whilst traditional nativity plays at Christmas will no longer occur because of the 
offensiveness to Muslims. Whilst school uniforms will still remain compulsory, 
Muslims may opt out on wearing them on religious grounds. 
 
The core curriculum will be restructured to promote Islamic beliefs and values. 
Children will learn more about Islam in Religious Education, and History lessons 
will also place importance on Islamic history.   
 
The fight to bring Islamic teaching to all British Schools is being driven by the 
Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). The MCB has been the voice for British Muslims 
since its formation in 1994 and currently has over 500 affiliated organisations, 
mosques and charities. It continues to contest British social, educational and legal 
policy that infringes upon Muslim beliefs. A recent survey suggested that 72% of 
British Muslims supported the MCB’s challenges to these policies. 
 
But as Britain succumbs to the rising Muslim population, this fight to win schools 
and children may potentially turn into a larger and more explosive issue. A recent 
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protest (pictured right) saw dozens of Muslims take to the streets of London to 
campaign against ‘British decadence’ and bring Sharia law to Britain. 
 
Promoting the introduction of Sharia law in Britain, one follower explains: “In the 
past 50 years, the United Kingdom has transformed beyond recognition. What was 
once a predominantly Christian country has now been overwhelmed by a rising 
Muslim population, which seeks to preserve its Islamic identity and protect itself 
from the satanic values of the Britain. Those who have been affected by the British 
way of life need to be rehabilitated”. 
Under the brutal rules of Sharia law, many of British traditions and customs would 
be outlawed, and the so called “man-made laws” would be disregarded in favour of 
divine laws. 
 
Whilst members of the House of Lords highlighted the dangers of Sharia law’s 
‘tightening grip on our society’, rumblings from inside the government cabinet may 
suggest that some of the MCB policies may not be entirely opposed. A source close 
to Parliament said that the Secretary of State for Education, The Rt Hon Nicky 
Morgan MP, was “ready to listen about how Islamic-British teaching may be 
implemented”.  
 
Whilst there may be cause for concern over the government’s wavering stance on 
this issue, there is little doubt that any change to British policy would likely be met 
with opposition from British electorate. According to the British Social Attitudes 
(BSA) survey, in 2004, 48 per cent of Britons worried that an increase in the Muslim 
population would weaken Britain’s national identity. By 2014, that had risen to 62 
per cent.  
 
A former councillor of Newham shared these public concerns of a rise of pro-Sharia 
campaigners saying that “this is the public tip of a hidden iceberg. I would like to 
think that the campaign is orchestrated by extremists, and is only supported by a 
small group of their followers; but I fear that it is not the case.” 
 
In Waltham Forest, North London, the home to thousands of British Muslims, there 
are already signs that the issue of Sharia law may be here to stay. 20,000 leaflets 
have been printed by Islamic activists that state “You are now entering a Sharia 
controlled zone. Islamic rules enforced”. The great irony will undoubtedly be lost on 
those handing out the leaflets, as if Sharia law ever came to Britain, such public 
demonstrations would almost certainly be prohibited. 
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Attachment C 
Control article used in Study 5 
NEVER FEAR: THE GREAT BRITISH SUMMER IS 
FINALLY HERE! 
Britons to enjoy extended sunny spell 
 
 
  
Drenched Britons will finally be able to bid farewell to the grey skies and torrential 
downpours which have caused fears of a summer wash out as a tropical blast is set to 
bring sunshine and smiles back to the British shores. 
 
Whilst many Britons will be disappointed by the early Summer weather so far, 
forecasters are predicting a blistering “heat surge” from the Continent at the start of 
next month that will likely send Britons flocking to the sandy beaches to finally 
enjoy the hot summer weather. 
 
The latest long range forecasting models indicate scorching temperatures for much 
of July and August, with the mercury likely to approach a sizzling 32C (90F) before 
the end of the summer. 
 
James Madden forecaster for Exacta Weather, said summer will soon kick off as 
high pressure builds over the Azores Islands. He said a dramatic surge in 
temperatures will bring the first lengthy hot spell of the summer with three weeks of 
sunshine and blue skies ahead. 
 
He said: “From the start of early July we will see high pressure building in across the 
country to bring dry weather and prolonged periods of sunshine for many.” 
 
“As this scenario develops thanks to high pressure from the Azores, we are likely to 
experience our first prolonged and widespread spell of warm weather across the 
country, and just in time for the start of the meteorological summer. 
 
“There is now a high chance and growing model consensus that we could have at 
least a two to three-week spell of warm weather from this developing scenario, and 
with temperatures ranging in the mid to high 20s for many parts of the country.” 
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Experts are then suggesting that by August temperatures are expected to reach highs 
of 28C, possibly rising beyond 30C in certain parts of the South and South East of 
England. 
  
However, Britons have been warned not to crack out the sun cream and head for the 
beach just yet though, with forecasters warning the next few days are still expected 
to be a little on the chilly side. 
 
A cool breeze from the North could see the mercury dip to below the recorded 
average for the month even in parts of the south on Wednesday night although things 
will warm up by the weekend. 
 
A Met Office spokesman said: "High pressure will bring plenty of dry and fine 
weather for most through Sunday, Monday and Tuesday with variable cloud 
amounts and sunny spells, but with cold nights bringing patchy frost. 
 
"A band of cloud and rain on Sunday will make limited southward progress before 
gradually dying out, showers will follow into northern parts. 
 
“High pressure should retain a good deal of influence across the UK with plenty of 
dry, and at times sunny weather. 
 
"Amounts of rainfall should generally be below average for many places too." 
  
The news of summer finally arriving should please those who want to enjoy one of 
the Great British past-times: the summer barbecue. B&Q, Homebase, Tesco and 
other leading UK supermarkets have all reported lower than average sales growth of 
barbecues and outdoor furniture. 
  
"There is definitely barbecue potential there for the next couple of weeks” said a Met 
Office Spokesman. "After all the rain and then the sunshine the gardens may see 
some growth so it probably will be mow first and barbecue later." 
 
Other high street retailers are also expecting a rebound in sales after a slow start to 
the summer with shoppers predicted to stock up on summer clothes. 
 
“Clothing is expected to make a comeback this month after suffering a slow start in 
May. This appears to be due to consumers waiting for just the right moment before 
embarking on their pre-summer spending,” said British Retail Consortium’s chief 
executive, Helen Dickinson. 
 
“The promise of good weather to come is going to encourage consumers to spend 
more on fashionable summer wear for the beach and outdoors”. 
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Attachment D 
Sentence unscrambling task that was used as the MS manipulation in Study 6. 
Participants either unscramble the 7 death-related sentences or the 7 pain-related 
sentences. All participants saw the 13 neutral sentences. Order of presentation was 
randomised across all participants. 
MS manipulation 
The following tasks assesses individual differences in pattern recognition. The 
following words can be used to create a grammatically correct sentence. Please place 
the words in the correct order to form a sentence. This task is being timed. Please 
continue once you have completed all the sentences. If you cannot think of a sentence 
from the words provided then feel free to leave the answer blank. 
1. He dreamed that he died last night 
2. They lowered the coffin into the ground 
3. She placed flowers on the grave 
4. The funeral was a gloomy event 
5. The corpse laid cold on the slab 
6. The pedestrian was killed immediately  
7. The cemetery gave him the chills 
 
1. The toothache kept getting worse 
2. He injured his shoulder playing tennis 
3. She hurt her ankle as she fell 
4. He burnt himself doing the cooking 
5. Going to the gym had left him in pain 
6. His mum put a plaster on the wound 
7. Playing football left him covered in bruises 
 
1. She placed the items in the basket 
2. He picked flowers from the garden 
3. He put the letter in the mailbox 
4. They watched television all night 
5. She took a bath to relax 
6. She made a note in her diary 
7. He washed the car at the weekend 
8. They went to watch a film at the cinema 
9. She gave the money to the cashier 
10. He played the piano flawlessly 
11. She prepared for her next lesson 
12. He rehearsed his lines all night 
13. Normally he arrived on time 
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Attachment E 
Control condition passage in Study seven.  
“The electric light, an everyday convenience to modern lives, was not “invented” in 
the traditional sense in 1879 by Thomas Alva Edison, although he could be said to 
have created the first commercially practical incandescent light. He was neither the 
first nor the only person trying to invent an incandescent light bulb. In fact, some 
historians claim there were over 20 inventors of incandescent lamps prior to Edison’s 
version. However, Edison is often credited with the invention because his version was 
able to outstrip the earlier versions because of a combination of three factors: an 
effective incandescent material, a higher vacuum than others were able to achieve and 
a high resistance that made power distribution from a centralized source economically 
viable.” 
Please describe in a maximum of three sentences why the lightbulb is one of the 
most important historical inventions. 
 
 
 
 
Attachment F 
Videos used in Study seven that formed the MS/TS manipulation 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sL1IJ-17H08-  
Diana death news clip 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gwyqT7rcCYk  
7/7 news clip 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2PYyEDl1bJk  
Andy Murray wins Wimbledon 
 
